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vEXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The present thesis consists of three essays on the economic and cultural integration of
migrants in Switzerland, reverse causation between these two dimensions of the integra-
tion process, and the role of host society culture. Whereas each dimension is usually
examined separately, this study proposes a systemic approach to investigate both the
economic and cultural dimensions of migrant integration, their interaction as well as the
influence of the broader social context.
The introduction starts from the political controversy about migration and in-
tegration issues, which is currently unfolding in many European countries, and highlights
its relevance for broader societal and political debates. After defining the concept of mi-
grant integration, it outlines the research questions that are explored in detail in the
dissertation. The introduction also provides a review of immigration history and policy
in Switzerland as well as some critical comments about limitations to this research.
Chapter 1 includes the first essay of the dissertation: “The Cultural Integration
of Migrants in Switzerland: The Evolution of Behaviours and Attitudes from the First
to the Second Generation”. This essay was part of a project of the Center for Economic
Research and its Applications (CEPREMAP) on the cultural integration of migrants in
Europe published at Oxford University Press. It explores the cultural integration paths
of eight migrant groups by tracing the evolution of selected behaviours and attitudes,
which are taken as indicative of cultural integration. In order to deepen the analysis
beyond changes across generations, this evolution is further examined across cohorts
(older vs. younger migrants) and across types of couples (individuals in endogamous
vi
vs. mixed couples). To what extent are behaviours and attitudes of migrants diverging
from or converging with those of natives? The findings of chapter 1 show that cultural
integration is at work across all migrant groups, although at different paces. They also
confirm the intuition that attitudes may change faster than actual behaviors, notably
in relation to gender issues, and that certain migrant groups tend to preserve more
traditional household structures than natives, especially those with low intermarriage
rates.
Chapter 2 is entitled “Employment Discrimination, Cultural Distance, and the
Swiss Minaret: Assessing Opposed Discourses Explaining Migrant Integration in Socio-
Economic vs. Ethno-Cultural Terms”. It examines the causes of integration failures
or, more precisely, how economic and cultural barriers to integration reinforce each
other. Are cultural differences preventing the successful integration of migrants or does
the root of integration failures lie in unequal economic opportunities and discrimination?
Developing an empirical method to build indices of economic discrimination and cultural
differences (“cultural distance”), the findings of chapter 2 show that, at the aggregate
level, population groups facing higher employment discrimination are culturally more
distant from the natives. Muslim communities, which currently often lie at the center of
this debate, are no different in this regard: their specificity resides more in the stronger
discrimination they face in the labour market than in cultural differences separating them
from natives. Using an instrumental variable approach, evidence at the individual level
reveals that there is an asymmetric causal relationship between economic discrimination
and “cultural distance”, the former clearly dominating the latter. It also shows that the
vii
asymmetry is at least twice as acute for second-generation compared to first-generation
migrants.
Chapter 3, “The Effect of Host Society Culture on Migrant Wage Discrimina-
tion: Approaching the Roestigraben”, investigates whether migrant wage discrimination
is more intense in host societies where the culture is more “inward-looking”. Do the
markedly more conservative political preferences on issues related to migration and asy-
lum of voters in the German-speaking region of Switzerland affect outcomes in the labour
market, or are economic interactions immune from tensions developing in the society at
large? Using a human capital model of wage determination, results show that returns to
factors of wage-earning migrants are lower compared to natives in Switzerland, but more
so in the German region. An analysis of unexplained wage differentials also supports the
hypothesis that wage discrimination is more pronounced in the German region. Finally,
results of the regression discontinuity design approach confirm that host society culture
is a significant determinant of migrant wage discrimination.
The conclusion summarizes the main results and contributions of this thesis
to the existing literature. It also stresses the importance of developing interdisciplinary
approaches, which are able to account for interactions between the multiple dimensions of
migrant integration and the influence of the broader social context. Finally, it proposes
ideas for future research.
ghost
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Introduction
Ivan S. is an anonymous character. Description: white man, unfriendly, even
threatening. Actually he is a migrant, probably from Eastern Europe. How many
of them? There is only one certainty: they are rapists, and they are on the verge of
obtaining Swiss citizenship! Who wants to invite rapists to their home? On 28 November
2010, 52.9% of population voted to expel Ivan S. and his accomplices from Switzerland.
Figure 0.1: An anonymous migrant (as imagined by the Swiss People’s Party)
The appeal of the populist right wing discourse relies on a simple logic ex-
plaining the integration of migrants in purely cultural terms: because their culture is
different (if not inferior), migrants are simply different. As a tautological consequence,
they cannot and should not be integrated. Discourses of moderate political parties
2usually emphasize economic considerations like the need to proceed to a cost-benefit
analysis of migration or the merits of selective migration to pick out the most educated
and productive migrants. The liberal analysis1 thematizing economic discrimination as
an obstacle to migrant integration is left to academia and external observers like the
International Labour Organization, which don’t need the support of the majority. Even
without evoking this taboo, moderate political discourses experience declining support
among voters in many developed countries, especially in Europe. The rise of the Na-
tional Front in France, the Party for Freedom in Austria and in the Netherlands, the
Anti-Islam Party in Germany illustrate the far-reaching nature of this trend.
The purpose of this thesis is not to comment on the ads of populist parties or
on any political discourse about migration in particular. This thesis, however, is part
of a public debate on migration and integration that is increasingly dominated by the
imagery and discourse of the populist right wing.
This debate is especially tense in Switzerland, where the share of foreigners in
the population is around 23% and where the Swiss People’s Party has become a major
political force (D’Amato, 2008). The aggressive tone of the political debate about mi-
gration and integration2 is clearly problematic for social cohesion between natives and
migrants, but it is also problematic for social cohesion among natives themselves (i.e.,
1”Liberal” is meant in the sense of supporting political, social and religious change, not in the economic
sense.
2See figures 0.3 to 0.6 in appendix. Those political ads from the Swiss People’s Party are emblematic
of the emotional and agressive way right wing populist parties thematize migration and integration
issues. The fearmongering rhetoric and imagery are common to most European right wing populist
parties, which sometimes even share campaign ads across borders (e.g., following the successful popular
initiative to ban the construction of minarets in Switzerland, the add conceived by the Swiss People’s
Party (see figure 0.5) has been used in other countries).
3between richer and poorer social classes) because it affects the willingness of the popula-
tion to pay taxes to support social programmes and the provision of public goods by the
welfare state in general (Alesina et al., 1999; Shayo, 2009). Developing a better under-
standing of the dynamics at work in the integration process of migrants may therefore
shed some light on broader societal and political issues.
A definition of integration and three related research ques-
tions
To enable informed policy decisions, social scientists are investigating integra-
tion processes. The literature proposes several definitions of migrant integration that
could serve as a starting point to articulate research questions on that issue. A definition
that is often used in the Swiss context defines the integration of migrants as individual
and collective processes happening after migration occurred. Those can be classified
into three general categories, which are not mutually exclusive. Economic integration
encompasses the transition of a migrant across social classes. Legal integration covers
changes of a migrant’s status and its implications for her conditions of stay. Cultural
integration concerns the evolution of behaviors, attitudes, daily life habits, beliefs, etc.
(Wanner et al., 2002).
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the cultural and economic integration
of migrants in Switzerland, in order to better understand how they influence each other
and the extent to which the context in which these processes occur matters. Whereas
4the first chapter focuses on the cultural integration of migrants from the first generation
to the second, chapters 2 and 3 look at how the cultural differences between migrants
and natives (“cultural distance”) are influenced by economic discrimination (and vice
versa) and whether host society culture has an effect on economic discrimination.3
These issues are highly complex and would ideally require an interdisciplinary
approach, including face to face interviews with migrants as is done in other social
sciences. However, as part of the debate touches upon their traditional field of study,
economists should be able to provide new insight if they exercise the necessary caution in
extending their quantitative approach to the study of cultural integration. This includes
accepting the fact that the modeling of complex processes such as economic or cultural
integration and attempting to measure them requires an ongoing debate and special care
from the person interpreting the results.
The remainder of this section briefly presents what is at stake in each chapter
of this thesis and how these issues relate to one other.
(i) How problematic is the cultural integration of migrants?
As mentioned above, cultural integration concerns the evolution of behaviors,
attitudes, daily life habits, beliefs, etc. (Wanner et al., 2002). Cultural integration
processes happen in migrant communities as well as among natives, but minority groups
bear the bulk of it. Many qualitative studies have documented various dimensions of
3The definition of important concepts used in this thesis (e.g., “cultural distance”, employment and
wage discrimination, host society culture) is postponed to the chapters where the empirical method
implemented to measure them is simultaneously described.
5the cultural integration patterns of specific communities residing in Switzerland (Wicker
et al., 2003) and generated a rather encouraging knowledge base. However, despite the
evidence gathered and analysis produced by social scientists, the claim that migrants
(or certain migrant groups) don’t integrate culturally into Swiss society has easily made
its way into public debate and is being accepted by many as well founded.
This claim is appealing to many voters for several reasons. First of all, the
sucessful cultural integration of migrants in general doesn’t preclude individual or group
variations. It also doesn’t preclude individual integration failures. However, as most
individuals don’t interact with such migrants, what matters most is the importance given
to them in the public discourse. While it is a challenging task to monitor how news media
are covering issues related to migration and integration,4 the political exploitation of such
issues and the role of right wing populist political parties in fostering the perception
that there is a dramatic cultural integration problem (for certain population groups) in
Switzerland is public knowledge.5
4Several studies have documented the predominantly negative media coverage granted to Muslim
migrants in particular, as well as the use of cliche´s lumping together Muslims, terrorism, fundamentalism,
etc. (Ettinger, 2010; Gianni, 2010). It might be possible to examine the existence of a media bias against
migrants in general, but this would be a demanding task.
5The main political source of anti-migrant feelings in Switzerland is the Swiss People’s Party as is
illustrated by the series of referenda it has successfully launched asking for harsher laws ruling the status
of migrants and asylum seekers (in 1999, 2002, 2004, 2006 and again 2008) and for a constitutional ban
of minaret construction (in 2009). This right wing populist party is also the main beneficiary of the
instrumentalization of these feelings as is illustrated by the growing share of representatives of the Swiss
People’s Party in the federal Parliament (11,1% in 1991; 22,5 % in 1999; 29% in 2007).
A second and indirect source of anti-migrant feelings is the conservative majority. Although it has been
the first victim of the rise of a strong right wing populist party, the conservative majority has contributed
to legitimizing the arguments of the Swiss People’s Party. While the moderate conservative discourse
traditionally emphasizes economic considerations including the need to proceed to a cost-benefit analysis
of migration or the merits of selective migration (as opposed to the threat migration represents to the
native culture), it has been converging and blending with the populist right wing discourse in support
of more stringent migration and asylum rules. An example of their political complementarity is the
adoption by the Swiss administration of the concept of “cultural distance” in the formulation of the
three “circles” policy during the 1990s. This policy aiming at restricting certain types of migration by
6In this context where the analysis of social scientists and the public discourse
often diverge, the first chapter of this thesis contributes to the ongoing debate by specif-
ically exploring the cultural integration paths of eight migrant groups from the first to
the second generation. It traces the evolution of selected behaviors and attitudes, which
are taken as indicative of cultural integration. Different perspectives are proposed to
deepen the analysis of these evolutions. First, differences across cohorts are used to
investigate change and continuity over time (Georgiadis and Manning, 2011) and see if
younger migrants depart from behaviors and attitudes of the first generation more than
older migrants do. Second, to explore the role of intermarriage as a factor (and not only
an outcome) of integration (Waldis, 2008), differences across individuals in endogamous
and mixed couples are examined. Looking at integration patterns, the objective of the
first chapter is to highlight convergences and remaining differences across a series of
indicators.
(ii) Are the causes of migrant integration failures primarily cultural or
economic?
The second chapter of this thesis proposes to look at the causes of integration
failures or, more precisely, at how cultural and economic barriers to integration reinforce
each other. In the contemporary political arena where perception is key, various dis-
courses are competing to explain integration issues in ethno-cultural vs. socio-economic
granting foreigners different rights to migrate to Switzerland according to their origin was inspired by
the Arbenz report, which stated that migrants from some countries “don’t belong to the same culture
marked by European ideas in the broad sense” and that, as a consequence, “they cannot be integrated”
(CFR, 1996).
7terms. As mentioned above, in recent years the populist right wing narrative, which ar-
gues that “cultural distance” prevents the successful integration of migrants, has gained
ground against the other narratives, including the liberal analysis, which considers that
the root of integration failures lies in unequal economic opportunities and discrimination.
Chapter 2 assesses the relevance of these opposed narratives6 by investigating
the endogenous relationship between economic discrimination and “cultural distance”.
Both factors certainly reinforce each other negatively, hindering the integration of mi-
grants in the host society, but is there a way to determine which of the two narratives is
more relevant in the Swiss context? How legitimate are claims arguing that migrants are
economically discriminated against because they don’t integrate culturally compared to
claims that migrants don’t integrate because they are discriminated against? A series
of articles inspired by Battu et al. (2003) found evidence of the former without exam-
ining the latter. The contribution of the second chapter is to examine both sides of the
argument at once. Given the current strong focus on Muslim migrants in the integra-
tion debate in Switzerland and other Western countries, the situation of this minority is
looked at more closely.
6Moderate discourses would emphasize purely economic factors, especially differences in human capi-
tal endowments between migrants and natives, to explain integration failures. This point of view is dealt
with in chapter 2 and 3, when examining human capital factors and returns to human capital factors
in the analysis of employment and wage, which is an intermediary step required to estimate economic
discrimination.
8(iii) Speaking of culture, what about host societies?
Finally, looking at the integration of migrants in its full context, the focus shifts
from the migrants to the natives. If culture does affect economic outcomes, then how
does the culture of the host society influence the way migrants fare in the economy?
The third chapter investigates whether host society cultures do affect migrant
wage discrimination in Switzerland, i.e., if migrant wage discrimination is more intense
in the region where host society culture is most “inward-looking”. Cultural differences
between the German and Latin region of Switzerland are supposedly so important that
there is a special word for it: the “Roestigraben.”7 While the “Roestigraben” lumps
together cultural traits that are largely imaginary, some of them are reflected in the
political preferences of Swiss voters. On issues concerning migration, asylum and nat-
uralization, preferences of voters are markedly more conservative in the German region
than in the rest of the country.8 Is such a difference likely to affect migrant wage dis-
crimination?
This research question, together with the one investigated in chapter 2, is im-
portant to improve the understanding of the conditions under which migrant integration
7 The “Roestigraben” is a term describing the dividing line between the German-speaking and the
French-speaking regions of Switzerland with their respective cultural differences. This term (referring to
the way to prepare potatoes in the German regions of Switzerland, Ro¨sti) has become a metaphor for the
general cultural divide within the country. The cliche´ is that German-Swiss are hard working, historically
used to Spartan living conditions, being proud of their independence and deriving their identity from
the founding myth of the Swiss federation. In contrast, Latin-Swiss are bon-vivants enjoying the fruits
of their temperate climate and, being a minority in their own country, are much more outward-oriented
(towards France and Italy, and the EU as a whole). See Bru¨gger et al. (2009) and Bu¨chi (2003).
8Christophe Bu¨chi recently pointed out that differences in political preferences between regions in
Switzerland are most intense on issues of social and migration policy. See Neue Zu¨rcher Zeitung, “Wie
tief ist der Roestigraben eigentlich? Vor allem SVP-Themen und die Sozialpolitik trennen Romands und
Deutschschweizer,” 8 January 2011.
9can be successful. Indeed, if the cultural integration of migrants is considered to be
problematic, it is especially important to understand what factors are influencing it and
the context in which it is occuring. This systemic approach leads to the formulation
of questions that have no simple answers. Hopefully, the investigation of these three
research questions will provide further input for thought on nascent integration policies.
In order to better frame the questions investigated in this thesis, this introduc-
tion further proposes a short historical review of immigration and integration policies
in Switzerland. Since the end of the nineteenth century when Switzerland turned from
being an emigration country to being an immigration country, there have been many
difficult episodes in the relationship between Switzerland and its migrants. As history
sometimes stutters, it is worth putting the current debate on migration and integration
into perspective with historical reference points.
Immigration history and policy: “Ueberfremdung” and its
shadow
For centuries, Switzerland was a country of emigration before becoming a coun-
try of immigration. In 1850, migrants were almost non-existent in Switzerland, except
for the Huguenots (Henry et al., 1995). The construction of infrastructure necessary for
the unfolding industrial revolution created an excess demand for manpower. At that
time, foreigners were welcome and perceived as indispensable. The Swiss government
signed recruitment agreements with neighboring countries, granting migrants the same
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Figure 0.2: Migrant population and right wing populist parties in Switzerland (1850-
2011)
rights as nationals. Two years of residence were sufficient to acquire Swiss citizenship.
This policy was in line with the belief that naturalization was the most suitable way to
assimilate migrants (Wicker, 2003). Figure 0.2 shows that the share of foreigners living
in Switzerland progressively rose and reached 15% in 1910, one of the highest rates in
Europe.
The outbreak of the First World War signaled the beginning of a lasting change
in the perception of migrants as a threat to Swiss culture. Conservative circles brought
into the political debate the idea of “Ueberfremdung,” the fear that Swiss identity would
be dissolved with the inflow of too many foreigners. In 1917, the Central Office for Aliens
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Police was created in order to better monitor migrant population. In 1931, the Federal
Law on the Settlement and Residence of Foreigners engraved in law the transmutation of
“migrants” into “foreigners” (Wicker, 2003). It also made residence and naturalization
more difficult. In the 1930s, a more malleable version of the “Ueberfremdung” idea, the
“Geistige Landesverteidigung”, literally the spiritual national defense, insisted on the
duty of individuals to defend typical Swiss values. With Nazi and fascist regimes at
the border, liberal circles progressively rallied conservatives around the flag to promote
“Swiss” values such as cultural diversity, democracy or technological progress. This
episode of Swiss history is important because the national “culture of threat” that de-
veloped in Switzerland and the representation of foreigners as a danger to Swiss identity
had a lasting impact on Swiss collective identity and immigration policy (Riano and
Wastl-Walter, 2006). During that period, the proportion of migrant population dropped
sharply and reached 5% on the eve of World War II.
In the second half of the 20th century, three successive waves of immigration
brought different types of migrants to Switzerland. The defensive attitude inherited from
the previous period still weighted on policy decisions. While the government attempted
to create conditions supporting the provision of cheap labour to the economy, it always
had to pay attention to underlying xenophobic feelings that could burst onto the political
scene. Like other countries, Switzerland opted for a “Gastarbeiter” system. The first
recruitment agreement was signed with Italy in 1948 and was followed by an inflow of
Italian manpower. Spaniards came soon after. Despite a quota system, immigration
kept rising. In 1970, the Schwarzenbach initiative, which proposed to expel one third of
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migrants and impose harsher quotas, was rejected by only 54% in one of the highest voter
turnouts in Swiss history. The federal government reacted by imposing more restrictive
quotas, but it was mostly the non-renewal of permits that drove out migrants. This was
also a convenient way for Switzerland to export its unemployment. During the economic
crisis of the 1970s, 67% of the 340,000 workers who lost their jobs were migrants (Mahnig
and Piguet, 2003). As the economy recovered in the 1980s, the second wave of migration
followed a different pattern. Portuguese, Yugoslav and Turkish workers, as well as
refugees from Sri-Lanka, Vietnam and the Middle East also brought their families with
them. After a decline in the 1970s, migrant population again exceeded 15% in 1990.
Pressure from European countries for the improvement of conditions for their
nationals drove Swiss authorities to reconsider their immigration policy. The idea of
creating a point system or implementing a “three circles” policy based on the concept of
“cultural distance” of migrants were debated as a means to satisfy Switzerland’s neigh-
bors without alienating xenophobic voters. In the 1990s, Switzerland started to apply a
“three circles” policy, defining an inner circle and outer circles, and creating a hierarchy
favoring individuals from EU/EFTA countries over those from the US and the rest of
the world. Through bilateral agreements, EU/EFTA citizens are granted the same living
and working rights as the Swiss (Mahnig and Piguet, 2003), while, for other countries,
immigration is restricted to highly-qualified individuals only. Beyond the pragmatism
of Swiss authorities, this political move also hints at the shift of symbolic barriers and
a change in how Swiss define foreigners and themselves (Wicker, 2003). However, this
new policy could not prevent unwanted migrants from coming to Switzerland. During
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this period, the third wave of migrants was mostly composed of refugees from former
Yugoslavia, but also from Africa, as well as highly qualified workers, mainly from neigh-
boring countries.
The 1990s also coincided with the rise of the Swiss People’s Party, which became
the strongest political party in the federal parliament. Right wing populist parties have a
long history in Switzerland, but never before had they succeeded in obtaining politically
significant electoral scores. This spectacular rise changed the Swiss political landscape.
It partly reshaped the political debate by forcing other parties to explicitly address
migration and integration as major issues. Right wing populist parties also influenced
policy-making in those areas.9
Despite different restrictive policies, the migrant population continued to rise
and the proportion of foreigners officially reached 22.9% in 2009 (OFS).10 As it became
obvious that many migrants would never return to their home countries, politicians
could no longer escape the question of migrant integration. Some cantons had started
to use their autonomy in matters of education, religious matters and the attribution
of local civic rights to deal with integration-related issues, but their practices still are
heterogeneous and resources very limited (Cataccin and Bu¨hlent, 2005). The legal basis
for a coherent federal policy was only set up in 1998 when the integration of migrants
became an item on the Swiss political agenda and the Federal Law on the Settlement and
Residence of Foreigners was once more amended to allow the government to subsidize
9D’Amato (2008) proposes a detailed analysis of the factors that favoured the rise of right wing
populist parties in Switzerland as well as of their influence in policy-making in the areas of migration
and integration.
10 www.bfs.admin.ch
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the integration of foreigners. In 2001, a budget of around 10 million Swiss francs was
accepted and has barely increased since (OFM, 2006). The previous year, an order
of the government defined the objectives of integration and the tasks of the Federal
Commission for Foreigners. The Central Office for Aliens Police was changed into the
Federal Migration Office (Wicker, 2003).
For a majority of the Swiss population, Western and Southern European mi-
grants may be considered as economic competitors, but not as a threat to the Swiss
identity. This empathy, however, does not extend to “non-European” migrants. In 2005,
a new Federal Law on Foreigners passed defining in depth the objectives and principles
of integration policy as well as the competence of the government (OFM, 2006). The
fact that a conservative government has initiated such changes during a period where
the populist right wing has risen to become the strongest political force in the federal
parliament indicates that the design of an integration strategy is politically costly but
indispensable. As in other countries, many voters are caught between the fear that the
country they know may change and the necessity to adapt to a globalizing economy and
society.
Migrant groups definition and composition
Before investigating the three research questions, it is necessary to provide
detailed information about how migrants and migrant groups are defined. As mentioned
earlier, migrants are individuals of foreign descent born abroad (first generation) or in
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Switzerland (second generation). Migrant population is divided in eight groups according
to their origin, and this categorization is kept unchanged throughout this thesis.11 The
remainder of this section presents the definition and composition of these population
groups.
Table 0.1 shows that in 2000 when the last census was conducted in Switzerland,
29% of the population was of foreign descent and more than 20% were foreigners. As
mentioned earlier, these proportions have slightly increased during the last decade. First-
generation migrants are born abroad, whereas second-generation migrants are born in
Switzerland but are of foreign origin. The proportion of second-generation compared to
first-generation migrants is a rough indicator of the length of stay of a particular group
in Switzerland.
Table 0.1: Migrants living in Switzerland in 2000 by region of origin and generation
Region of origin All 1st generation 2nd generation
Natives (%) 70.78
Immigrants (%) 29.22 20.07 9.14
Of which (%)
WE 27.34 28.12 25.65
SE 34.79 28.62 48.35
EE 21.05 24.06 14.44
AF 2.03 2.51 0.98
TMM 6.84 6.99 6.49
SA 2.82 3.44 1.47
AS 2.52 3.29 0.80
SCA 2.61 2.98 1.82
Source: Swiss census, 2000
Groups of migrants presented in table 0.1 are based on an aggregated United
11Besides the Swiss census of 2000, two other datasets are used in these three chapters: the Swiss
Household Panel (SHP) and the Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS). In all three datasets, it is possible
to group migrants into identical origin categories.
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Nations typology and correspond to broad regions of origin. Besides natives, eight groups
of migrants are formed: Western Europe and Anglo-Saxon countries (WE), Southern
Europe (SE), Eastern Europe (EE), Africa (AF), Turkey, the Middle East and Maghreb
(TMM), Latin Amercia (LA), Asia (AS) and South and Central Asia (SCA).12
The first three European groups are significantly larger than the five remaining
ones and represent 83% of the migrant population in Switzerland. The first group
gathers Western and Northern Europeans as well as Anglo-Saxons. Three quarters
are from neighboring Germany (37%), France (26%) and Austria (12%) and are not
part of any specific wave of migration. Italians dominate the Southern European group
(65%); Spaniards (19%) and Portuguese (14%) are also sizeable communities. The group
of Eastern Europeans is largely dominated by former Yugoslavia (85%), but remains
heterogeneous. Migrants from this country first came as economic migrants in the 1980s,
and then massively as refugees fleeing the civil war after 1991. The largest community
12The categories include the following countries: (1) WE: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, New Zeland,
Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States (2) SE: Andorra, Greece, Italy,
Malta, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, the Vatican (3) EE: Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia
and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine (4) AF: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kin-
shasa), Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Maurice, Mauritania, Mozambique,
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe (5) TMM: Algeria, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Georgia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco,
Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Western
Sahara, Yemen (6) LA: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Dominique, Ecuador, El Salvador, grenade,
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Lucia, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay,
Venezuela (7) AS: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, China (Taiwan), Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, Korea
(North), Korea (South), Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa,
Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Tonga, Vanuatu, Vietnam (8) SCA: Afghanistan, Bangladesh,
Bhutan, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Turk-
menistan, Uzbekistan.
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comes from former Serbia-Montenegro (48%), with half of them being Muslims from
Kosovo. Bosnia and Herzegovina (13%), Macedonia (12%) and Croatia (9%) follow in
terms of size.
Immigration from Africa (excluding Maghreb) is more recent and very diverse.
The three largest communities come from Angola (13%), Congo (10%) and Somalia
(10%). Many are political refugees. The Middle East generated a significant number
of political refugees too, but most migrants of the sixth group are workers from Turkey
(66%) or Maghreb (20%). Latin Americans mostly come from Brazil (29%) and the
Dominican Republic, Colombia and Chile (10% each). The Asian group is similarly
heterogeneous, with economic migrants from Thailand (20%), the Philippines (17%),
China (15%) and Japan (10%), and political refugees from Vietnam (19%) and Cambodia
(4%). The final group of South and Central Asia is clearly dominated by political refugees
from Sri-Lanka (59%). Indians (17%) and Iranians (12%) are also sizeable communities.
The same classification of population groups is kept throughout the thesis for
the sake of simplicity and transparency.
Limitations and issues
There are several limitations to the research presented in this thesis. One is
directly related to the classification of migrants into broad and static population groups
discussed in the previous section. This classification is arbitrary to some extent and can
be the subject of a debate because there are different ways to group migrants. Is it still
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relevant to distinguish between Southern, Western and Central Europe? Should Turkey
be considered part of Eastern Europe as Russia is? Or should the focus be on national
communities only? There is no clear-cut solution to such issues and the answer depends
on the question that is investigated. One reason for lumping national communities into
broad categories is that the Swiss political discourse is often articulated at such an
aggregate level. It is however necessary to keep in mind the composition of the different
groups when analyzing results in the next three chapters.
The difficulty in defining relevant population groups is even more acute in
fast changing societies. Classifying and mapping differences across population groups
has a long and problematic tradition in social sciences (Winlow, 2006). Like maps,
graphs and figures are powerful communication tools that transmit information without
explicitly addressing the assumptions that lie behind their construction. They therefore
bear the danger of contributing to the crystallizing of differences and, eventually, to
sharpening antagonisms. However, the sequence of questions raised in this thesis and the
shifting nature of their focus (i.e., alternatively highlighting migrants and natives) shows
that differences are omnipresent in modern societies and that the multi-dimensional and
complex integration process involves both migrants and natives. Taken unilaterally and
out of context, some of the results of this research could foster polemic and sterile debate,
which is not the purpose of this thesis.
Another limitation relates to the problem of matching concepts and methods
in social sciences when using a quantitative approach. The concept of culture is not
explicitly defined in this thesis. Instead, it is implicitly assumed that culture and the
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cultural dimension of integration can be captured by certain indicators whose availability
is constrained by existing data. This bottom-up approach is an ad hoc approach that
lacks the conceptual coherence that prevails in other social sciences relying on more
qualitative approaches and less on data, thereby limiting the scope of what can be
described and analyzed.
This criticism applies especially to the concept of “cultural distance”, which
is defined and measured for different population groups in the second chapter. Using
this term is legitimate to a certain extent, because it appears in official Swiss policy
documents and because the dissimilarity index proposed to capture cultural differences
technically measures a distance. It does, however, not follow that this measure is ade-
quate to fully or satisfactorily describe cultural differences between migrants and natives,
and how migrants integrate culturally. The concept should therefore not be considered
as more than an artifact relevant in the context of the specific question investigated in
the second chapter.
With this introduction, forewarned readers will be able to better assess and
put into perspective the merits and shortcomings of this empirical research.
20
Appendix
Political campaign adds
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1.1 Introduction
As mentioned in the brief section on migration history and policy, there have
been many difficult episodes in the relationship between Switzerland and its migrants
since the end of the nineteenth century. Despite the impossibility of an accepted def-
inition of (the Swiss) national identity, some political parties have managed to instru-
mentalize successive waves of immigration to strengthen the fear that Switzerland may
lose its identity to migrants unable to integrate culturally in its society. The repeated
failures of anti-migrant popular initiatives in the past may have tempered their political
significance, but recent successes stress the many open questions that remain concerning
the handling of cultural integration issues in Switzerland.
Cultural integration can be defined as the evolution of behaviours, attitudes,
daily life habits, beliefs, etc. (Wanner et al., 2002). Different schools of thought exist
in cultural integration literature. Assimilation theory assumes cultural differences pro-
gressively level out whereas multiculturalism insists on their persistence over time (Alba
and Nee, 1997). Proponents of de-constructivism and system theories have criticized
“groupist” approaches arguing groups are a product of social processes or discourse
and do not exist a priori. However, empirical observation tends to hint that none of
these theories are adequate and that the relation between ethnicity, identity, behaviours
and attitudes is a complex multi-level evolutionary phenomenon (Wimmer 2008). As
an example, a study conducted in three Swiss migrant neighborhoods shows that even
if migrants do not primarily define themselves in ethnic terms, the majority of their
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social interactions occur within the group they belong to (Wimmer, 2004). Cultural
integration may affect behaviours and attitudes in different ways. Such evidence calls
for further research on the stability of group boundaries and their transformation, so as
to better understand the evolutionary nature of group formation and how groups insert
themselves in the host society. Qualitative studies have generated knowledge over the
cultural integration patterns of specific communities residing in Switzerland. Only few
quantitative studies, however, have been conducted on that subject.
This chapter contributes to this debate by specifically exploring the cultural
integration paths of eight migrant groups from the first to the second generation. It
traces the evolution of selected behaviours and attitudes, which are taken as indicative
of cultural integration. Different perspectives are proposed to deepen the analysis and
look beyond their evolution across generations. First, differences across cohorts are used
to investigate change and continuity over time (Georgiadis and Manning, 2011) and see
if younger migrants depart from behaviours and attitudes of older migrants.1 Second,
to explore the role of intermarriage as a factor (and not only an outcome) of integration
(Waldis, 2008), differences across individuals in endogamous and mixed couples are
examined. Can significant patterns be identified? And what is the impact of education?
These are some of the questions explored in this chapter. Special attention is given to
migrant women, as they play a key role in the transmission of cultural traits and in the
socialization process of the second generation on whom most policy efforts are targeted.
This chapter is structured as follows. After reviewing some of the related
1Migrants born before 1970 are labelled as “old” and those born after 1970 as “young.”
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quantitative studies in the next section, section 1.3 presents the datasets used in the
empirical investigation. Section 1.4 proposes a list of indicators of cultural integration
as well as the empirical model. Section 1.5 then explores objective behaviours of migrants
by examining their position at school (educational achievement and gender education
gap), in the couple (marriage, intermarriage, age and education gap between partners,
early marriage, cohabitation, fertility, divorce) and in the labour market (labor force
participation). This section also covers subjective attitudes of migrants by examining
their use of national languages, their feelings towards Switzerland as well as their gender,
religious and political attitudes. The last section concludes by summarizing key findings
and proposes recommendations for future cultural integration policies.
1.2 Related literature
The findings of the few existing quantitative studies relevant for this investiga-
tion are briefly presented below, with some of the results referred to later, as necessary.2
Qualitative studies are not presented here, but the results of some of them will be men-
tioned when interpreting the results.
Bauer and Riphahn (2005) investigated the performance of migrants at school
through the study of intergenerational patterns of educational attainment. Fibbi et al.
(2005) looked at statistical differences across gender and between naturalized and non-
naturalized second-generation migrants. They also proposed an analysis of the prob-
2International economic literature on cultural integration has rapidly grown in recent years and it is
not possible to review it entirely. In Switzerland, sociologists and demographers were the first to conduct
cultural integration studies based on larger datasets as they became available. By contrast, economists
mainly focused on the economic integration of migrants in the labour market.
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ability to have a weak education level, to be in the labour force, to be unemployed
and to acquire Swiss citizenship by regressing independent variables on a set of origin
dummies (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, and six former Yugoslavian
provinces) and other controls. Wanner et al. (2003, 2005b) prepared a comprehen-
sive study on female labour force participation. Other reports proposed statistics only
on socio-professional and household characteristics of migrants (Wanner, 2004), on mi-
grants, the use of language and religion (OFS, 2005) or on migrant families, highlighting
their specificity and their role in the migration and integration process (Fibbi et al.
2005b).
Quantitative studies on subjective attitudes of migrants are even less numerous
and, as surveys containing such data are costly to conduct, they usually rely on small
samples. Wanner et al. (2002) investigate determinants of the values and beliefs of
migrants based on data from the first two waves (1999 and 2000) of the Swiss House-
hold Panel (SHP). They regressed many indicators on origin dummies (Swiss, Italian,
Spanish/Portuguese, other European Economic Community/European Free Trade As-
sociation, other Europe, rest of the world) and controlled whether respondents have one
or two parents of foreign origin.
This study is the first to systematically examine the evolution of the behaviours
and attitudes of migrants to better understand their cultural integration paths from the
first to the second generation. Previous articles either only focused on the second-
generation or attributed a common factor to the second-generation when considering all
migrants. It also differs from existing literature in the way migrant groups are defined.
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Although European migrants form the bulk of migrant population in Switzerland, the
focus is not on European national communities, but on a limited number of broadly
defined migrant categories that are geographically more balanced.
1.3 Data
Two datasets are used to investigate the cultural integration of migrants in
Switzerland: the 2000 Swiss census and the Swiss Household Panel (SHP). As men-
tioned in the introduction to this thesis (see Table 0.1), the census covers the 7 million
individuals living in Switzerland in 2000. It provides information about the country of
birth of an individual, his first and second nationality, and whether he is Swiss by birth
or not. Individuals born in Switzerland and Swiss by birth are defined as natives. First-
generation migrants are born abroad. A second-generation migrant is an individual born
in Switzerland, but whose first or second nationality is foreign.3
The SHP started in 1999 with 7’799 individuals answering a detailed question-
naire. New observations from the European Survey on Income and Living Conditions
(SILC) were added in 2004 and 2005 and increased the total number of observations by
wave to 11’565. The SHP indicates whether an individual is born in Switzerland or not,
and contains information on the first, second and even third nationality, as well as on
the first and second nationality of both parents. An individual is defined as a second-
generation migrant if he is born in Switzerland and one of his nationalities or one of his
3A small fraction of second-generation migrants are included in the native group as some of them only
have the Swiss nationality by birth. Those who are only Swiss, but are naturalized and are of unknown
origin, are not included in either category.
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parents’ nationalities is foreign. If parents are both of foreign origin, the nationality of
the father prevails. Table 1.1 shows the origin and composition of the population in both
the census and the SHP. The sample of first-generation migrants is smaller in the SHP
than in the census, probably because survey questions are more difficult and lengthier
to answer than survey questions. The proportion of migrants from Eastern Europe is
also smaller in the SHP compared to the census, but other population groups are of
comparable importance in both datasets.
1.4 Methods and specifications
1.4.1 List of cultural integration indicators
The census conducted in 2000 and the SHP allow examining certain objective
behaviours and subjective attitudes, which are assumed to reflect the cultural dimension
of integration. Integration processes cannot be localized geographically or institution-
ally, but some units of analysis are especially relevant. School is the first place where
all second-generation migrants are exposed to natives and native culture, and school is
an important integration mechanism. Secondly, as many adults spend most of their life
in the couple (or family), it is of particular interest to observe behaviours in the couple,
especially differing patterns of integration between individuals in endogamous couples
and partners of mixed couples, where cultural accommodations and compromises are a
necessity. Finally, the labour market is the most important mechanism stimulating con-
tacts between natives and migrants outside the household. The list of selected indicators
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also includes information about the main language of migrants and their attitudes with
respect to Switzerland, gender, religious and political issues. Descriptive statistics for
natives, first-generation and second-generation migrants are displayed in table 1.2.
• Educational attainment: the number of years of education;4 the sample is
limited to individuals aged 25 years or more.
• Marriage: a dummy equals 1 if an individual is married; the sample is composed
of all women aged 18 years or more. Widows are excluded.
• Mixed couple: a dummy equals 1 if a Swiss individual has a partner from a
different country of origin; the sample is limited to individuals in a couple, aged 18
years or more. Mixed couples where neither of the partners is Swiss are excluded.
• Age gap between partners: the age difference between the male and female
partners; the sample is limited to individuals in a couple, aged 18 years or more.
• Education gap between partners: the difference in number of years of educa-
tion between the male and female partners; the sample is limited to individuals in
a couple, aged 18 years or more.
• Early marriage: a dummy equals 1 if an individual is married; the sample is
limited to women aged between 18 and 25 years. Widows are excluded.
• Cohabitation: a dummy equals 1 if an individual lives in cohabitation; the sample
is limited to individuals married or living in cohabitation.
4In the census as well as in the SHP, the available educational variable is categorical. De Coulon et
al. (2003) proposed a scale to compute the number of years of education.
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• Fertility: the number of children of women aged 40 years or more.
• Divorce: a dummy equals 1 if an individual is divorced; the sample is composed
of married and divorced women only, aged 18 years or more.
• Female labour force participation: a dummy equals 1 if a woman is in the
labour force; the sample is limited to women aged between 25 and 62 years.
• Main language: a dummy equals 1 if an individual uses one of the four Swiss
national languages (French, German, Italian, Romansh) as his main language.
• Feelings towards Switzerland (i) In favor of more equality between Swiss and
foreigners5: a dummy equals 1 if the respondent declares to be in favor of more
equality. (ii) In favor of opening Swiss traditions6: a dummy equals 1 if the
respondent declares to be in favor of opening Swiss traditions to the world.
• Gender attitudes: (i) Child suffers if mother is working7: 0 if the respondent
does not agree at all with the statement, 10 if she totally agrees; the sample is
limited to women. (ii) Women penalized in general8: 0 if the respondent does not
agree at all with the statement, 10 if he totally agrees; the sample is limited to
5Original question: Are you in favour of Switzerland offering foreigners the same opportunities as
those offered to Swiss citizens, or in favour of Switzerland offering Swiss citizens better opportunities?
Possible choices: in favour of equality of opportunities, neither, in favour of better opportunities for
Swiss citizens.
6Orignal question: Are you in favour of Switzerland opening towards other countries, or in favour
of Switzerland defending its traditions? Possible choices: opening towards other countries, neither,
defending traditions.
7Original question: Please tell me how far you would agree with the statements I am going to read
to you now, if 0 means “I completely disagree” and 10 “I completely agree”. A pre-school child suffers,
if his or her mother works for pay.
8Original question: Do you have the feeling that in Switzerland women are penalized compared with
men in certain areas, if 0 means “not at all penalized” and 10 “strongly penalized” ?
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men.
• Religious attitudes: (i) Participation in religious services9: a dummy equals 1
if the respondent declares she participates in religious services at least occasionally
(not only on special occasions). (ii) Prayers10: a dummy equals 1 if the respondent
declares he prays at least occasionally.
• Political attitudes: (i) Political affiliation11: 0 if a respondent declares to have
extreme left political views, 10 if extreme right. (ii) Satisfaction with Swiss democ-
racy12 : 0 if a respondent does not agree at all with the statement, 10 if he totally
agrees.
1.4.2 Specifications
To investigate the evolution of those indicators, two main specifications are
used. The first specification compares the outcomes between first and second-generation
migrants:
Outcomei =
∑
j βjOriginj ∗ 1stGeneration
+
∑
j γjOriginj ∗ 2ndGeneration
+αX ′i + εi. (1.1)
9Original question: How frequently do you take part in religious services? In the beginning, no answer
is proposed by the interviewer.
10Original question: How frequently do you pray apart from at church or within a religious community?
In the beginning, no answer is proposed by the interviewer.
11Original question: When they talk about politics, people mention left and right. Personally, where
do you position yourself, 0 means “left” and 10 “right” ?
12Original question: Overall, how satisfied are you with the way in which democracy works in our
country, if 0 means “not at all satisfied” and 10 “completely satisfied” ?
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βj and γj catch the effect of being a first or second-generation migrant of origin j
compared to being a native. The difference between βj and γj indicate if the second
generation rather tends to reproduce behaviours and attitudes of the first generation
or to adapt to those of natives. This first specification implicitily assumes that other
factors are common among all observed individuals.
The second specification allows deepening the analysis by introducing addi-
tional distinctions. First, as there is no reason to believe that trends in behaviours and
attitudes are equally shared among migrants of different origin, outcomes are compared
across birth cohorts (born before vs. born after 1970). Second, to investigate if the
composition of the couple has an effect on behaviours and attitudes, and if this effect
is similar across origin groups, outcomes are compared across types of couples (endoga-
mous vs. mixed couples). Finally, gender differences are also carefully examined using
the same specification:
Outcomei =
∑
j
∑
k βjOriginj ∗ Cohort/Couple/Genderk ∗ 1stGeneration
+
∑
j
∑
k γjOriginj ∗ Cohort/Couple/Genderk ∗ 2ndGeneration
+αX ′i + εi. (1.2)
An OLS estimator is used with continuous indicators and a probit when the outcome
is binary. Standard errors are robust. Vector X includes the following controls: age,
age squared and the number of years of education. With SHP data, X additionally
includes year dummies. With census data, X also controls for four linguistic regions,
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16 economic regions and four types of communes. In order not to arbitrarily truncate
the sample when looking at specific effects tied to intermarriage on a variable that is
observable on individuals whether they are in a couple or not (fertility, labour force
participation, language), three civil status dummies are included to keep non-married
individuals in the sample.13 Finally, whereas a gender dummy is generally included in
the analysis of attitudes, most regressions looking at behaviours focus strictly on women.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Objective behaviours
(i) At school
According to recent studies, migrants fare rather well in the Swiss educational
system. Focusing on a sample of second-generation Italian and Spanish migrants in the
cantons of Geneva and Basel, Bolzman and Fibbi (2003) observed that their educational
achievements are as good as those of natives. Using 2000 census data on 17 year-old
individuals still in the parental household to analyze intergenerational transmission of
educational attainment, Bauer and Riphahn (2007) found evidence of higher intergener-
ational mobility among second-generation migrants. They also found that their achieve-
ments or failures are less dependent on their parents’ level of education. Fibbi et al.
(2005) observed that naturalized migrants are less likely to have a low education level,
but this is not the case of non-naturalized first and second-generation migrants (except
13Married natives are the reference group.
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for Spaniards and Germans). How does the picture change if the scope of the analyis is
enlarged to further include non-European migrants?
Table 1.3 shows the average number of years of education across migrant groups
and the gender education gap. This table confirms the impressive educational success of
second-generation migrants from Southern Europe that has been documented in previous
studies. African women are in a similar situation. However, results also show that the
educational achievements of “Secundas” and “Secundos”14 are not characteristic of all
second-generation migrants. Such an outcome might be partly explained by the fact
that first-generation migrants are self-selected among the most motivated and capable
individuals or by the lack of specific knowledge among migrant parents about the Swiss
education system.
Despite the observed negative trend, the gender education gap common to all
first-generation groups is reverted among second-generation migrants, with the exception
of Western Europeans and Latin Americans, who have the highest average education
levels, and Southern European women, who make the largest progress from the first to
the second generation.
Results in table 1.4 (plotted in figure 1.1) confirm that migrant women progress
more at school than their male counterparts. It seems that second-generation men from
South and Central Asia, Turkey, the Middle East and Maghreb and Eastern Europe
remain in a low education equilibrium. The better performance of Western Europeans
is not very surprising given the very high education level of the first generation, but the
14In reference to the title of the study of Bolzmann and Fibbi (2003) about second-generation migrants
from Southern Europe.
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impressive results of second-generation Latin Americans, Africans and the tremendous
progress of Southern Europeans support the idea that individuals with a mother tongue
close to one of the Swiss national languages (in this case Latin languages) fare better at
school.
Table 1.5 provides more detailed information about cohort effects for both
genders (plotted in figures 1.2 and 1.3). A striking result is that the educational level of
first-generation migrants is generally declining. Another interesting trend is that second-
generation men from Turkey, the Middle East, Maghreb and Eastern Europe that are
born after 1970 fare better than those born before 1970.
(ii) The couples
Previous studies (Wanner and Fibbi, 2002; Wanner et al., 2005a) looked at the
role of family in the migration and integration process. They observed that compared to
natives, second-generation migrants tend to remain in the parental household for a longer
period and get married after a much shorter cohabitation period with their partner. The
overall marriage rate, however, is converging across migrant groups. In their qualitative
study on binational couples, Ossipow and Waldis (2003) analyzed the interests and
strategies of both intermarried partners. Noticing homogamy and heterogamy exist
across many dimensions in any couple, they point to the existence of complementary
exchanges in each couple.
In this chapter, the analysis is extended to examine the position of women in
mixed as well as in endogamous couples. To what extent does origin matter in matching
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partners? Are women from some groups more likely to contract early marriage and
have many children? It is often assumed that migrants from poorer countries are more
inclined to form traditional unions with a clear distribution of roles within the household,
but to what extent are these cliche´s supported by facts and do such behaviours persist
among second-generation migrants? Also, if some traditional behaviours seem more
deeply rooted in specific communities, how do women of these communities behave in
mixed couples?
Marriage: Results in table 1.5 (plotted in figure 1.4) show the marginal effect
of origin dummies on the probability of getting married. First-generation women are
much more likely to be married than natives. Differences among migrant groups hint
to the existence of distinct cultural patterns. Western Europeans display the lowest
propensity to be married. The decrease in the probability to be married of second-
generation women to the level of native women points to at least two possible hypotheses.
Either cultural differences in the decision to marry disappear or there are other strong
incentives (e.g., legal incentives) for first-generation migrants to get married, which do
not exist for the second generation. Looking at differences across cohorts reveals that
young first-generation migrants are more likely to get married compared to natives,
whereas the opposite is true for the second generation. This might be due to more
stringent legal conditions for entering Switzerland happening in parallel to a cultural
trend to marry less that is not migrant-specific. This is true even for women of Central
and South Asia, who remain in a very robust and much more traditional equilibrium
characterized by a high probability to be married for first as well as second-generation
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migrants.
Mixed couples: Intermarriages differ from endogamous marriages because,
through the partner and his social network, a migrant is exposed to the native culture
in a way that is not possible in an endogamous relationship. Table 1.7 shows the distri-
bution of endogamous and mixed couples across migrant groups. “Other” couples are
composed of partners from different origins, but none of them Swiss. First-generation
women intermarry more than their male counterparts. Only women from Turkey, the
Middle East, Maghreb, and South and Central Asia do not, and more surprisingly, this is
accentuated for second-generation women belonging to these groups. The intermarriage
rate of second-generation Western European, Latin American and African women also
decreases a lot, but from a very high initial level. Asian women remain in the highest
equilibrium despite a slight decrease; Eastern and Southern European second-generation
women are the only groups which enter mixed unions more than their mothers.
The marginal effect of origin dummies on the probability to be in a mixed couple
reported in table 1.8 (plotted in figure 1.5) confirm the intuition conveyed by statistics in
table 1.7. First-generation migrant women from Latin America, Asia, Western Europe
and Africa are around 50% more likely than natives to enter a mixed union. Asian
women are more likely to choose a Swiss partner than their male counterpart. Women
originating from South and Central Asia and Turkey, the Middle East and Maghreb are
exceptions in this regard and, more surprisingly, the marginal effect for second-generation
women of these groups is negative. Eastern and Southern European women also have a
low probability to enter a mixed couple, but it increases for the second generation. It is
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also interesting to notice that whereas the propensity to choose a native partner rather
decreases for second-generation women, it is less the case for men.
This trend also evolves slowly over time: young second-generation female mi-
grants tend to have a lower probability to have a relationship with a native man compared
to their mothers, but this probability is equal or higher for women born after 1970. The
same is true for male migrants, and the magnitude of the change is even higher (figures
1.6 and 1.7). The only exceptions are again women originating from South and Central
Asia and Turkey, the Middle East and Maghreb. It is surprising to see that their proba-
bility to intermarry decreases for second-generation and younger migrants. This strong
preference for endogamy contrasts with trends in other groups.
Different couples - early marriage vs. cohabitation: How do couples
form? Early marriage is often associated with a traditional gender role distribution
between husband and wife, whereas cohabitating couples are supposedly more fragile,
and consist of more independent partners. Table 1.8 shows most migrant groups (across
cohorts and types of couples) have a higher propensity for early marriage compared
to natives, especially women from Eastern Europe, Turkey, the Middle East, Maghreb,
Central and South Asia. However, this tendency diminishes for all second-generation
groups. It seems that migrant groups with the highest probability to get married also
do so at a younger age.
Cohabitation is a rather recent phenomenon that has developed as more women
started to become economically independent and politically empowered. It is not sur-
prising that first-generation migrants are less likely to choose cohabitation over marriage.
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However, this propensity increases for the second generation, more so for women from
Europe, Latin America and Asia. The coefficients of the post-1970 cohort in table
1.9 also clearly indicate that there is a cohort-specific change in behaviours concerning
cohabitation. Whereas migrants born before 1970 behave more or less alike across gen-
erations, second-generation migrants born after 1970 converge to the native baseline,
although less rapidly for women of Central and South Asia, Turkey, the Middle East
and Maghreb. Mixed couples are much more likely to cohabit than endogamous couples
(figure 9). This supports the hypothesis that individuals living as mixed couples may
be more liberal, but that legal incentives for first-generation migrants to improve their
conditions of stay (or that of their partner) are strong enough to influence the decision
to get married.
Partners’ differences - age and education gap: Waldis (2008) stresses that
heterogamy/homogamy in the couple is not limited to its ethnic dimension, and that
complementary/symmetric exchanges happen at different levels in any couple. Table
1.9 shows three clear trends in relation to the role of age and education as matching
factors in the couple. First there seems to be a difference between European women,
who are usually slightly younger than their partner, and non-European women, who
display larger age gaps. More striking is the fact that non-European first-generation
women born after 1970 are significantly younger than their partner (figure 1.9). Age
gaps might be explained by the fact that men who migrated alone only find a partner
later on in their life. Some of them return home to choose a younger partner and then
bring them back to Switzerland (Wanner et al., 2005a). The age asymmetry is stronger
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among migrants born after 1970. However, age gaps in mixed couples are even larger for
non-EU first-generation migrants, which supports the hypothesis that access to a permit
or citizenship might be part of complementary exchanges happening in mixed couples
(Ossipow and Waldis, 2003).
However, the age asymmetry observed in mixed couples is balanced by the fact
that partners have almost the same education level. Whereas education seems to only
have a small impact on the probability to intermarry, women who intermarry least (from
South and Central Asia, Turkey, the Middle East and Maghreb) also have the highest
education gaps in endogamous couples. One likely reason for them to intermarry could
be to live with a partner that has a similar level of education. In any case, it seems
that having similar education levels is a factor in matching partners of different origins,
and that eduction represents an important common ground between individuals coming
from different horizons (table 1.11 and figure 1.10).
Fertility: Table 1.12 reports the marginal effect of origin dummies on fertility.
Migrant women generally have more children than natives. Differences tend to be smaller
for the second generation. Women from Switzerland, Western and Southern Europe,
Latin America and Asia have lower fertility rates than Eastern European women, and
women from Turkey, the Middle East and Maghreb, Africa or South and Central Asia
have the highest fertility rate. The coefficient of second-generation Asian women is not
significant, but they seem to have a fertility pattern that is different from other non-
European migrant groups. Second-generation women from the Middle East, Maghreb
and Turkey still display the largest differential, but the drop in their fertility rate is also
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the largest. As expected, the number of years of education has a negative and significant
effect on the completed fertility rate.
Although coefficients of the second generation are not significant, columns 3 to
6 in table 1.12 (figure 1.11) indicate that the fertility rate of women in mixed couples is
similar to that of natives. In endogamous couples, first-generation migrants from Africa,
Turkey, the Middle East and Maghreb have the most children.
Divorce: Differences in the probability of getting divorced varies across mi-
grant groups, but the groups that tend to be more traditional in marriage also divorce
less. Second-generation migrants have a higher divorce rate, but as was observed in
cohabitation, it seems that the cultural trend facilitating divorce is not origin-specific,
but cohort-specific (table 1.6 and figure 1.12).
(iii) In the labour market
Wanner et al. (2003) conducted a thorough analysis of factors impacting fe-
male labour force participation. They notice three factors specifically influence migrant
women’s behaviour in this regard: gender roles imported from the origin country, house-
hold income and the fact that some permits are related to a pre-existing work contract.
Although they are more likely to be active in the labour market compared to native
women, migrant women originating from some countries display a significantly lower
labour force participation rate. Fibbi et al. (2005) also propose an analysis of the prob-
ability to be out of the labour force, focusing on individuals aged 23 to 34 years. They
do not find evidence of lower labour force participation of migrants compared to natives.
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Their results do not support the hypothesis that women from “culturally distant” popu-
lations have a lower propensity to participate in the labour force. As mentioned before,
their report focuses on European migrants, but how does the picture change when the
scope of the analysis is enlarged to include non-European migrant women?
Table 1.13 shows that although there may be cultural differences among first-
generation women that lead to varying labour force participation rates, second-generation
women almost behave like natives. Migrants from South and Central Asia, Turkey, the
Middle East and Maghreb as well as Asia remain least likely to be active in the labour
market, sticking to a more traditional gender role distribution.
Looking at cohorts reveals that women originating from Western and Southern
Europe are more likely to enter the labour force, especially women born after 1970. This
is partly due to the combination of better qualifications and lower fertility rates that
were observed earlier. Regression results also show that first-generation women in mixed
couples behave like natives in this regard (table 1.14 and figure 1.13).
1.5.2 Subjective attitudes
Besides influencing behaviours, integration processes also affect daily habits,
attitudes, values and beliefs of migrants. This section explores the evolution of mi-
grants’ use of national languages, of their feelings towards Switzerland, and of their
attitudes concerning gender, religious and political issues. SHP data (except for lan-
guage) is used to investigate cultural integration paths in these subjective dimensions.
The smaller sample size reduces the significance of the results obtained. The analysis is
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therefore mostly limited to the evolution from the first to the second generation. Gender
differences are considered only when examining gender attitudes.
Language: Knowledge of one of the four national languages is fundamental
not only to succeed at school and in the labour market, but also to understand native
culture and develop enriching relationships in the host society. It is therefore not sur-
prising that a substantial part of the federal budget devoted to cultural integration was
spent on subsidizing organization offering language courses for migrants (OFM, 2006),
that mastering one of the national languages is often viewed as a prerequisite for natu-
ralization or that partners in mixed couples often consider it as a fundamental external
sign of successful integration (Ossipow and Waldis, 2003).
Results in table 1.15 (plotted in figure 1.14) show that second-generation mi-
grants are much more likely to declare one of the national languages as their main
language. Surprisingly, young second-generation migrants do so more than those born
before 1970, whereas no such trend is detectable among first-generation migrants. Differ-
ent hypotheses could explain this. It might be that the methods to teach languages that
are used at Swiss schools have become more effective or that younger second-generation
migrants are more willing to adopt a national language as their own.
As expected, differences across migrant groups remain. Western and Southern
Europeans are always more likely to adopt a national language of Switzerland as their
own, Asians and South and Central Asians display lower probabilities to do so, but it is
striking to observe a similarly low probability for Latin Americans, who seem to be much
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more attached to their mother tongue than Latin migrants from Southern Europe.15
First-generation migrants with a Swiss partner have a slightly higher proba-
bility to adopt a national language as their own than those in endogamous couples.
However, the picture is more blurred for second-generation migrants, as African and
Latin American migrants are visibly rather keen to keeping their mother tongue.
Feelings towards Switzerland: One could assume that in a non-discriminatory
society, no one would request more equality between natives and foreigners. Table 1.16
shows that all migrants living in Switzerland are in favor of more equality compared to
natives. This trend is stronger among first-generation than among second-generation
migrants, except for those likely to have darker skin color or those likely to be identi-
fied as Muslims (South and Central Asians, Africans and individuals originating from
Turkey, the Middle East and Maghreb), who feel more could be done to facilitate their
integration in the Swiss society. Interestingly, migrants of the younger cohort have a
more pronounced opinion than those born before 1970. When asked whether they are
in favor of opening Swiss traditions to world influence, results look similar (table 1.17
and figure 1.15).
Gender attitudes: In relation to gender attitudes, it appears that more con-
servative behaviours of first-generation migrants are in line with their more conservative
subjective attitudes. Results in table 1.18 show how women internalize the traditional
role of mothers. Compared to natives, migrant women are likely to believe children suffer
when the mother is working. Western European women are the only exception. It might
15As Italian is a national language, the author tested this by keeping migrants of Italian origin out of
the sample. Results are available upon request.
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also be that as more migrant women live in precarious conditions, they feel strongly
that working would harm their children (e.g., because they cannot afford to leave their
children in a private day-nursery) Results in table 1.19 (plotted in figure 1.16) show
how sensitive men are to the specific discriminations women are suffering from. Male
migrants from Western, Southern Europe and Latin America are the only ones to be
more sensitive to this issue than native men. Looking at the second generation, it is dif-
ficult to identify meaningful differences. It might be that attitudes of second-generation
migrants concerning gender issues converge relatively fast with the Swiss average, while
behaviours need more time to change.16
Religious attitudes: Religious attitudes are also losing their intensity over
time. Table 1.20 shows that first-generation migrants are more likely to visit places of
worship than natives. More assiduous attendance of religious offices could be explained
by the fact that it is a social act strengthening the cohesion of communities. The hypoth-
esis that religion fulfills a social rather than a spiritual function in migrant communities
is supported by the fact that migrants are not more inclined to pray than natives (ta-
ble 1.21 and figure 1.17), and that second-generation migrants are not more religious
than natives. Interestingly, migrants from Turkey, the Middle East and Maghreb are
very close to natives in terms of their propensity to attend religious offices or to pray.
The qualitative study of Gianni et al. (2005) on Muslims in Switzerland draws similar
conclusions.
Political attitudes: Finally, the analysis of political attitudes shows that all
16See results on behaviours in the couple, and the findings of Wimmer (2004) that were cited above.
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migrants are more leaning to the left than the more conservative Swiss majority, except
for second-generation Asian and African migrants (table 1.22). Their coefficients, how-
ever, are not significant. It also appears that migrants from countries with democratic
traditions (Western and Southern Europeans, Latin Americans) are less likely to express
satisfaction with the Swiss democracy than migrants coming from regions were political
regimes are mostly undemocratic (table 1.23 and figure 1.18). Natives seem to be the
most critical of their own political system.
1.6 Discussion
The main findings of this first chapter can be summarized as follows:
• The evolution of selected indicators from the first to the second generation clearly
shows that cultural integration processes are at work in all migrant communities.
However, significant differences remain between behaviours and attitudes across
migrant groups:
– At school, men from South and Central Asia, Turkey, the Middle East and
Maghreb and Eastern Europe seem stuck in a low educational equilibrium.
Young second-generation migrants, however, have improved their performances
and the gender gap is declining, due to the progresses made by second-
generation women. Differences across groups are especially obvious when
looking at the position of women in the couple. Migrant women from South
and Central Asia, Turkey, the Middle East and Maghreb are least likely to
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intermarry, even less than their male counterparts, and they display more
traditional behaviours in most of the indicators examined. In the labour
market, migrant women are slightly less likely to be active, but this difference
disappears in the second generation, except for Asian migrants.
– Patterns of migrants’ subjective attitudes are more difficult to identify. Re-
sults show “linguistically distant” migrants are less likely to declare one of
the four national languages as their main language. Migrants’ feelings toward
Switzerland show that they perceive discriminations more strongly in com-
parison to natives, particularly migrants likely to have darker skin color or
those likely to be identified as Muslims. The more conservative behaviours of
first-generation migrants in the couple are in line with their more conservative
subjective gender attitudes. It might be that attitudes evolve more rapidly in
a new social environment than behaviours do. Minor differences in religious
attitudes vanish at the second generation, which supports the hypothesis that
religious office attendance fulfils a social (and to some extent an economic)
function rather than a spiritual function. Concerning political attitudes, mi-
grants seem to be more satisfied with Swiss democracy, and they lean more
to the left than natives.
• The general convergence pattern observed from the first to the second generation
has no match across cohorts. Only a few cohort-specific cultural trends could be
identified (see section on cohabitation or divorce). It is therefore not possible to
claim that younger migrants integrate better or worse than migrants born before
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1970.
• Convergence is particularly at work in mixed couples, where first-generation women
of all origin already adopt native behaviours (including women from South and
Central Asia, from Turkey, the Middle East and Maghreb), stressing the weak-
ness of the “cultural distance” argument. First and second-generation migrants
in endogamous couples reproduce more traditional behaviours. Although it is not
possible to capture individual traits that impact on the partner choice, this anal-
ysis leads to the conclusion that the interplay between household members (given
the characteristics of individuals, of the household and of their social environment)
or “household dynamics” has an important role in integration processes.
• Education always has the expected significant effect on examined indicators. Its
impact is non-negligible on fertility, but it is modest for most other indicators.
The review of the selected indicators reveals that cultural integration processes,
which are at work in various ways in the different groups, contribute to overall conver-
gence. The most striking and lasting differences that are observed across groups do not
pertain to educational achievement, religious or political attitudes, but to gender-related
attitudes and even more to gender-related behaviours. Differences are more pronounced
in endogamous couples in general, specifically for women from South and Central Asia,
Turkey, the Middle East and Maghreb.
As such, the decision to marry at an early age or to live in cohabitation, age
and education gaps between partners, the preferred number of children and opinions on
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gender issues are private matters. However, they also influence the position women have
in the household and in society. Previous studies called to focus less on individuals in
migration studies and more on families, as they are key in socializing second-generation
migrants on whom most policy efforts are targeted (Wanner and Fibbi, 2002). Others
observed that some migrant groups are more inclined to reproduce traditional family
structures and relationships (Moret et al., 2007) and have very pronounced gender at-
titudes that may be exacerbated by the destabilizing effect of migration on families
(Gianni et al., 2005).
The findings presented in this chapter lead to the recommendation to better
take into account migration-related gender issues and migration-specific “household dy-
namics” in the design of future cultural integration policies. It is on purpose that term
“household dynymics” is preferred over “family.” First, the term family evokes the im-
age of married couples with children, whereas a household is not associated with any
particular structure (traditional or not). Secondly, implicitly or explicitly insisting on
the unity and intergenerational solidarity existing in (migrant) families conceals the fact
that migrant households may be confronted by specific problems. Constraints imposed
by migration require specific household arrangements, which facilitate the division of
labour among household members and a clearer distribution of gender roles within the
couple. Those constraints can intensify gender issues, which also exist, although to a
different degree, among native couples. Education, labour market and other policies can
and should be used to influence the integration of migrants in Swiss society, but more tar-
geted programmes (next to existing language courses, civic and other programmes) and
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policies could be designed to address gender issues, which arise out of or are exacerbated
by migration and migration-specific dynamics developing in migrant households.
Such programmes should not so much aim at informing migrants about what
is considered in conformity with Swiss values concerning gender or family, but about
informing them of their individual rights. Moreover, programmes should support as-
sociations and organizations which contribute to empower migrants in general (when
confronted by the precariousness of their legal situation, the diminished job security,
discrimination, etc.) and migrant women in particular (when confronted by situations
of domestic violence, forced marriage, etc.) to exercise their rights. Given the ease
with which extremist parties exploit such problems and the disproportionate emphasis
cultural integration issues are given in the public debate, it is important that decent
financial support is granted by lawmakers to actors involved in such work. Finally, the
challenging situation that some migrant women face should not conceal that, although
gender equality is claimed to be a fundamental value of Western societies, it is a relatively
recent “acquis,” particularly in Switzerland,17 and that much remains to be done.
17The emancipation of women is particularly recent in Switzerland. The fact that Switzerland was
not militarily involved in any of the World Wars of the last century delayed the entry of women in the
labour market and their access to economic independence compared to other industrialized countries.
This and other factors in turn slowed down the acquisition of the voting rights for women, who obtained
this political right only in 1971 at the federal level. In 1990, the Swiss federal court finally ruled that
the exclusion of women in cantonal polls in Appenzell Inner Rhodes was unconstitutional.
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Table 1.4: Educational attainment (I)
Women Men
Origin 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
WE 0.928*** 0.815*** 1.235*** 0.367***
(0.006) (0.014) (0.007) (0.015)
SE -2.304*** -0.255*** -2.973*** -0.856***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010)
EE -1.041*** -1.076*** -1.796*** -1.902***
(0.008) (0.040) (0.008) (0.040)
AF -1.266*** 0.412*** -1.304*** -0.266*
(0.024) (0.141) (0.025) (0.160)
TMM -1.855*** -0.828*** -2.036*** -1.910***
(0.015) (0.051) (0.013) (0.054)
LA -0.311*** 0.272** -0.468*** 0.473***
(0.016) (0.108) (0.026) (0.119)
AS -0.607*** -1.031*** -0.844*** -1.171***
(0.016) (0.160) (0.026) (0.202)
SCA -1.150*** -0.983*** -2.324*** -2.983***
(0.025) (0.132) (0.020) (0.147)
Gender -1.202***
(0.002)
Observations 4460422
R2 0.18
Source: Swiss census, 2000; Standard errors in parentheses;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.5: Educational attainment (II)
Women Men
Pre-1970 Post-1970 Pre-1970 Post-1970
Origin 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
WE 0.926*** 0.716*** 1.069*** 0.533*** 1.299*** 0.621*** 0.933*** 0.294***
(0.006) (0.016) (0.020) (0.029) (0.008) (0.019) (0.025) (0.033)
SE -2.330*** -0.424*** -2.458*** -0.555*** -2.948*** -0.621*** -2.876*** -0.801***
(0.007) (0.012) (0.023) (0.018) (0.007) (0.014) (0.025) (0.019)
EE -0.979*** -1.822*** -1.771*** -0.676*** -1.592*** -2.196*** -2.569*** -1.110***
(0.008) (0.052) (0.019) (0.062) (0.009) (0.056) (0.024) (0.073)
AF -1.274*** 0.269* -2.114*** 0.163 -0.829*** -0.0861 -2.279*** -0.0242
(0.025) (0.158) (0.050) (0.277) (0.029) (0.203) (0.062) (0.346)
TMM -1.905*** -0.840*** -2.424*** -1.347*** -1.820*** -2.018*** -2.516*** -1.440***
(0.016) (0.064) (0.034) (0.083) (0.015) (0.084) (0.035) (0.089)
LA -0.208*** 0.111 -1.541*** 0.368* -0.0217 0.678*** -1.472*** 0.333
(0.017) (0.118) (0.037) (0.222) (0.031) (0.144) (0.067) (0.308)
AS -0.611*** -1.263*** -1.325*** -0.998*** -0.705*** -1.607*** -0.889*** 0.215
(0.017) (0.178) (0.038) (0.319) (0.030) (0.267) (0.067) (0.395)
SCA -0.948*** -0.764*** -2.444*** -2.911*** -2.032*** -2.846*** -3.172*** -3.046***
(0.027) (0.136) (0.050) (0.344) (0.023) (0.191) (0.051) (0.294)
Observations 2255991 2120707
R2 0.17 0.13
Source: Swiss census, 2000; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.6: Marriage and divorce
Marriage Divorce
All Pre-1970 Post-1970
Origin 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
WE 0.0573*** -0.0218*** 0.00793*** -0.0504*** 0.0196*** -0.0301***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
SE 0.195*** 0.0825*** -0.0582*** -0.0677*** -0.0288*** -0.0342***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
EE 0.252*** 0.127*** -0.0292*** -0.0730*** -0.0530*** -0.0343***
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.008)
AF 0.179*** 0.102*** -0.00420 -0.0601*** -0.00989 -0.0859***
(0.003) (0.020) (0.003) (0.004) (0.020) (0.023)
TMM 0.253*** 0.151*** -0.0347*** -0.0608*** -0.00561 -0.0101
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.008) (0.010)
LA 0.230*** 0.0532*** -0.0102*** -0.0567*** 0.0271 -0.0469
(0.001) (0.016) (0.002) (0.003) (0.017) (0.030)
AS 0.201*** 0.0680*** -0.0232*** -0.0627*** -0.0394** -0.0722*
(0.002) (0.023) (0.002) (0.003) (0.019) (0.037)
SCA 0.274*** 0.250*** -0.0721*** -0.0988*** -0.0894*** -0.0908***
(0.002) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.01)
Education -0.010*** -4.72e-05
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Observations 2276316 1655090
PR2 0.18 0.035
ll -1.217e+06 -585480
Source: SHP, 1999-2007; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.8: Mixed couples
All Pre-1970 Post-1970
Origin 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
0.513*** 0.389*** 0.528*** 0.376*** 0.342*** 0.555***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007)
SE 0.091*** 0.176*** 0.105*** -0.010*** 0.167*** 0.179***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
EE 0.049*** 0.096*** 0.066*** -0.005** 0.078*** 0.095***
(0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) (0.011) (0.011)
AF 0.487*** 0.186*** 0.514*** 0.388*** 0.125*** 0.302***
(0.006) (0.036) (0.006) (0.012) (0.040) (0.068)
TMM 0.060*** -0.023*** 0.094*** -0.028*** -0.017 -0.039***
(0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.011) (0.009)
LA 0.646*** 0.423*** 0.649*** 0.622*** 0.389*** 0.521***
(0.003) (0.029) (0.003) (0.007) (0.033) (0.059)
AS 0.589*** 0.574*** 0.592*** 0.560*** 0.589*** 0.507***
(0.003) (0.035) (0.003) (0.008) (0.040) (0.074)
SCA -0.002 -0.061*** 0.023*** -0.062*** -0.066*** -0.052
(0.004) (0.016) (0.005) (0.005) (0.018) (0.035)
Education 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 1492037 1492037
PR2 0.18 0.18
ll -548027 -546437
Source: Swiss census, 2000; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 1.9: Early marriage vs. cohabitation
Early marriage Cohabitation
All All Pre-1970 Post-1970
Origin 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
WE 0.124*** -0.0170*** -0.0240*** 0.00376** -0.0200*** -0.0125*** -0.0403*** 0.0375***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0007) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
SE 0.291*** 0.046*** -0.060*** -0.034*** -0.054*** -0.041*** -0.072*** -0.030***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
EE 0.522*** 0.191*** -0.079*** -0.055*** -0.065*** -0.054*** -0.083*** -0.059***
(0.004) (0.009) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.0002) (0.002)
AF 0.273*** 0.123*** -0.060*** -0.063*** -0.052*** -0.075*** -0.071*** -0.052***
(0.011) (0.039) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.012)
TMM 0.532*** 0.232*** -0.077*** -0.072*** -0.069*** -0.064*** -0.082*** -0.076***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.0007) (0.003) (0.0002) (0.001)
LA 0.403*** 0.064*** -0.066*** -0.045*** -0.058*** -0.044*** -0.075*** -0.052***
(0.009) (0.024) (0.0006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.010) (0.0006) (0.010)
AS 0.250*** -0.020 -0.062*** -0.049*** -0.055*** -0.072*** -0.074*** -0.011
(0.009) (0.023) (0.0007) (0.009) (0.001) (0.006) (0.0007) (0.024)
SCA 0.432*** 0.313*** -0.077*** -0.075*** -0.074*** -0.077*** -0.079*** -0.076***
(0.012) (0.057) (0.0004) (0.002) (0.0008) (0.003) (0.0004) (0.003)
Education -0.018*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.0002) (9.92e-05) (9.97e-05)
Observations 281477 1531937 1531937
PR2 0.30 0.13 0.13
ll -79229 -454518 -452617
Source: Swiss census, 2000; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.10: Age gap between partners
All Endo Inter
Origin 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
WE -0.070*** 0.101*** -0.152*** -0.123** -0.073*** 0.254***
(0.015) (0.038) (0.024) (0.055) (0.020) (0.057)
SE 0.118*** 0.444*** -0.060*** 0.238*** 0.695*** 0.740***
(0.017) (0.026) (0.019) (0.031) (0.039) (0.049)
EE -0.424*** 0.301*** -0.026 0.321*** -2.102*** 0.235
(0.018) (0.092) (0.020) (0.108) (0.048) (0.221)
AF -2.645*** -0.174 -2.280*** 1.465*** -3.648*** -3.991***
(0.058) (0.366) (0.100) (0.471) (0.086) (0.729)
TMM -1.174*** 0.099 -0.797*** 0.335*** -2.618*** -1.410***
(0.034) (0.116) (0.039) (0.126) (0.090) (0.396)
LA -1.334*** -0.676** -0.115 -0.380 -1.734*** -0.892**
(0.039) (0.275) (0.087) (0.440) (0.050) (0.432)
AS -1.799*** -1.547*** -0.704*** -0.223 -2.457*** -1.866***
(0.039) (0.380) (0.072) (0.695) (0.051) (0.510)
SCA -1.559*** -1.485*** -1.597*** -1.662*** -1.359*** 1.578
(0.055) (0.299) (0.060) (0.312) (0.175) (1.262)
Education 0.072*** 0.077***
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 1532692 1532692
R2 0.03 0.03
Source: Swiss census, 2000; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 1.11: Education gap between partners
Pre-1970 Post-1970 Endo Inter
Origin 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
WE -0.213*** -0.260*** 0.100*** 0.062* -0.728*** -0.381*** -0.014 -0.214***
(0.007) (0.019) (0.023) (0.035) (0.011) (0.024) (0.009) (0.025)
SE 1.481*** 0.870*** 1.421*** 0.889*** 1.941*** 1.285*** -0.241*** -0.115***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021) (0.008) (0.014) (0.017) (0.022)
EE 0.960*** 1.079*** 1.030*** 0.888*** 1.133*** 1.312*** 0.351*** -0.035
(0.009) (0.057) (0.016) (0.059) (0.009) (0.047) (0.021) (0.098)
AF -0.076** -0.027 -0.105** 1.138*** 0.223*** 0.514** -0.518*** 0.020
(0.030) (0.196) (0.050) (0.295) (0.044) (0.209) (0.038) (0.323)
TMM 1.066*** 0.938*** 1.042*** 1.166*** 1.405*** 1.220*** -0.153*** -0.167
(0.018) (0.073) (0.029) (0.072) (0.017) (0.056) (0.040) (0.175)
LA 0.077*** -0.054 -0.293*** -0.007 0.355*** -0.086 -0.331*** -0.225
(0.020) (0.142) (0.034) (0.246) (0.038) (0.195) (0.022) (0.191)
AS 0.034* 0.443** -0.307*** 0.025 0.669*** 1.070*** -0.325*** 0.084
(0.019) (0.199) (0.038) (0.325) (0.032) (0.308) (0.022) (0.226)
SCA 0.968*** -0.005 1.572*** 1.135*** 1.467*** 0.301** -0.339*** -0.195
(0.030) (0.150) (0.043) (0.291) (0.026) (0.138) (0.077) (0.559)
Education 0.425*** 0.444***
(0.0008) (0.0008)
Observations 1532692 1532692
R2 0.17 0.18
Source: Swiss census, 2000; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.12: Completed fertility rate
All Endo Inter
Origin 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
WE -0.122*** -0.056*** -0.180*** -0.074*** -0.195*** -0.047*
(0.003) (0.011) (0.007) (0.016) (0.005) (0.025)
SE 0.076*** 0.061*** 0.012** -0.026** -0.189*** -0.070**
(0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.012) (0.011) (0.027)
EE 0.200*** 0.226*** 0.273*** 0.189*** -0.443*** -0.202
(0.006) (0.042) (0.007) (0.046) (0.016) (0.137)
AF 0.396*** 0.325*** 0.862*** 0.219 -0.093*** -0.354
(0.020) (0.126) (0.042) (0.173) (0.031) (0.356)
TMM 0.560*** 0.339*** 0.702*** 0.242*** -0.173*** -0.077
(0.012) (0.054) (0.015) (0.061) (0.031) (0.252)
LA 0.167*** 0.088 0.271*** 0.038 -0.200*** -0.091
(0.013) (0.085) (0.032) (0.136) (0.019) (0.175)
AS 0.031** -0.183 0.375*** 0.022 -0.417*** -0.432*
(0.013) (0.154) (0.025) (0.283) (0.019) (0.225)
SCA 0.410*** 0.300*** 0.351*** 0.026 -0.193*** 0.372
(0.022) (0.102) (0.028) (0.109) (0.060) (0.552)
Education -0.058*** -0.041***
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Observations 1512842 1512842
R2 0.08 0.23
Source: Swiss census, 2000; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.13: Group averages: female labour force participation (in %)
Natives WE SE EE AF TMM SA AS SCA Total
Born in Switzerland 75.4 81.9 84.1 82.1 82.6 82.9 78.3 71.4 77.5 76
Married 67 73.3 76.7 76.5 78.5 77.3 70.4 66 76.9 67.6
Single 88.7 90.6 93.3 90.9 89.1 90.8 88.2 78.7 81.3 89
Foreign born 72.1 74.6 74.8 75.1 69.3 70.6 68.8 70.3 73
Married 65.2 72.4 73 73.4 67.3 67.4 64.6 68.8 69.6
Single 86.1 83.2 83.2 78.8 78.1 82.1 83.2 77.5 83.8
Source: Swiss census, 2000
Table 1.14: Female labour force participation
Pre-1970 Post-1970 Endo Inter
Origin 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
WE -0.041*** 0.010*** -0.009*** 0.040*** -0.086*** 0.029*** -0.020*** -0.015***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005)
SE 0.039*** 0.019*** 0.068*** 0.086*** 0.092*** 0.064*** -0.008** 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
EE -0.007*** 0.008 -0.043*** 0.057*** 0.048*** 0.088*** -0.013*** 0.003
(0.001) (0.009) (0.002) (0.008) (0.001) (0.006) (0.004) (0.019)
AF -0.009** 0.036 -0.055*** -0.031 0.048*** 0.080*** -0.013* -0.138*
(0.004) (0.028) (0.008) (0.043) (0.006) (0.029) (0.006) (0.071)
TMM -0.078*** -0.003 -0.075*** 0.030*** -0.001 0.062*** -0.030*** 0.046
(0.003) (0.012) (0.005) (0.010) (0.002) (0.008) (0.007) (0.031)
LA -0.088*** -0.006 -0.143*** -0.026 0.004 0.012 -0.095*** -0.040
(0.003) (0.022) (0.006) (0.032) (0.006) (0.034) (0.004) (0.036)
AS -0.095*** -0.127*** -0.187*** -0.124** -0.011** 0.006 -0.107*** -0.108**
(0.003) (0.036) (0.007) (0.048) (0.005) (0.053) (0.004) (0.046)
SCA -0.076*** -0.011 -0.151*** -0.008 -0.011** 0.043** -0.091*** -0.033
(0.005) (0.025) (0.008) (0.052) (0.004) (0.021) (0.016) (0.112)
Education 0.017*** 0.017***
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Observations 1795117 1795117
PR2 0.05 0.09
ll -934436 -888678
Source: Swiss census, 2000; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.16: In favor of more equality between Swiss and foreigners
All Pre-1970 Post-1970
Origin 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
WE 0.153*** 0.055*** 0.155*** 0.036*** 0.136*** 0.086***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.022) (0.016)
SE 0.207*** 0.103*** 0.206*** 0.103*** 0.199*** 0.102***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.021) (0.015)
EE 0.104*** 0.087*** 0.088*** 0.014 0.133*** 0.165***
(0.019) (0.029) (0.024) (0.044) (0.030) (0.037)
AF 0.023 0.069 -0.075 0.052 0.221*** 0.107
(0.053) (0.086) (0.068) (0.104) (0.065) (0.153)
TMM 0.005 0.137*** -0.023 0.099** 0.060 0.174***
(0.037) (0.030) (0.047) (0.045) (0.060) (0.039)
LA 0.186*** 0.031 0.193*** 0.036 0.171*** 0.022
(0.027) (0.054) (0.032) (0.068) (0.047) (0.091)
AS 0.050 -0.212* 0.011 -0.217* 0.130 -0.202
(0.062) (0.111) (0.079) (0.128) (0.099) (0.225)
SCA 0.027 0.104 0.044 0.065 -0.003 0.182
(0.057) (0.076) (0.070) (0.097) (0.099) (0.115)
Education 0.026*** 0.026***
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 40692 40692
PR2 0.038 0.039
ll -25581 -25568
Source: SHP, 1999-2007; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 1.17: In favor of opening Swiss traditions
All Pre-1970 Post-1970
Origin 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
WE 0.137*** 0.063*** 0.266*** 0.032 -0.350*** -0.125*
(0.009) (0.010) (0.045) (0.056) (0.103) (0.071)
SE 0.170*** 0.096*** 0.073 -0.043 -0.665*** -0.214***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.053) (0.056) (0.117) (0.069)
EE 0.067*** 0.109*** 0.964*** 0.095 0.975*** 0.473***
(0.020) (0.028) (0.107) (0.177) (0.144) (0.183)
AF -0.011 -0.043 0.953*** 0.246 0.343 1.330**
(0.053) (0.093) (0.258) (0.438) (0.343) (0.636)
TMM 0.037 0.131*** 1.188*** -0.057 0.516** 0.519***
(0.036) (0.030) (0.188) (0.201) (0.249) (0.195)
LA 0.155*** -0.0002 0.309* 0.549** -0.559** 0.041
(0.028) (0.055) (0.171) (0.276) (0.249) (0.390)
AS 0.033 -0.101 0.656** -0.141 0.489 -0.460
(0.063) (0.109) (0.323) (0.477) (0.510) (0.854)
SCA -0.014 0.042 1.300*** 0.047 0.955** 1.029
(0.059) (0.081) (0.268) (0.417) (0.390) (0.636)
Education 0.025*** 0.071***
(0.0009) (0.003)
Observations 40985 40985
PR2 0.034 0.031
ll -25598 -84619
Source: SHP, 1999-2007; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
67
Table 1.18: Child suffers from working mother
All Pre-1970 Post-1970
Origin 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
WE -0.215* -0.189 -0.302** -0.054 0.333 -0.367*
(0.113) (0.122) (0.121) (0.158) (0.295) (0.189)
SE 0.768*** -0.126 0.681*** -0.129 1.104*** -0.111
(0.142) (0.119) (0.159) (0.153) (0.315) (0.186)
EE 0.805*** 0.238 0.773*** 1.195** 0.872** -0.796
(0.223) (0.394) (0.280) (0.544) (0.365) (0.569)
AF 0.981* -1.392 1.551** -0.998 0.355 -1.850
(0.559) (0.982) (0.768) (1.329) (0.816) (1.456)
TMM 2.495*** -0.421 2.364*** -0.807 2.719*** -0.101
(0.492) (0.333) (0.627) (0.498) (0.791) (0.446)
LA 1.019*** 0.0389 0.324 -0.950 2.280*** 1.041
(0.336) (0.617) (0.418) (0.871) (0.560) (0.872)
AS 1.686** 1.254 1.909*** 1.031 0.561 1.490
(0.665) (1.329) (0.729) (1.879) (1.627) (1.879)
SCA 3.307*** -1.094 3.342*** -1.504 3.250** -0.670
(0.870) (1.152) (1.085) (1.628) (1.456) (1.628)
Education -0.229*** -0.231***
(0.0103) (0.0103)
Observations 15482 15482
R2 0.069 0.071
Source: SHP, 1999-2007; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 1.19: Women penalized in general
All Pre-1970 Post-1970
Origin 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
WE 0.405*** 0.258*** 0.454*** 0.121 -0.314* 0.006
(0.091) (0.097) (0.075) (0.108) (0.179) (0.127)
SE 0.162 -0.017 -0.121 0.393*** 0.037 0.284**
(0.101) (0.092) (0.099) (0.103) (0.209) (0.119)
EE -1.145*** -0.346 -0.581*** 0.564 -0.682*** -0.008
(0.190) (0.261) (0.185) (0.395) (0.239) (0.386)
AF -0.982** 0.565 0.989* -1.196 0.191 1.370
(0.434) (0.761) (0.505) (1.029) (0.565) (1.030)
TMM -0.996*** -0.183 0.423 -0.034 -0.026 -0.513
(0.249) (0.370) (0.415) (0.344) (0.505) (0.315)
LA 0.192 0.869* 0.148 -0.456 -0.176 0.981
(0.359) (0.459) (0.246) (0.674) (0.305) (0.613)
AS -0.818 -0.562 -0.693 1.479 1.113 2.900**
(0.590) (1.076) (0.461) (1.456) (1.128) (1.456)
SCA -1.282*** -1.402* -0.372 0.795 -0.015 -0.015
(0.356) (0.795) (0.841) (1.261) (0.892) (1.261)
Education 0.072*** 0.101***
(0.007) (0.006)
Observations 19449 19449
R2 0.064 0.064
Source: SHP, 1999-2007; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.20: Probability to participate to religious offices more than for special occasions
All Pre-1970 Post-1970
Origin 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
WE -0.110*** -0.031*** -0.086*** -0.012 -0.194*** -0.073***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.019) (0.016)
SE 0.042*** 0.023* 0.060*** 0.040*** -0.014 -0.006
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.030) (0.017)
EE 0.079*** -0.033 0.036 -0.032 0.123*** -0.051
(0.024) (0.033) (0.028) (0.045) (0.037) (0.044)
AF 0.176*** 0.006 0.224*** -0.059 0.064 0.239
(0.054) (0.096) (0.063) (0.111) (0.079) (0.151)
TMM 0.033 -0.145*** 0.102** -0.116*** -0.146*** -0.139***
(0.039) (0.029) (0.045) (0.044) (0.049) (0.038)
LA 0.112*** 0.0135 0.158*** 0.079 0.101* -0.196***
(0.038) (0.063) (0.044) (0.078) (0.060) (0.073)
AS 0.084 -0.023 0.138* 0.068 0.002
(0.071) (0.108) (0.080) (0.136) (0.110)
SCA 0.261*** 0.044 0.328*** 0.041 0.171* 0.018
(0.057) (0.092) (0.062) (0.106) (0.092) (0.180)
Education -0.012*** -0.014***
(0.0009) (0.0009)
Observations 32887 32887
PR2 0.034 0.033
ll -19718 -22640
Source: SHP, 1999-2007; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 1.21: Probability to pray at least occasionally
All Pre-1970 Post-1970
Origin 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
WE -0.123*** -0.041*** -0.088*** -0.031** -0.197*** -0.064***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.024) (0.015)
SE 0.060*** 0.050*** 0.044*** 0.037*** 0.084*** 0.060***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.022) (0.013)
EE 0.021 -0.068** 0.012 -0.035 0.063** -0.103**
(0.019) (0.031) (0.022) (0.044) (0.026) (0.043)
AF 0.138*** -0.153 0.182*** -0.244** 0.084 0.011
(0.036) (0.097) (0.038) (0.118) (0.058) (0.137)
TMM -0.052 -0.052 -0.072* -0.010 -0.067 -0.029
(0.035) (0.034) (0.042) (0.048) (0.056) (0.042)
LA 0.098*** 0.112*** 0.143*** 0.140*** 0.123*** 0.065
(0.028) (0.042) (0.029) (0.053) (0.040) (0.070)
AS 0.011 -0.070 -0.018 0.028 0.106 -0.216
(0.059) (0.105) (0.072) (0.113) (0.071) (0.179)
SCA 0.131*** 0.100 0.161*** 0.040 0.069 0.170*
(0.038) (0.068) (0.041) (0.098) (0.071) (0.090)
Education -0.006*** -0.011***
(0.0008) (0.0007)
Observations 41601 41601
PR2 0.047 0.029
ll -24118 -28654
Source: SHP, 1999-2007; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.22: Political affiliation
All Pre-1970 Post-1970
Origin 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
WE -0.541*** -0.215*** -0.244*** -0.199*** -0.408*** -0.261***
(0.073) (0.078) (0.048) (0.063) (0.107) (0.079)
SE -2.080*** -0.826*** -0.699*** -0.311*** -0.236 -0.696***
(0.086) (0.078) (0.065) (0.064) (0.149) (0.076)
EE -1.875*** -0.281 -0.040 0.246 -0.859*** -0.766***
(0.153) (0.226) (0.129) (0.204) (0.174) (0.207)
AF -2.546*** 0.622 -1.400*** 0.003 -1.421*** -0.067
(0.366) (0.641) (0.310) (0.496) (0.448) (0.665)
TMM -1.193*** -0.584** -0.023 -0.098 -1.091*** -0.841***
(0.266) (0.248) (0.206) (0.228) (0.263) (0.229)
LA -1.716*** -0.830** -0.868*** -0.450 -0.411 -1.206***
(0.250) (0.400) (0.187) (0.307) (0.257) (0.421)
AS -1.212** 0.396 -0.290 0.0140 -1.118** -0.600
(0.484) (0.740) (0.355) (0.543) (0.510) (0.940)
SCA -2.182*** -0.298 -0.394 -0.068 0.257 -1.721**
(0.392) (0.619) (0.355) (0.482) (0.448) (0.701)
Education 0.092*** -0.054***
(0.006) (0.003)
Observations 40985 40985
R2 0.053 0.036
Source: SHP, 1999-2007; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 1.23: Satisfaction with Swiss democracy
All Pre-1970 Post-1970
Origin 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
WE 0.168*** -0.017 0.266*** 0.032 -0.350*** -0.125*
(0.041) (0.044) (0.045) (0.056) (0.103) (0.071)
SE -0.053 -0.102** 0.073 -0.043 -0.665*** -0.214***
(0.048) (0.044) (0.053) (0.056) (0.117) (0.069)
EE 0.975*** 0.293** 0.964*** 0.095 0.975*** 0.473***
(0.086) (0.127) (0.107) (0.177) (0.144) (0.183)
AF 0.744*** 0.598* 0.953*** 0.246 0.343 1.330**
(0.206) (0.361) (0.258) (0.438) (0.343) (0.636)
TMM 0.950*** 0.257* 1.188*** -0.057 0.516** 0.519***
(0.150) (0.140) (0.188) (0.201) (0.249) (0.195)
LA 0.038 0.390* 0.309* 0.549** -0.559** 0.041
(0.141) (0.226) (0.171) (0.276) (0.249) (0.390)
AS 0.608** -0.212 0.656** -0.141 0.489 -0.460
(0.273) (0.417) (0.323) (0.477) (0.510) (0.854)
SCA 1.192*** 0.348 1.300*** 0.047 0.955** 1.029
(0.221) (0.349) (0.268) (0.417) (0.390) (0.636)
Education 0.069*** 0.071***
(0.003) (0.003)
Observations 40985 40985
R2 0.029 0.031
Source: SHP, 1999-2007; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure 1.1: Educational attainment
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 Data: Swiss census, 2000; sample: all women aged 25+
 Data: Swiss census, 2000; sample: all women aged 25+
d c t onal attainment = number of years of education
Educational attainment = number of years of education
Figure 1.2: Female educational attainment
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 Data: Swiss census, 2000; sample: all men aged 25+
 Data: Swiss census, 2000; sample: all men aged 25+
d c t onal attainment = number of years of education
Educational attainment = number of years of education
Figure 1.3: Male educational attainment
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Figure 1.4: Marriage
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Figure 1.5: Mixed couple
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Figure 1.6: Women in mixed couples
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Figure 1.7: Men in mixed couples
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Cohabitation = dummy 1 if cohabiting, 0 if married
Figure 1.8: Cohabitation
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ge p = (age of person/wo an - ge f partner/man)
Age gap = (age of person/woman - age of partner/man)
Figure 1.9: Age gap between partners
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d c t n ap = ( ducation of person/ a  - education of partner/man)
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Figure 1.10: Education gap between partners
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e ility  = umber of children
Fertility rate = number of children
Figure 1.11: Completed fertility rate
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Figure 1.12: Divorce
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abor fo c  participation = du my 1 if in labor force,  if not
Labor force participation = dummy 1 if in labor force, 0 if not
Figure 1.13: Female labour force participation
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Nat onal langu ge =1 if one of four national languages, 0 if not
National language =1 if one of four national languages, 0 if not
Figure 1.14: Main language
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Figure 1.15: Feelings towards Switzerland
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 Data: Swiss census, 2000; sample: all women/men
 Data: Swiss census, 2000; sample: all women/men
Bo h vari l s = 0 (does not agre  at all) to 10 scales
Both variables = 0 (does not agree at all) to 10 scales
Figure 1.16: Gender attitudes
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Figure 1.17: Religious attitudes
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Figure 1.18: Political attitudes
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2.1 Introduction
During the last decade, the debate about migration and integration has been
growing in many Western societies including Switzerland. Facing new kinds of migra-
tion flows from more distant regions, Swiss policy-makers seem unable to address the
concern of many voters that recently arrived migrants don’t integrate in the host coun-
try. Although such a concern is not new and doesn’t reflect the evidence gathered and
analysis produced by social scientists in Switzerland (Wicker et al., 2003), the argument
that migrants (or certain migrant groups) don’t integrate culturally has easily made its
way into public debate and is being accepted by many as commonplace. In the con-
temporary political arena where perception is key, various discourses are competing to
explain integration issues in ethno-cultural vs. socio-economic terms. In recent years,
the populist right wing narrative, which argues that “cultural distance”1 prevents the
successful integration of migrants, has gained ground against the liberal narrative, which
considers that the root of integration failures lies in unequal economic opportunities and
discrimination.2
1See the last section of the general introduction for some critical comments about that concept, which
is placed in quotations marks in the introduction and conclusion of this chapter in order to remind the
reader about its inherent limitations.
2The populist right wing discourse sometimes merges with a third discourse, the moderate conser-
vative discourse. While the latter traditionally emphasizes economic considerations, like the need to
proceed to a cost-benefit analysis of migration or the merits of selective migration to pick out the most
educated and productive migrants, the former emphasizes the threat migration represents to the native
culture and the argument that cultural differences represent an insurmountable obstacle to the integra-
tion of migrants. In the political arena, however, they usually converge and blend in support of more
stringent migration and asylum rules. An example of their political complementarity is the integration
by the Swiss administration of the concept of “cultural distance” in the formulation of the “three circles”
policy during the 1990s. This policy aims at restricting certain types of migration by granting individ-
uals a different right to migrate to Switzerland according to their origin, creating a hierarchy favoring
individuals from EU/EFTA countries over those from the US and the rest of the world (Mahnig and
Piguet, 2003). Over the last decade, the right wing rhetoric became increasingly appealing to voters.
As a consequence, the conservative/right wing narrative not only became more radical, it also gained
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This chapter assesses the relevance of these opposed narratives by investigating
the endogenous relationship between economic discrimination and “cultural distance”.
Both factors certainly reinforce each other negatively, hindering the integration of mi-
grants in the host society, but is there a way to determine which of the two narratives is
more relevant in the Swiss context? How legitimate are claims arguing that migrants are
economically discriminated because they don’t integrate culturally compared to claims
that migrants don’t integrate because they are discriminated? A series of articles in-
spired by Battu et al (2007) found evidence of the former without examining the latter.
The contribution of this study is to examine both sides of the coin at once. Given the
current strong focus on Muslim migrants in the integration debate in Switzerland and
other Western countries, the situation of this minority is examined more closely. Indeed,
as Muslim migration has become a controversial especially in regard of their cultural in-
tegration, it is of particular interest to examine these communities when looking at the
reciprocal influence between “cultural distance” and economic discrimination. Further-
more, by using data from the year 2000, it is possible to shed some light on the situation
prevailing prior to the anti-minaret initiative and even prior to 9/11, at a time when the
cultural integration of Muslims had yet gotten as much attention as it currently does.
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to define the concepts at stake as well
as give a hint about the way they are approached empirically in this study, in order to
ground against the liberal narrative. These two shifts are illustrated by the growing share of far right
representatives in the Swiss Parliament, mostly to the detriment of conservative political parties (11,1%
in 1991; 22,5 % in 1999; 29% in 2007), and by a series of successfully launched referenda asking for
harsher laws ruling the status of migrants and asylum seekers (in 1999, 2002, 2004, 2006 and again
2008). In 2009, the right wing alone succeeded in convincing Swiss voters to approve a constitutional
ban of minaret construction, singling out Muslim migrants.
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better frame the debate and stress the scope of this study. Integration can be defined
as individual and collective processes happening after migration occurred. Those can be
classified into different categories, which are not mutually exclusive. Economic processes
encompass moves of a migrant across a society’s classes. Cultural processes cover the
evolutions happening in behaviors, attitudes, daily life habits, beliefs, etc. (Wanner
et al., 2002).3 In this framework, barriers to economic processes may affect cultural
processes, and vice versa, impeding the integration of migrants.
The empirical approach comprises two steps. The first consists in finding ac-
ceptable proxies for the barriers to integration put forward in both narratives (economic
discrimination and “cultural distance”). As employment is at the heart of economic
processes, employment discrimination is probably the most crippling economic barrier
to integrate the host society. Employment discrimination is is therefore used as a proxy
for economic discrimination, and both terms are sometimes used as substitutes in this
chapter. It is measured using a decomposition of the probability to be employed. Cul-
tural distance is a multidimensional and diffuse concept that is difficult to approach
empirically. In the present context, the best feasible way to proxy for “cultural dis-
tance” is to build a dissimilarity index based on cultural indicators that, according to
previous studies, potentially distinguishes migrants from natives. The second step con-
sists in finding appropriate instruments to avoid the endogeneity bias when estimating
how economic discrimination and “cultural distance” affect each other. The empirical
approach is presented in more details under the methodology section.
3The reference mentioned also includes a legal dimension of integration that is left aside in this study.
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Endogeneity certainly makes it difficult to understand the extent to which
barriers to integration reinforce each other, but ideology is a reason why voters, policy-
makers, as well as intellectuals and social scientists can develop strongly opposed views
on whether the root of integration failures is economic or cultural.4 After all, did Max
Weber not show that the beliefs and behaviors considered as desirable in certain cultures
are more conducive to work than others?5 And does employment discrimination not
affect migrants’ income, which in turn influences their consumption patterns (buying
clothes, movies, books, etc.) as well as their investment decisions (notably decisions
concerning the education of their children; see Djajic, 2003), thus limiting the economic
capacity of migrants to imitate the behaviors of natives and their access to the culture of
the host society? The debate about the causes generating integration failures is loaded,
and new evidence may help assess the relevance of existing arguments and put in them
perspective.
The next section provides a brief review of the literature on economic discrim-
ination and cultural integration, including Switzerland as a particular case. Section 2.3
presents the data and descriptive statistics. Section 2.4 introduces the empirical strat-
4This opposition is illustrated by the polemic that followed the riots in French suburbs in 2005. While
some conservative intellectuals (Alain Finkielkraut, etc.) pointed to the cultural stickiness of (Muslim)
migrants from the second or third-generation migrants in order to blame their alleged unwillingness to
integrate into French society, other social scientists (Dominique Vidal, Emmanuel Todd, etc.) portrayed
the outbreak of violence as a new version of the class struggle opposing the economically oppressed to
the social order established by the well-to-do, which has closed its doors upon them. Although this
polemic is anchored in the French context, the cliche´s used in this debate and the rationale justifying
the analysis of integration failures in ethno-cultural vs. socio-economic terms are similar in the Swiss
political debate. As a starting point, see Dominique Vidal, “Alain Finkielkraut, bouffon du roi,” Le
Monde Diplomatique, 8 January 2007.
5In the political arena, this subtle analysis often boils down to a deterministic argument claiming
that the higher unemployment rate of migrants is culturally determined, culture being itself a product
of climatic (Montesquieu) or genetic (Gobineau) factors.
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egy, which consists of (i) measuring employment discrimination faced by migrants of
different origin in the labour market (ii) computing an index of “cultural distance” to
the natives (iii) using an instrumental variable approach to deal with endogeneity in
order to estimate the effect of employment discrimination on “cultural distance” and
vice versa. Section 2.5 describes the results at the aggregate level for eight groups of
migrants, distinguishing across gender, between first and second-generation migrants as
well as between Muslim and non-Muslim individuals; it then presents the results ob-
tained at the individual level using the instrumental variable approach. The last section
concludes.
2.2 Related literature
2.2.1 A barrier to integration (I): employment discrimination
As mentioned previously, the economic integration of migrants encompasses
theirs moves across a society’s classes. Economic discrimination represents a barrier
to those moves and thus hinders their economic integration. With the development
of empirical investigation methods in social sciences, sociologists and economists found
evidence of employment, wage and other kinds of economic discrimination in many coun-
tries. In the labour market, migrant workers are usually more likely to be unemployed
than natives, they earn less and occupy positions with lower social prestige. Penalties
faced by migrants can be explained by observable individual characteristics, but they
are also caused by unobservable factors like discrimination.
As employment is at the heart of economic processes, employment discrimi-
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nation is the most crippling economic barrier to integrate the host society. In most
countries, the unemployment rate of migrants is above that of natives (Wanner et al.,
2004). In Switzerland, practice testing results show that second-generation non-EU mi-
grants have lower chances to be invited to a job interview, and that discrimination is
more severe in the Swiss German part of Switzerland (Fibbi et al., 2006). The esti-
mates of discrimination these authors obtained through practice testing will later be
put in perspective with those obtained through a decomposition of the probability to
be employed. Widmer (2005) already implemented the latter method in the Swiss con-
text. Using data from the census 2000, his findings show returns to factors are lower for
migrants. Comparing the unexplained residuals of different national groups, he argues
that although the non-transferability of human capital acquired abroad and unobserved
differences in human capital may partly explain these residuals, a substantial part of
them can be attributed to discrimination.
Few studies have examined the situation of Muslim migrants. Berthoud and
Blekesaune (2007) look at the British labour market. They first observe that unemploy-
ment rates among majority Muslim ethnic communities (Pakistani, Bangladeshi) are
much higher than among non-Muslim migrant groups. Analyzing the probability to be
employed, they find a significant negative effect for being Muslim, which supports their
claim that discrimination is at work on the British labour market, not only along ethnic,
but also along religious lines. The Open Society Institute (2009) also finds evidence of
religious discrimination, which, together with other kinds of discrimination (origin, skin
color, gender) and factors (lower human capital endowment, individual preferences, etc.)
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explain the poor integration of Muslim workers into the mainstream labour market.
2.2.2 A barrier to integration (II): cultural distance
As a subcategory of integration, cultural integration concerns the evolution of
behaviors, attitudes, daily life habits, beliefs, etc. (Wanner et al., 2002). These processes
occur in migrant communities as well as among natives, but minority groups bear the
bulk of it. The larger the initial differences in behaviours and attitudes, the more intense
will be the process of cultural integration. In this sense, cultural distance can be seen
as a barrier to cultural integration. Cultural integration is a rather novel field of study
in economics. Economists started to investigate the phenomenon of cultural integration
more than a decade ago, developing theoretical models on identity (Akerlof and Kranton,
2000) or cultural transmission (Bisin and Verdier, 2000) choices. The field of research is
expanding rapidly. However, in addition to disagreements on definitions and modeling
techniques, researchers also face constraints imposed by data when it comes to capturing
a multidimensional phenomenon like cultural integration. The articles surveyed in this
section illustrate the variety of existing theoretical and empirical approaches.
When studying migrant cultural integration using a quantitative approach, sev-
eral questions need to be considered. First, what dimensions does cultural integration
encompass? And how can it be measured? Some economists chose to build indices of
cultural integration or cultural distance to the natives. Zimmermann et al. (2006), for
instance, propose a weighted index (“ethnosizer”) that captures a person’s ethnic iden-
tity. This index is a function of individual characteristics and behaviors related to 1)
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language 2) culture 3) ethnic self-identification 4) ethnic interaction 5) migration his-
tory. Vigdor (2009) proposes another way to measure cultural integration. His index
encompasses the following individual characteristics: 1) language 2) intermarriage 3)
fertility 4) marital status, but it can easily be expanded as weights are “naturally” at-
tributed through the estimation of the probability to be born abroad. Instead of building
indices, other economists have used single variables on self-declared ethnic identity or
information considered to reveal the attachment of the interviewed migrant to a partic-
ular culture (e.g., attitude towards intermarriage). Another issue is how to deal with
the phenomenon of multiple identities? Acknowledging individuals can belong to several
cultures and instrumentalize their ethnic identities in specific contexts, some economists
have made attempts to go beyond the one-dimensional trade-off between cultures/identi-
ties, which is assumed in theoretical models. Inspired by acculturation theories of Berry
(1980), the two-dimensional ethnosizer of Zimmermann et al. (2006) takes into account
both the attachment to the origin and host country in order to distinguish between 1)
separated 2) integrated 3) assimilated and 4) marginalized migrants. The choices made
to empirically define the four categories are however a bit arbitrary and can be subject
of a debate.6 A third important question concerns the time dimension and how should
it be integrated in theoretical models and empirical investigations? Data usually enables
the distinction between first and second-generation migrants, and some datasets include
information about the time spent in the host country, but even using this information
6The variables taken to proxy for the five dimensions mentioned above are a bit thin on the ground.
As an example, the third dimension, culture, is only proxied by one indicator that is the preferred
media. This dimension is however given the same weight as other dimensions that may actually be more
informative about the attachment of a migrant to his home and host country.
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in the analysis of migrant integration is only a rough way to account for the complex
adaptation processes migrants are undergoing over time.
Quantitative studies about the cultural integration of migrants in Switzerland
are very few. The first chapter of this thesis reviews some of the literature and provides
an analysis of the cultural integration paths of 8 migrant groups. This study specifically
analyzes the evolution of objective behaviors and subjective attitudes from the first to the
second generation, looking at this evolution from different perspectives: across cohorts
(older vs. younger migrants) and across types of couples (individuals in endogamous
vs. mixed couples). The findings show that there is overall convergence in all examined
indicators.
Empirical studies on the cultural integration of Muslim migrants are also few
in numbers. Bisin et al. (2006) builds a theoretical model of ethnic identity formation
focusing on how identity choices are affected by cultural transmission and socialization
within the family, peer pressure and social interactions. Using data from the UK, they
look at the determinants of identity choices, as proxied by 1) the importance of religion
2) the attitude towards intermarriage 3) the importance of the racial composition of
schools attended by the children of the surveyed individuals. The authors find that the
main determinants are past experience of discrimination, language spoken at home and
with friends, quality of housing and structure of the family. Using the same framework
and data, Bisin et al. (2007) analyze the possibility of a distinct integration pattern for
Muslims. In their results Muslims appear to have a stronger feeling of identity than non-
Muslims. Higher household incomes as well as better qualification do not temper this
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phenomenon. Arai et al. (2008) however challenge the validity of the findings of Bisin et
al. (2007) claiming that replicated results turn out to be non-significant. Other studies
temper these findings. Georgiadis and Manning (2011) show evidence that behaviors
of individuals belonging to the two largest Muslim communities in Britain (Pakistani,
Bangladeshi) may be somewhat different, but that they converge towards the native
baseline on many cultural integration indicators. In another article (2009) they explore
the correlations between various measures of identity and indicators that commentators
have argued to be important determinants of identity (e.g., experience of discrimination,
frequency and intensity of interaction with natives). When looking at the significance
of Muslim religion compared to other religions as a determinant of cultural integration,
they don’t find evidence justifying a binary categorization of Islam vs. other religions.
2.2.3 The relationship between employment discrimination and cul-
tural distance
In theory, the causality in the relation between economic discrimination and
cultural distance goes both ways: while economically discriminated individuals may
themselves reject the cultural codes of the majority group and find a refuge in their
ethnic community, it is also true that individuals stemming from a foreign culture may
find it more difficult to understand and adapt to professional codes in the host country
in order to find (and keep) a job. Empirically, causality in this relationship is difficult
to estimate.
Battu et al. (2003) develops a model having in mind the United States and the
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relationship between whites and non-whites, but the mechanism it tries to capture is
relevant to the relationship between natives and migrants in other countries. Repeating
in other words the summary the authors make of their own one-dimensional identity
model, migrants must decide to adopt the natives’ culture or to reject it anticipating
the implications of this choice on their labour market outcomes. The model shows that
the cultural integration of migrants increases their probability of getting a job, because
interacting with undiscriminated natives offers them access to more performing social
networks. It is therefore rational to integrate culturally. However, if utility from fol-
lowing ethnic peer pressure is higher than utility derived from the access to a more
performing social network, migrants have an incentive not to integrate even if it results
in a lower probability of finding a job. Empirical evidence of Battu et al. (2010) confirms
the existence of a trade-off for ethnic minorities between sticking to their own roots and
labour market success. They find that the social environment of individuals and attach-
ments to the culture of origin has a strong association with identity choice, and that
migrants, who have preferences that accord with being “oppositional” do experience an
employment penalty. A small number of other empirical studies examines the relation-
ship between ethnic identity, cultural integration and economic outcomes.7 Pendakur
and Pendakur (2005), Constant and Zimmermann (2008), Nekby and Ro¨din (2007) also
find evidence of the effect of cultural integration on labour market outcomes in Canada,
Germany and Sweden.
The studies mentioned here focus on the choice migrants make to integrate cul-
7Most of the research looking at identity and outcomes tends to be in the field of education and
focuses on the academic achievement of African American youths.
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turally or not, and on the effect of cultural integration on labour market outcomes. Yet,
in their model Battu et al. (2003) assume that native social networks are more perform-
ing because natives aren’t discriminated against, and in other studies there is evidence
that economic discrimination is one of the main determinants of identity formation and
cultural integration.8 It is therefore surprising that these studies did not examine in
more detail the effect that economic discrimination may have on cultural integration.
The contribution of this study is to examine both sides of the coin at once. In
order to better understand how barriers to integration reinforce each other, this study
proposes to examine the endogenous relationship between economic discrimination and
cultural distance with the objective of assessing causality both ways and at the same
time.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Data and sample
The census covers 7 million individuals living in Switzerland in 2000. Sample
size decreases once individuals aged less than 18 or more than 65 years old, 9 and obser-
vations with missing information on key characteristics listed in the descriptive statistics
part are discarded. Table 2.1 shows the number of observations for natives and eight eth-
nic groups: Western Europe (WE), Southern Europe (SE), Eastern Europe (EE), Africa
8Bisin et al. (2007) find such evidence. In this study, the variable capturing discrimination is a
dummy variable taking value one if the respondent had been refused a job at least once or had been
treated unfairly at work with regard to promotion or a move to a better position for has been attacked
or insulted in the last year for reasons to do with race or color, or religious or cultural background.
9The reasons for limiting the sample are explained below.
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(AF), Turkey, the Middle-East and Maghreb (TMM), Latin America (LA), Asia (AS)
and South and Central Asia (SCA).10 Additionally, the split up is refined across gender,
between Muslim and non-Muslim and first and second-generation migrants. Natives are
defined as individuals born in Switzerland and Swiss since birth. First generation mi-
grants are born abroad. An individual born in Switzerland, but whose first or second
nationality is foreign is defined as a second-generation migrant.11
European migrants represent the bulk of migrant population, the most numer-
ous being Southern Europeans, followed by Western and Eastern Europeans. Although
TMM has a sizeable community, the five extra-European minorities are comparatively
much smaller. The same is true for the second generation. The even larger proportion of
Southern Europeans is due to the fact that Italian and Spanish migrants where the first
to come to Switzerland from the 1960s on. The relative size of the second generation is
a rough indicator of the length of stay of a group in Switzerland.
Turning to the religious distinction, it appears migrants declaring to be Muslim
are a minority in most migrant communities, except TMM. The Muslim community
from Eastern Europe, mostly from Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina is also sizeable. The
number of second-generation Latin American and Asian Muslim migrants, and to a
lesser extent of African migrants, is irrelevant for any analysis. The size of some other
Muslim groups (first-generation LA, second-generation WE, SE, AF or SCA) could be
considered problematic too, but these groups are not excluded from the analysis.
10See the general introduction for more details.
11A small fraction of second-generation migrants are included in the native group as some of them
only have the Swiss nationality since their birth. Those who are only Swiss, but were naturalized and
are of unknown origin are not included in either category.
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2.3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics about the variables used in this chapter.
These numbers already reveal differences between population groups. Looking at the
economic status of migrants, it first appears that unemployment slightly decreases for
second-generation migrants compared to first-generation migrants. Men are generally
more likely to be active in the labour market and to have a job, while more women are
inactive. However, the pool of inactive women decreases by about 10% from the first
to the second generation. Muslim migrants are on average more likely to be inactive
or unemployed. As the sample covers individuals aged 15 to 65, these differences in
economic status might be partly due to the lower average age of the Muslim population.
It might also be related to differences in types of residence permits (see below).
Turning to education, it appears the average number of years of education
is higher for men than for women.12 Second-generation migrants are more educated
compared to first-generation migrants, and come closer to the native average (12.63 years
of education). Here again, age might partly explain the fact that Muslim migrants have
the lowest average number of years of education, and second-generation men perform
worse (9.72 years) than the first generation (10.23 years).
While 66% of first-generation and 96% of second-generation migrant men de-
clare to speak a national language as their main language, these proportions fall to 38%
and 78% among Muslim migrants. They are slightly lower for women than for men.
12In the census, the available educational variable is categorical, but de Coulon et al. (2003) propose
a scale to compute the number of years of education.
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For first-generation migrants, the fact that Muslim migrants are less likely to have one
of the national languages as their main language compared to non-Muslim migrants is
related to the fact that a vast majority of non-Muslim migrants come from neighboring
countries and have as their mother tongue one of the Swiss national languages. This
factor might partly explain the persisting difference among second-generation migrants.
The proportions of migrants that speak the language of the linguistic region they are
living in as their main language is slightly lower. As natives are mobile across linguistic
regions in Switzerland, the proportion of natives having the language of the region they
are living in as their main language is above 90%, but not 100%.
Turning to civil status and household characteristics, it appears 53% of native
men (55% women) are married, a large majority of them (44%) to native women (48%
for women). First-generation migrants have higher marriage rates, but these rates drop
at the second generation, although less so for women than for men. Muslim migrants
are more likely to be married, despite the lower average age of this population group.
The rate of intermarriage with a native is 13% among first-generation men (19% for
women) and slightly decreases at the second-generation (11% and 12%). It is of 7% for
first-generation Muslim men, and as low as 3% for women. It is most surprising that
less than 2% of second-generation Muslim migrants intermarry with natives given the
high propensity of this population group to marry, even at a young age. It should also
be noted that the highest divorce rates are observed among native Muslims (6% for men
and 10% for women), but migrant Muslim have the lowest separation rates (1 to 3%).
On average, Muslims also have more children, except for native Muslim men.
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The proportion of permit holders is higher among male than female migrants,
and higher among Muslim than among non-Muslim migrants. This indicates that women
are more often naturalized than men, and that Muslim migration is a more recent phe-
nomenon, which is also reflected in the lower average age of Muslim population groups.
2.4 Methods and specifications
Using the dataset described above, the empirical strategy to estimate the en-
dogenous relationship between employment discrimination and cultural distance in order
to assess the relevance of opposed discourses explaining migrant integration in socio-
economic vs. ethno-cultural terms consists of three steps (i) measuring employment
discrimination faced by Muslim and non-Muslim migrants of different origin compared
to the natives (ii) computing an index of cultural distance to the natives (iii) using an
instrumental variable approach to deal with endogeneity and measurement errors in or-
der to estimate the reinforcing effect existing between economic and cultural barriers to
integration.
2.4.1 Employment discrimination
Employment outcomes are analyzed using a simple logistic regression:
E∗i = X
′
iα+ εi (2.1)
where E∗i is the latent variable associated with being employed in a professional occu-
pation. The vector X, includes the following individual characteristics: education (the
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number of years of education), age, age squared, number of children, as well as dum-
mies taking a value of one if an individual is married (married), if married to a Swiss
spouse (native spouse), if his main language is the language of the region where he lives
(language of the region), dummies for permit types (C, B and Other), as well as the
cantonal unemployment rate. The effects of these factors on employment are easy to
guess. Whereas education, age and language of the region are expected to increase the
probability to be employed, holding a permit and cantonal unemployment should have a
negative effect. Having a Swiss spouse should positively influence the probability to be
employed as it provides access to a larger social network, but being married and having
children usually has a different effect across gender: positive for men and negative for
women. The choice of determinants is inspired by the analysis of migrant unemployment
that Widmer (2005) made using the same data, but additionally includes information
on language and nationality of the spouse. α is a vector of coefficients and ε is a vector
of independent and identically distributed error terms. The probability to be employed
can be expressed as
Prob(E∗i > 0) = Prob(εi > −X ′iα)
= Φ(X ′iα), (2.2)
where Φ(•) is the standard normal cumulative distributive function (C.D.F.). In order
to obtain a measure of employment discrimination, the probability to be employed is
predicted twice for every individual, using the coefficients estimated for the natives (the
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reference group) and those estimated for his group. The difference in the probability to
be employed of individual i predicted using the coefficients estimated for the reference
group and those estimated for his ethnic group j is not explained by endowments, but
by differences in returns to factors. This unexplained part of the differential in the
probability to be employed,
UDEij = Prob(E∗i > 0|X ′i, αreference)− Prob(E∗i > 0|X ′i, αj), (2.3)
is used as proxy for employment discrimination. For unemployed individuals, this mea-
sure can be interpreted as realized discrimination, whereas for employed individuals it
rather represents the additional effort they needed to make to get a job compared to a
native having the exact same endowments.
To estimate αj and compute UDEij , separate regression are run over sub-
samples defined by generation, gender, origin and religion. Whereas differences in dis-
crimination according to generation, gender and origin are commonly acknowledged, it
remains to be seen if employment discrimination as measured by the decomposition of
the probability to be employed is different for Muslim and non-Muslims. As mentioned
in the literature review, evidence of religion-based discrimination has been found in other
countries. No study has so far confirmed the existence of such a bias in Switzerland, but
the acceptance by a majority of voters of the minaret ban in 2009 hints to the existence
of strong anti-Muslim feelings. It would be surprising if interactions in the labour market
were fully immune of such a strong and socially widespread phenomenon. The analysis
excludes individuals that don’t participate in the labour force, individuals aged less than
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15 years (youngest age to work in Switzerland) are excluded, as well as men aged over
65 and women aged over 62 years (pension age in Switzerland in 2000).
2.4.2 Cultural distance
As mentioned in the introduction, the concept of cultural distance has been
used in the formulation of Swiss migration policy in order to classify entire countries as
more or less culturally distant from Switzerland. This may be useful from a political
or administrative point of view, but is not suited to examine the research question.
The literature review emphasized the lack of consensus about the way to define and
empirically measure cultural distance, as well as the variety of proposals advanced so
far. All of them can be the subject of a debate. The first step in building the dissimilarity
index chosen for this study consists in a simple logistic regression
B∗i = Y
′
i β + µi (2.4)
where B∗i is the latent variable associated with being born in the host country, i.e.,
Switzerland. Following Vigdor (2009), the vector Y includes factors, which are consid-
ered as marking a cultural difference between migrants and natives in social sciences:
ability to speak the national language, being married to a native, number of children and
marital status. While adopting the language of the host country as one’s main language
is a prerequisite for cultural integration, and being married to a native represents the
incorporation of an individual into a native social network, the role of the two last factors
as a catalyst for cultural integration is less obvious. However, like the two first factors,
102
they remain potential markers differentiating individuals born in Switzerland from those
born abroad. Vector Y also includes information on age and gender.
There are several reasons for including objective indicators only in the measure
of cultural distance, and excluding information on subjective attitudes. First, this is
the solution that Vigdor (2009) proposes. Secondly, the census 2000 only contains in-
formation on objective indicators. The third reason is more complex and related to the
tentative of setting a reference point when defining/measuring cultural distance. As il-
lustrated by the political debate around the preparative text (Arbenz report) that led to
the definition of the three circles migration policy, defining differences between cultures
in terms of values often can easily lead to a “clash of cultures” worldview sometimes
bordering on racism. As an example, the Arbenz report considered that migrants from
some countries “don’t belong to the same culture marked by European ideas in the broad
sense” and that, as a consequence, “they cannot be integrated.” The Federal Commis-
sion against Racism (CFR, 1996) made a thorough criticism of implicit assumption that
the European culture is more advanced, creating impassable barriers between different
cultures. This commission also stressed the religious bias against countries majoritarily
populated by Muslims that had slipped into the definition of the circles, asking why
all of them were relegated into the third circle although some of them were located in
Europe. Furthermore, concrete issues occur when trying to set a reference point for a
cultural distance index. As an example, such an index may easily integrate information
on values regarding gender equality, because, as has been shown by Gianni et al. (2005)
or in the first chapter of this thesis, migrants living in Switzerland seem to have more
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conservative attitudes in this regard. However, it also appears that many of them are
more attached to democracy or human rights than the natives are. If information about
such attitudes was included in the measure of cultural distance, would it make sense to
consider an individual whose attachment to democracy is higher than the native average
as culturally more distant? Such a paradoxical situation illustrates that although the
measure of cultural distance proposed by Vigdor does attribute less weight to indicators
that do not significantly distinguish migrants from natives, it is not an inherently neutral
measure, and the meaning of the measure is a function of the variables included in the
index. As a consequence, it may be better to avoid using information about subjective
attitudes in such a measure.
Only one regression is run over the sample of individuals aged 25 to 65, with
different coefficients allowed across gender for certain variables. The sample is thus dif-
ferent from the sample used to estimate employment discrimination: it includes inactive
individuals that are not in the labour market; and it excludes individuals aged between
15 and 25 years old. The higher minimum age that is proposed by Vigdor (2009) can
be justified by the possibly yet incomplete socialization process of young individuals
still living with their family. For instance, a second-generation migrant living with his
parents may be more enclined to declare that his main language is the language spoken
at home, although this may change in his adult life.
In a situation where the age and gender composition of the migrant population
would be very different and have a strong effect in distinguishing individuals born abroad
from those born in Switzerland, it would be possible to implement a procedure to net-
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out the effect those factors have on the estimated probability. A transformation of the
estimated probability allowing to net-out such effects is derived in appendix.13 µ is a
vector of independent and identically distributed error terms. The probability to be
born in Switzerland can be expressed as
Prob(B∗i > 0) = Prob(µi > −Y ′i β)
= Φ(Y ′i β), (2.5)
where Φ(•) is the standard normal cumulative distributive function (C.D.F.). In order
to obtain a measure of cultural distance, the probability to be born in Switzerland is
predicted for each individual using the same coefficients. This predicted probability
is then substracted from the average predicted probability of natives to be born in
Switzerland. Let Si be a dummy taking a value 1 if individual i is a Swiss native, so
that
CDi =
∑n
i=1 Prob(B
∗
i > 0|Si = 1)∑n
i=1 Si
− Prob(B∗i > 0|Y ′i ), (2.6)
can be used as a proxy for the cultural distance to the natives of individual i. Following
Vigdor (2009), the sample used to estimate CDi includes all individuals aged 25 to 65.
13In the section presenting the results, it will appear that the effect of age and gender is not strong
enough to justify implementing the alternative procedure.
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2.4.3 Employment discrimination and cultural distance: an instrumen-
tal variable approach
Once employment discrimination and cultural distance are estimated, it is pos-
sible to examine how the group averages of these two measures correlate at the aggregate
level. A correlation analysis can provide a first hint about the relationship between these
two variables, but it needs to be confirmed or invalidated by evidence at the individual
level.
As causation is reverse between employment discrimination and cultural dis-
tance, an ordinary least square (OLS) estimator will be biased. One solution to obtain
a non-biased estimator of the effect of employment discrimination on cultural distance
and vice-versa is to use the instrumental variable (IV) approach. The intuition is that in
a model where yi = βxi+i, if the regressors are correlated with the error term, then the
OLS estimator will be biased.14 However, if there exists a variable z that is (i) correlated
with the endogenous regressor x, but (ii) not with the independent variable y, it is pos-
sible to net out the part of x that is caused by y by using the value of x predicted using
z instead of the actual value of x in the initial model in order to obtain a non-biased IV
estimator.15 The instrumental variable approach thus provides non-biased estimates in
the presence of endogeneity, which can arise from omitted variables, measurement errors
in the covariates or reverse cauasation.16
Instrumenting for the endogenous regressors in the context of this study, the
14Formally, if E[x′] 6= 0, then βˆOLS = x
′y
x′x =
x′(xβ+)
x′x = β +
x′
x′x and βˆOLS 6= β.
15If z′ = 0 by assumption, then βˆIV =
z′y
z′x = β +
z′
z′x .
16This is the intuition behind the two-stage least squares instrumental variable method. See Greene
(2003) for more details and extensions.
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two following equations are estimated:
CDi = δ ∗ UDEij + λ ∗ Z1′i + νi (2.7)
UDEij = κ ∗ CDi + θ ∗ Z2′i + ωi (2.8)
where δ represents the effect employment discrimination on cultural distance, and κ
captures the effect of cultural distance on employment discrimination. The vector of
exogenous regressors Z1i and Z2i contain a limited set of common variables, includ-
ing linguistic region dummies and the proportion of same-origin-group individuals in
the canton. Variables used to instrument for employment discrimination are also in-
cluded in vector Z1i in the regression where employment discrimination is the dependent
variable.17 The same applies to Z2i the regression on cultural distance. λ and θ are
coefficient vectors. ν and ω are error vectors.18
The instrumental variable method requires only one instrument per endogenous
regressor. However, at least two instruments are necessary to conduct tests confirming
the exogeneity of the instruments (Sargan/Hansen tests). Two instruments are therefore
proposed for each endogenous regressors. For all four instruments, it is necessary to
verify that it is (i) influencing the endogenous regressor (ii) without directly influencing
the dependent variable. Furthermore, in order to be a perfect instrument, the indirect
influence of the instrument on the independent variable should be channeled entirely
17Instruments are presented below.
18It should be noted that, alternatively, equations 2.7 and 2.8 could be estimated as a system. Results
of the simultaneous estimation of both equations provide very similar results to the ones presented in
this chapter. Each equation is estimated separately, because it is then possible to conduct various tests
to assess the quality of the proposed instruments.
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through the endogenous regressor.
Instrumenting for employment discrimination
Skin color: (i) Skin color is an obvious marker likely to influence employment discrim-
ination. In many societies, dark skin individuals have been and still are discriminated.
Switzerland is no exception. Results of the decomposition of the probability to be em-
ployed (see results section) will confirm that individuals with darker skin color still face
more intense discrimination in the Swiss labor market. (ii) Skin color, however, has no
direct impact on cultural distance. The genetic factors determining the skin color of a
migrant do not determine his ability to adopt a certain language as her main language
or to intermarry with a native. As a matter of fact, African migrants living in Switzer-
land are more likely to speak one of the national languages as their main language or
to intermarry with natives than other migrants (see first chapter). It could be argued
that skin color also indirectly affects cultural distance, but through other channels. It
is true that dark skin individuals might get rebuffed when attempting to enter a night
club, but looking at the big picture, only two (non-family) institutions really matter for
the socialization of individuals: school and the labour market. Whereas skin color-based
discrimination is at best a marginal issue in the former environment that is usually
considered as progressive (and only concerns second-generation migrants), it is acknowl-
edged to be a problem in the latter (for all migrants). It therefore seems the effect
of skin color is channeled to cultural integration through economic discrimination only.
The skin color variable is built using the human skin color distribution map designed
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by the Italian geographer Renato Biasutti and based on von Luschan’s chromatic scale,
by assigning a value between 1 (clearest) and 8 (darkest) to each observation according
to its origin.19 It is averaged for each of the eight origin regions. The value associated
with the skin color of each individual is thus a function of his origin.20
Cantonal policy to fight against xenophobia: (i) Policies to fight against xenopho-
bia target the natives in order to foster a better understanding among communities and
attenuate existing discriminations. This in turn facilitates the integration of migrants in
the host society. (ii) As policies to fight against xenophobia do not directly target mi-
grants, they do not directly affect the measure of cultural distance. As for the previous
instrument, it is possible to imagine a situation where such policies could affect cultural
distance by reducing other kinds of discrimination than economic discrimination. For
example, if a migrant is barred from entering a night club, he might develop bad feel-
ings against natives or an “oppositional” attitude against their culture. It is however
important to keep in mind the big picture that was mentioned in relation to the previous
instrument and how cultural distance is measured. After all, do most couples not meet
at the workplace? And are most daily conversations not held at the workplace? Employ-
ment discrimination is therefore again considered to be the only channel through which
such policies affect cultural distance. More importantly, it remains to be seen if such
policies have an impact at all. This policy variable is built using the typology developed
by Cattacin and Kaya (2001). In their comparative study of integration policies at the
19The map is available in Barsh (2003).
20The measurement and mapping differences between human population groups began in the 19th
century, with the work of anthropologists and geographers often inspired by racists ideologies (Winlow,
2006). The use of a skin color scale variable in the context of this thesis is an artifact, and is not intended
to legitimate this tradition of thought.
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local level in Switzerland. The authors classify the 26 Swiss cantons in two categories:
active/passive in “leading campaigns to sensibilize the public to cultural diversity and
fight against racism and xenophobia.” This categorization is based on the assessment
of the extent to which cantons are involved in/support the organization of events like
the National Day of Refugees or activities to increase public awareness about foreign
cultures and ethnic diversity.
Instrumenting for cultural distance
Official language in the origin country: (i) If the origin country of a migrant and
Switzerland share a common official language, it is likely he has been exposed or has
learned this language. As a consequence, this variable is likely to directly influence the
measure of cultural distance. (ii) However, the fact that the origin country of a migrant
and Switzerland share a common official language, even if it may improve the probability
that an individual is employed, does not influence employment discrimination, i.e., dif-
ferences in returns to factors determining the probability to be employed. This variable
is built using publicly available information about official national languages across the
world.21
Cantonal policy on naturalization: (i) Academic research has found evidence that
facilitated naturalization procedures positively influence attitudes of migrants towards
the host country as well as their cultural integration (Fibbi et al., 2005; Mey and Rorato,
2010). It is therefore plausible that an individual that is offered the opportunity to
21German and Italian are official languages in only a handful of countries. For French, see
http://www.francophonie.org.
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acquire the nationality of the host country is more likely to adopt the official language
of that country as his main language than an individual who is deprived from this
perspective. Variations in cantonal naturalization policies may thus have a positive
impact on the proposed measure of cultural distance. (ii) Such policies do however not
directly influence how migrants are discriminated when looking for a job. This policy
variable is built using the typology developed by Cattacin and Kaya (2001). In their
comparative study of integration policies at the local level in Switzerland, the authors
classify the 26 Swiss cantons according to their liberal/restrictive naturalization policy.
This categorization is based on the assessment of five binary criteria (i) the existence of
a fast-track procedure (ii) the possibility to challenge the official decision (iii) the fact
that naturalization is considered a right (iv) whether the duration of residence in the
canton is short and (v) whether the criteria used in the naturalization procedure are
stringent or not.
Three estimators
Three different estimators are used to estimate parameters in equations 2.7 and
2.8: OLS, IV two-stage least squares (2SLS) and IV general methods of moments (GMM)
allowing for clustered errors within origin groups. Allowing for clustered standard errors
might address potential issues arising from the fact that origin is used in measuring
employment discrimination and in building the skin color variable. Four sets of separate
regressions are run on women and men of the first and second generation.
Ideally, a model to investigate the relationship between economic discrimination
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and cultural distance would allow non-linear effects and estimate causality over time.
While it is possible to add squared endogenous regressors in equation 2.7 and 2.8, cross-
sectional evidence about the effect of employment discrimination on cultural distance
(and vice-versa) is the best that can be obtained with census data.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Employment discrimination
Tables 2.3 to 2.6 show the results of the estimation of the probability to be
employed (equation 2.1) for men and women of different generation, origin and religion.
Human capital is taken into account and has a positive effect on it. For most groups, edu-
cation raises the probability to be employed. In comparison to natives, the magnitude of
the effect is often stronger for first-generation migrants, but weaker for second-generation
migrants. These results seem to weaken the argument about the non-transferability of
human capital and strengthen the claim that employment discrimination is at work on
the Swiss labor market. Indeed, if human capital was non-transferable across countries,
returns to education of first-generation should be lower. And if there were no discrim-
ination, second-generation should experience similar returns to education as natives.
Widmer (2005) draws the same conclusion. The fact that he uses three dummies for
categories of educational achievement instead of a continuous variable allows him to
go into a more detailed analysis. The other human capital characteristic, speaking the
language of the region as one’s main language, has a positive effect too.
For men, being married and having children increases the probability of being
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employed, while the opposite is true for women. However, being married to a native
increases the likelihood of having a job, which supports the hypothesis that the integra-
tion in a native family and tapping into its social network facilitates the mobilization of
resources when it comes to looking for a job. First and second-generation migrants who
have received the Swiss nationality have better chance to be employed than those still
holding a permit.22 Finally, a higher proportion of unemployed individuals in the canton
negatively affects the probability to be employed. These results are also consistent with
those obtained by Widmer (2005). They are displayed for the sake of transparence, but
not commented further here, as the number of groups considered is large and the focus
of this section is the unexplained part of the probability to be employed.
Table 2.7 reports summary statistics of all the regressions. Since the purpose
is not to compare the goodness-of-fit of different specification for a given sample, the
pseudo R-squared of these logistic regressions can’t be compared to each other and only
have an indicative value. The chi-squared statistic allows to test whether the model
proposed is better than a random walk. The p-values of F tests indicate that the null
hypothesis that all coefficients in the model are simultaneously zero can be rejected in
most cases with a high level of confidence. However, the iterative estimation process
could not converge for several small samples (second-generation Muslim women from
WE, AF, LA, AS and SCA as well as second-generation Muslim men from SE, LA and
AS) or many determinants dropped due to collinearity (second-generation Muslim WE
and SCA men, second-generation Muslim).23. Furthermore, the null hypothesis cannot
22Permit C is a permanent residence permit, permit B is an annual work permit.
23Summary statistics are shown for these groups, but regression results are not showsn in table 2.4
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be rejected with a 1% level of confidence for some other groups for which the procedure
did converge (native Muslim women, first-generation Muslim women from WE, LA and
AS; second-generation women from LA and second-generation Muslim women from SE;
first-generation Muslim men from LA; second-generation men from AF, TMM, LA and
second-generation Muslim men from WE and AF).
Based on these estimations, table 2.8 reports the average value of the unex-
plained part of the probability to be employed for each population group. Average
UDEij for each group j are also graphically represented in figure 2.1. According to
these estimates, migrants seem to be at a disadvantage in the labour market, and Mus-
lim migrants seem to be doubly disadvantaged for their origin and for their religion. A
first-generation female African migrant, for instance, has -13.1% chance of being em-
ployed compared to a native with similar characteristics, and if she were also Muslim,
the employment probability gap grows to -24.3%.
It is true that census data doesn’t provide information on the number of years
spent by an individual in Switzerland, and that this matters in the labour market. This is
an important issue as Muslim migration is a rather recent phenomenon. The more intense
employment discrimination faced by Muslim migrants, however doesn’t disappear in the
second generation. The only exception concerns second-generation males from TMM.
For this group, the discrimination related to origin still exists, but not the one related
to being a Muslim. On possible explanation could be that, facing difficult circumstances
in the labour market, young Muslims turn to self-employment working for small family
and they don’t appear in figure 2.1.
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businesses (restaurants, grocery shops, etc.) as has been observed in Germany (Constant
and Zimmermann, 2006).
The stronger discrimination faced by female migrants could be explained by
the fact that their decision to migrate is more often related to family reunion. As a
consequence, many of them have to look for a job once they are in Switzerland. In
contrast, male migration is more often triggered by a concrete job opportunity. A higher
number of men therefore have a job when they arrive in Switzerland and don’t have to
look for one. This interpretation is also consistent with the fact that differences across
gender dampen among second-generation migrants.
There are other ways to estimate employment discrimination faced by migrants
and it is interesting to compare different measures of discrimination. An alternative
method is to include origin dummies in a regression estimating the probability to be
employed of all individuals active in the labour market. As this method does not measure
differences in returns to factors, but the effect of origin on the probability to be employed
after controlling for individual characteristics, it is more relevant to call this measure
“employment penalty” rather than “employment discrimination.” Results of this method
applied to the same sample are graphically represented in figure 2.2. Although there
are differences, both approaches provide estimates that are quite close and lead to a
conclusion that migrants are discriminated in the labour market, along ethnic as well as
religious lines.
Pratice testing is yet another method to estimate employment discrimination.
This method consists in having two fictitious candidates, who differ only in their name
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and country of origin, send two letters of application for job vacancies advertised in
the newspapers. Qualifications, experience, sex, age, and all the employability criteria
are identical. There is inequality of treatment when one candidate is refused and the
other invited to a job interview. Fibbi et al. (2005) conducted such a study for a
limited number of second-generation male migrants living in Switzerland and found much
higher estimates of employment discrimination.24 Portuguese and Turks migrants are
respectively 9.6%, 30.1% less likely be invited to a job interview than a native. Migrants
from former Yugoslavia face a discrimination level of 23.5% in the Latin region and to
59.4% in the German region. In table 2.8, estimates of employment discrimination for
second-generation Southern European, Turks and Eastern Europeans are much lower:
0.7%, 7.2% and 3.7% respectively. The ordering, however, is respected. The difference in
the magnitude of the estimated level of employment discrimination is caused by the fact
that most migrants facing employment discrimination will prefer to accept a job involving
less prestige and a lower pay rather than remain unemployed, resulting in a kind of forced
”self-selection” of migrants into lower category occupations. A decomposition of the
probability to be employed is blind to this phenomenon. As a consequence, the method
used in this study provides a very conservative measure of employment discrimination.
2.5.2 Cultural distance
Table 2.9 shows the results of the estimation of the probability to be born
in Switzerland. Language is the strongest predictor. Having a national language as
24In the ILO methodlogy used in their study, employment discrimination is defined as the ratio between
the number of positive answers given to the foreign applicant minus the number of positive answers given
to the Swiss candidate and the number of total valid observations.
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one’s main language increases by 79% the probability to be born in Switzerland. Being
married increases by about 40% the probability to be a first-generation migrant, while
being married to a native decreases it by 40%. First-generation migrants are more
likely to be divorced or widowed than individuals born in Switzerland by about 10%.
The effect related to the number of children is very weak. The strongly negative log
likelihood statistics confirms the relevance of the model.
The cultural dissimilarity measure proposed by Vigdor (2009) has the advan-
tage of not arbitrarily weighting factors composing it. As a consequence, the cultural
distance index, CDi, is dominated by language and intermarriage. The influence of other
factors is comparatively marginal. On the one hand, the dominance of these two factors
is interesting as it reveals the marginality of other variables in distinguishing individu-
als born in Switzerland from those born abroad. On the other hand, the limitations it
implies for the meaning of the cultural distance measure should be kept in mind when
interpreting the results.
The average cultural distance of each population group is displayed in table
2.10 and represented graphically in figure 2.3. Among first generation migrant men, WE
migrants are closest to natives, followed by SE, AF and TMM migrants. EE, LA, AS,
and SCA migrants have lower average index values. First-generation female migrants are
similar, but the ordering is different, as AF and TMM migrants have higher index values
than SE migrant women. In all origin groups, Muslim migrants are slightly more distant
from natives than other migrants, except for the other SCA migrants, who happen to
also have the largest average cultural distance among all groups.
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Second-generation migrants all progress compared to the first generation. The
average index value of those most distant from the natives at the first generation generally
increases most. Among non-Muslim migrants, distance shrinks most for Eastern Euro-
peans migrants and, among Muslim migrants, all non-European groups progress even
more. Overall, migrant women seem to be culturally slightly stickier than men. Fur-
thermore, although the cultural distance to the natives shrinks for second-generation mi-
grants in comparison to the first generation, the gap between Muslims and non-Muslims
migrants slightly increases, especially for Muslim women. As an example and in contrast
to non-Muslim Eastern European migrants, Muslim women from this region have the
worst score among all second-generation migrants and progress relatively little compared
to the first generation. While such differences in outcome may partly be explained by
cultural factors, it might also be caused by other factors, including economic discrimi-
nation as will be shown later.25
2.5.3 Employment discrimination and cultural distance: an endoge-
nous and asymetric relationship
(i) At the aggregate level
Figure 2.4 represents the correlation between average employment discrimina-
tion and cultural distance measured in the two previous sections.26 The trends and
confidence intervals are set without taking natives into account. As the employment
25The outlier in the fourth panel of figure 2.3 (Muslim AS women) can be explained by the very
small size of this group (3 observations, see table 2.1). In such a small sample, it can occur that the
characteristics pushing up the average index score (in this case, the fact of being married with a native)
are more concentrated than in the native population itself.
26In figure 2.4, Muslim origin labels are in minor case appended with “m.”
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penalty of natives is null and their average cultural distance index value is naturally the
highest, the reference group is an outlier that shouldn’t be included.
Several patterns appear in the distribution of correlation points in figure 2.4.
First, most correlation points belonging to Muslim groups lie below the correlation trend
line in all four panels of figure 2.4. This should not come as a surprise as it directly
derives from results obtained in the two previous sections: in comparison to a non-
Muslim migrant with the same cultural distance score, a Muslim migrant faces higher
employment discrimination in the Swiss labor market.
Secondly, correlation points of the first generation are more dispersed than
those of the second-generation. The same is observable for men with respect to women.
The fact that most correlation points lie within the 95% confidence intervals in the panel
for second-generation women indicates that the relationship between employment dis-
crimination and cultural distance may be statistically most consistent for this particular
population group.
Finally, the slope of the trend lines may provide an intuition about the elas-
ticity of cultural distance with respect to employment discrimination (and vice versa).
Overall, it seems that a small reduction in employment discrimination is matched by a
larger change in cultural distance. Furthermore, the steeper slopes observed in female
panels hint to the possibility that the cultural integration of women is less influenced by
the intensity of employment discrimination than it is the case for men, whose cultural
integration is more dependent on fair access to jobs. Keeping in mind how the measure
of cultural distance is constructed, this might also be related to the higher intermarriage
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rate of female migrants in comparison to men. In any case, given the endogeneity of
the relationship, such a hypothesis needs to be verified at the individual level using an
instrumental variable approach.
(ii) At the individual level
Tables 2.12 and 2.13 contain results of the instrumental variable approach used
to estimate the endogenous relationship between economic discrimination and cultural
distance. Table 2.12 presents the results of the estimated effect of employment discrimi-
nation on cultural distance, and table 2.13 the results of the estimated effect of cultural
distance on employment discrimination. Both contain two panels: Panel A with struc-
tural (second-stage) coefficients associated with the endogenous regressor and Panel B
with reduced form (first-stage) coefficients associated to instruments. In each panel,
results are shown separately for men and women of the first and the second genera-
tion in order to enable comparison. Three different estimators are presented for each
relationship: OLS, IV 2SLS and IV GMM allowing for clustered errors within origin
groups.
Summary statistics report the number of observations, a goodness of fit mea-
sure (R-squared) and an assessment of the relevance of the model against a random walk
(F test). Additional statistics are reported in order to gauge the relevance of the pro-
posed instrumental approach and of the instruments: the p-value of the Sargan/Hansen
overidentification test of all instruments; the weak identification Cragg-Donald Wald F
statistic/Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic together with a benchmark (i.e the critical
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values established by Stock and Yogo). Other complementary results like the value of
the F test of excluded instruments and its p-value as well as the p-value of an underiden-
tification test are commented in the text, but not reported in order to avoid overloading
results tables.
The steps followed to assess results of the instrumental variable approach con-
sist in first looking at the F test of excluded instruments, which is a test of weak identifi-
cation of endogenous regressors. It is constructed by partialling-out linear projections of
the remaining endogenous regressors. Like other F tests, it allows to reject (or accept)
the null hypothesis that including the instruments in the model does not lead to a better
statistical fit. A rule of thumb is that if the value of the F test is larger than 10, then
instruments are good.
The Sargan/Hansen test is a test of overidentifying restrictions. The joint null
hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the
error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated
equation. A rejection casts doubt on the validity of the instruments. It is therefore
desirable that the null hypothesis can’t be rejected with a high level of confidence. A
p-value>0.1 is usually considered satisfactory.
Finally, even when the Sargan/Hansen test is passed successfully, it might be
that the estimated equation is underidentified or that weak instruments introduce a bias
in the estimation of the effect of the endogenous regressor. The first issue is addressed
through a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test of the null hypothesis that the equation is
underidentified, i.e., that the excluded instruments are not relevant, meaning not corre-
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lated with the endogenous regressors. Stock and Yogo (2002) have developed a method
to address the second problem. By comparing the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic or
the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic to the critical values calculated by Stock and
Yogo, it is possible to estimate the bias that might be introduced by weak instruments.
The critical values they established for one endogenous regressor and two instruments
are the following:
10% IV size bias = 19.93;
15% IV size bias = 11.59;
20% IV size bias = 8.75;
25% IV size bias = 7.25.
As an example, even if the first-stage F test of excluded instruments is strong, a Cragg-
Donald Wald F statistic of 15 is still introducing a bias of 10% to 15% in the measure
of the effect of the endogenous regressor.
Reduced form: Looking at first-stage results (Panel B in both tables), it
appears that variables proposed to instrument for employment discrimination (skin color,
cantonal policy to fight against xenophobia) and cultural distance (official language in
origin country, cantonal naturalization policy) all have the expected sign. Cantonal
policy variables are more often statistically not different from zero than the two other
instruments. This is not surprising as cantonal policy variables can only be expected
to have a weak effect through the difference in proportions of well/weakly integrated or
more/less discriminated migrants living in Swiss cantons.
Instrument coefficient variations across generations and gender also provide
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some insights. The effect of skin color as a determinant of employment discrimination
is stronger for female compared to male migrants, but it plays a lesser role for second-
generation migrants. The same can be observed for cantonal policy to fight xenophobia.
These decreasing effects could mean that those variables matter less for men or for
second-generation migrants, but it is also because measured employment discrimination
is smaller for men and second-generation migrants that the estimated effect is smaller.
That said, while the effect of the cantonal policy to fight xenophobia is indeed positive
but infinitesimal, being of dark skin color remains a strong factor of discrimination
among second-generation migrants. Concretely, it increases the unexplained employment
probability gap by 9.66% for women, and by 3.42% for men.27
Turning to variables used to instrument for cultural distance, it appears that
the cultural distance score of a migrant improves if Switzerland and his origin country
share a common official language. While, this factor matters less for second-generation
migrants, the effect of cantonal naturalization policy is more important for them. This
variable remains a feable determinant of cultural distance, but it is remarkable that its
effect increases when the dependent variable (cultural distance) is on average smaller for
second-generation compared to first-generation migrants. As both independent variables
are dummies and the measure of cultural distance in this last part is normalized (see table
2.11), coefficients can be readily interpreted.28 As an example, if a second-generation
27As the skin color scale goes from 1 to 8, and the highest value attributed to AF and SCA migrants
is 7, multiplying the coefficients estimated for skin color (in panel B of table 2.12) by 7 provides an
estimate of the employment discrimination increase due to skin color.
28Once normalized, an increase by one unit in cultural distance can be interpreted as the difference
existing between the individual that is culturally most distant from the average non-Muslim Swiss
national (an individual in an endogamous couple who doesn’t speak one of the official Swiss language as
her main language) and the individual that displays the exact same cultural characteristics as an average
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female migrant (see regression 12 in table 2.13) originally comes from a francophone
country, this reduces the cultural distance separating her from natives by 12.4%. If
the canton in which she resides has a liberal naturalization procedure, this reduces the
cultural distance by 1.42%.
Common factors (not reported here for the sake of simplicity) also provide an
interesting insight. Dummies for the French and Italian-speaking regions have a positive
and significant effect on both cultural distance and employment penalty. This seems to
indicate that migrants are better integrated and less discriminated in the Latin parts of
Switzerland. While it might be argued that the learning the Swiss German dialect repre-
sents a bigger hurdle to cultural integration than learning French or Italian, it is difficult
to find such an argument to explain the seemingly higher employment discrimination in
the German-speaking region. Other practice testing studies have also found that dis-
crimination according to origin is higher in the German part of Switzerland (Fibbi et al.,
2006), but this study is not designed to address this question. The proportion of same-
origin individuals in the canton also has a positive and generally significant effect on
employment discrimination, and a negative effect on cultural distance. This could mean
that while ethnic networks might be helpful in searching for a job, a stronger density of
same-origin migrants also reinforces intra-group interactions, including the preservation
of origin country language and endogamous marriage.
Structural form: Several observations can be made when comparing the
results of OLS with the second-stage of the IV 2SLS and IV GMM estimations in the
representative belonging to the reference group.
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upper panels. First, while IV estimates seem to converge, OLS estimates vary more
in magnitude and sometimes even have the wrong sign, which indicates that there is a
bias caused by endogneity.29 Second, in comparison to robust standard errors, allowing
for robust and clustered standard errors within origin groups (IV GMM) weakens the
statistical significance of estimated coefficients.
As is readily visible, most tests don’t pose any problem in table 2.13, whereas
test results are less clear-cut in table 2.12. It appears second-generation women are the
only group for which the statistical significance of the estimated coefficient and the rele-
vance of the proposed instrumental approach can be established both ways (regressions
11, 12, 23, 24).
Starting with second-generation women in table 2.12, it appears that all tests
are fine in regression 11. When error terms are clustered in regression 12, the p-value
of the F test of excluded instruments remains good (0.01), the p-value of the underi-
dentification test is a bit high (0.13), and the value of the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F
statistic (7.36) indicates there is a bias in the estimated coefficient of about 25%. Even
with this bias, the IV estimate remains informative as the coefficient (3.693) is about
twice as large as the one estimated by OLS (1.824).
For other groups, the IV estimate is also larger than the OLS estimate (for
second-generation men, the estimated effect even turns from negative to positive), but
one of the tests always fails. In regressions 3, 6 and 9 the coefficients are insignificant.
In regressions 2 and 5 allowing for clustered errors, the Hansen test is not good, but it
29See the negative coefficients in the regressions made on second-generation male samples.
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is close to pass in regression 8 for second-generation men.
These mixed results could be interpreted as a challenge to the claim that em-
ployment discrimination influences cultural distance, but it is more likely to reflect the
difficulty of finding a perfect instrument in this context to obtain a non-biased estimate
using the instrumental variable approach. A strict interpretation of tests results would
be that employment discrimination hinders the cultural integration of second-generation
women, but not of second-generation men. There is however no reason to believe that
the existence of such an effect is gender-specific. In this situation, it is more realistic to
point out the limitations of the proposed method, than to assume that results faithfully
mirror a complex reality, which remains difficult to approach with quantitative tools.
The magnitude of the IV estimates should be interpreted as local average treat-
ment effects rather than average treatment effects (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). In other
words, an IV estimate only reveals the effect for the subpopulations that are most af-
fected by observed changes in the instrument. As a consequence, the estimated effect of
employment discrimination on cultural distance is only revealed for dark skin subpopu-
lations.
Table 2.14 shows the results of a simple comparative statics exercise were UDEj
or CDj to vanish or to increase by one standard deviation SD. The first part of ta-
ble 2.14 shows that the cultural distance score of representative individuals from dark
color skin groups first-generation migrants would be only moderately affected, were em-
ployment discrimination to disappear (UDEj = 0). Most second-generation migrants
would, however, reach a score of about 2 and close the cultural gap. For several groups
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(second-generation Muslim men) the disappearance of employment discrimination leads
the cultural distance score to exceed the maximum value of 2. Such unrealistic outcomes
can easily occur in simple linear models. For comparison, the last column illustrates a
less dramatic scenario were UDEj would not disappear, but change by one standard
deviation.
Turning to estimates of the effect of cultural distance on employment discrim-
ination in table 2.13, it appears that the significance of the effect is established in all
regressions without clustered errors. When clusters are introduced, the p-value of un-
deridentification tests increases above 0.1, except for first-generation women. The value
of the F test of excluded instruments however remains above 10 for all groups, and
the estimate of the effect for second-generation men is the only to suffer from a weak
instrument bias (of 15%).
As the main instrument is a dummy taking a value of 1 when the origin country
of the migrant shares a common official language with Switzerland, no population group
is more affected by a change in the instrument than any other group. The comparative
statics exercise in table 2.14 shows the change in employment discrimination if cultural
distance were to vanish (CDi = 0). As the average measured employment discrimination
is already very low, most groups end up with positive employment discrimination. First-
generation Muslim migrants are the only exceptions. This unrealistic outcome again
highlights the limitations of this simple linear model and the caution necessary when
interpreting the results. In the last column, the more moderate scenario of a one standard
deviation increase in cultural distance provides more reasonable results.
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After having looked separately at results in tables 2.12 and 2.13, it is possible
to make several comments about the magnitude of estimated coefficients across tables.
Firstly, given that the measures of employment discrimination and cultural distance
both span over a space of approximately 1 (see table 2.11), the effect of employment
discrimination on cultural distance (that is estimated to range from 1.07 to 5.745) seems
larger than the reverse effect (that is estimated to range from 0.0261 to 0.192). However,
as already mentioned, IV estimates can be interpreted as local average treatment effect,
not as average treatment effects, and they are non-biased only for the subpopulation
most affected by changes in the instrument, not for the whole sample. In the current
context, these results for instance indicate that, for second-generation African women,
the negative effect of employment discrimination on cultural distance is stronger than the
reverse effect. In that sense, economic discrimination is a stronger impediment to their
integration than cultural distance is. But the specificity of the instrumental variable
approach doesn’t allow to consider this explanation as valid for the whole sample or for
subpopulations that do not experience any change in the instruments (for instance EE
migrants).
Secondly, table 2.11 also shows that, although the measures of employment
discrimination and cultural distance both span over a space of approximately 1, obser-
vations are more densely regrouped in the former, which has a smaller standard error.
As mentioned previously, the method employed to measure employment discrimination
is very conservative, because it is blind to the channeling of migrants (or “self-selection”
of migrants) into lower-pay or lower-prestige occupations. As a result, measured em-
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ployment discrimination is low for many migrant groups. With a measurement method
considering the self-selection of migrants into lower-pay and lower-prestige occupations
as part of employment discrimination, the distribution of the employment discrimination
would be more dispersed. With a less conservative measure of employment discrimina-
tion, the estimated effect on cultural distance would probably be less pronounced.
Despite the limitations of the methodology proposed in this study, the results
obtained through the instrumental variable approach allow several observations that are
interesting from a policy point of view. First, the relationship between employment
discrimination and cultural distance is indeed endogenous, and it is necessary to take re-
verse causation into account when discussing it. Secondly, the reinforcing effects between
employment discrimination and cultural distance are stronger for second-generation mi-
grants in comparison for fist-generation migrants. Finally, it seems that the effect of
employment discrimination on cultural distance is dominating the one cultural distance
exerts on employment discrimination, at least for subpopulations for which the IV esti-
mates can be interpreted. These findings are interesting as they indicate that a policy
aiming at integrating migrants should pay special attention to achieve a level playing field
and uphold equal employment opportunities for migrants, especially second-generation
migrants.
It should be noted that these findings are robust to changes in the measure of
employment discrimination and cultural distance as well as changes in sample compo-
sition. Similar results not shown here can be obtained using a measure of employment
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penalty30 or an alternate measure of cultural distance.31 Excluding groups for which the
p-value of the F test in table 2.7> 0.01 from the sample doesn’t affect the results signifi-
cantly. Neither does excluding from the sample migrants originating from neighbouring
countries. Ideally, different instruments and covariates should be included in order to
test various specifications. However, it is very difficult to make an argument for includ-
ing further covariates available in the census in the proposed specification. Furthermore,
it is difficult to find instruments satisfying the required conditions in a context where
instruments, endogenous regressors and independent variables are linked in a complex
web of relationships.
2.6 Discussion
The main findings of this investigation into the relationship between economic
discrimination and cultural integration of migrants in Switzerland can be summarized
as follows:
• Evidence at the aggregate level
– Population groups facing higher employment penalties are culturally more
distant from the natives.
– Muslim communities are no different in this regard: their specificity relies
30As mentioned earlier, employment penalties can be estimated by including origin dummies in a
regression in the whole sample rather than comparing returns to factors across subsamples. As a conse-
quence, all migrants belonging to one group suffer the same employment penalty.
31As mentioned above and detailed in the appendix, it is possible to net-out the effect of non-cultural
factors like age or gender from the cultural distance index. However, if these effects are negligible, it is
more intuitive to keep it simple and avoid transforming an index that still requires careful interpretation.
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more in the stronger discrimination they face in the labour market than in
the “cultural distance” separating them from natives.
• Evidence at the individual level
– The relationship between economic discrimination (as proxied by employment
discrimination) and cultural integration (as proxied by “cultural distance”) is
indeed endogenous, and it is necessary to take reverse causation into account
when discussing it.
– The reinforcing effects between employment discrimination and “cultural dis-
tance” are stronger for second-generation migrants in comparison for first-
generation migrants.
– The effect of employment discrimination on “cultural distance” is dominating
the one “cultural distance” exerts on employment discrimination, at least for
subpopulations for which the IV estimates can be interpreted.
• Other findings are that skin color does indeed play a significant role in explaining
economic discrimination, and that originating from a country that shares a common
official language with Switzerland facilitates cultural integration. Additionally,
liberal cantonal naturalization policies seem to facilitate the cultural integration
of second-generation migrants.
The findings of this study rely on a methodology constrained by the difficulty of
measuring complex concepts. As a consequence, the measure of employment discrimina-
tion and cultural integration are rather conservative or restrictive. The approach is also
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constrained by the structure of census data and the absence of a time horizon. Despite
these limitations, cross-section data provides convincing evidence.
In the context of the current migration and integration debate unfolding in
Switzerland and in many other Western countries, and the strong focus on Muslim
migrants, the findings summarized above stress the importance of equal economic op-
portunities for the integration of migrants, especially second-generation migrants. It
is of course possible to argue that migrants who don’t adopt the language of the host
country and don’t mix with the natives are a cause of integration failures, but evidence
gathered here doesn’t support the argument that cultural factors are dominant in the
integration process. Overall, without prejudging whether/the extent to which diversity
is desirable for the Swiss society, these findings tend to stress the relevance of the liberal
narrative as opposed to the conservative/right wing narrative, and promote the analysis
of integration processes in socio-economic rather than in ethno-cultural terms.
Finally, several recommendations can be derived from this investigation of the
reinforcing effects existing between economic and cultural barriers to integration. First,
it appears that policy-makers concerned with migration and integration issues should
support further research on that topic to enhance the understanding of migrant inte-
gration processes, which is required for an informed public debate and policy decisions.
Second, in designing successful integration policies, policy-makers should fully take into
account the need to provide economic opportunities to migrants, and especially make ad-
ditional efforts to ensure equal economic opportunities are granted to second-generation
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migrants of all origins.32 Tolerating or being indifferent to discriminations against indi-
viduals born in Switzerland bears undesirable consequences that can be prevented. As
supported by evidence presented in this chapter, offering migrants the perspective of
fully integrating the Swiss society as a citizen through liberal naturalization policies has
a positive impact on their cultural integration. Other policies might need to be modified
or strengthened, like the policy to fight against xenophobia, whose effectiveness in re-
ducing discrimination couldn’t be clearly established. Most importantly, policy-makers
who insist on the dominance of ethno-cultural factors in determining the outcome of in-
tegration processes should be asked to provide more than anecdotal evidence in support
of their arguments.
32It may well be that Italian and Spanish second-generation migrants are show cases for integration
(Bolzmann and Fibbi, 2003), but results obtained in this study, which confirm the successful integration of
Southern European second-generation migrants, also show other migrants have a harder time integrating
the labour market and that this hinders their integration.
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Tables and figures
Table 2.1: Sample
MEN WOMEN
Other Muslim Other Muslim
CH 1557425 1430 1522658 1584
1st generation
WE 123171 712 166045 887
SE 166218 179 132397 154
EE 68110 46609 80093 37597
AF 9748 2073 11515 1384
TMM 12830 28941 10204 21403
LA 11217 46 26009 59
AS 10711 281 24728 506
SCA 13274 3360 10382 1880
All 1st 415279 82201 461373 63870
2nd generation
WE 13734 53 13656 49
SE 67427 67 58042 101
EE 5379 1700 5322 1475
AF 199 19 215 20
TMM 971 3906 900 3336
LA 256 0 398 3
AS 290 5 349 3
SCA 327 79 265 42
All 2nd 88583 5829 79147 5029
ALL 2061287 89460 2063178 70483
Source: Swiss census, 2000
Note: Sample limited to individuals aged 18 to 65 with non-missing information on variables of interest.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics
MEN WOMEN
VARIABLE Other Muslim Other Muslim DESCRIPTION
employed Natives 0.860 0.790 0.682 0.623 1 if employed
1st gen 0.843 0.767 0.635 0.486
2nd gen 0.834 0.712 0.736 0.567
unemployed Natives 0.016 0.042 0.019 0.059 1 if unemployed
1st gen 0.036 0.087 0.056 0.152
2nd gen 0.034 0.067 0.038 0.102
inactive Natives 0.122 0.166 0.298 0.316 1 if inactive
1st gen 0.120 0.144 0.307 0.361
2nd gen 0.130 0.219 0.224 0.330
yearsed Natives 12.63 12.07 11.71 11.51 number of years of education
1st gen 11.86 10.23 11.53 9.24
2nd gen 12.07 9.72 11.72 9.27
lang Natives 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.99 1 if main language is a national language
1st gen 0.66 0.38 0.63 0.32
2nd gen 0.96 0.78 0.96 0.73
langreg Natives 0.94 0.87 0.93 0.89 1 if main language is that of the region
1st gen 0.47 0.36 0.49 0.31
2nd gen 0.82 0.76 0.82 0.71
single Natives 0.39 0.36 0.33 0.22 1 if single
1st gen 0.22 0.21 0.16 0.16
2nd gen 0.61 0.63 0.52 0.53
married Natives 0.53 0.55 0.55 0.65 1 if married
1st gen 0.70 0.75 0.71 0.78
2nd gen 0.34 0.34 0.42 0.44
widow Natives 0.006 0.005 0.026 0.017 1 if widow
1st gen 0.007 0.002 0.031 0.017
2nd gen 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.003
separated Natives 0.059 0.068 0.079 0.104 1 if separated/divorced
1st gen 0.060 0.031 0.086 0.031
2nd gen 0.034 0.012 0.046 0.021
spouse Natives 0.448 0.197 0.482 0.153 1 if married to a native spouse
1st gen 0.130 0.074 0.198 0.036
2nd gen 0.112 0.014 0.121 0.011
children Natives 1.13 1.04 1.27 1.41 number of children
1st gen 1.35 1.65 1.39 1.83
2nd gen 0.54 0.68 0.68 0.81
permisC Natives 0 0 0 0 1 if holder of a permis C
1st gen 0.57 0.51 0.40 0.46
2nd gen 0.71 0.74 0.58 0.64
permisB Natives 0 0 0 0 1 if holder of a permis B
1st gen 0.18 0.29 0.19 0.37
2nd gen 0.014 0.078 0.016 0.124
permisO Natives 0 0 0 0 1 if holder of another typer of permit
1st gen 0.057 0.086 0.037 0.073
2nd gen 0.006 0.019 0.005 0.016
age Natives 39.9 37.2 40.0 36.4 age
1st gen 42.1 34.8 41.7 33.3
2nd gen 30.2 25.7 29.9 25.1
Source: Swiss census, 2000.
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Table 2.7: Summary statistics of the probability to be employed
Natives WE SE EE AF TMM LA AS SCA
MEN
1ST GENERATION
MUSLIM
Observations 1,366,047 109,175 146,497 59,555 8,533 11,052 9,497 8,842 12,154
Pseudo R-squared 0.066 0.049 0.044 0.041 0.064 0.060 0.035 0.040 0.026
Chi2 17383 1315 1860 1050 407.7 438.5 200.6 165.9 136.2
Chi p 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MUSLIM
Observations 1,192 595 139 39,896 1,666 24,889 11 219 2,842
Pseudo R-squared 0.086 0.133 1 0.098 0.077 0.067 0.212 0.247 0.083
Chi2 41.75 42.45 36.27 2216 144.4 1248 3.05 30.80 212.4
Chi p 0 0 0.0001 0 0 0 0.87 0 0
2ND GENERATION
NON-MUSLIM
Observations 11,172 60,084 4,244 134 723 157 187 231
Pseudo R-squared 0.069 0.058 0.030 0.265 0.037 0.080 0.216 0.277
Chi2 293.2 1083 63.71 21.44 18.07 9.665 30.89 39.04
Chi p 0 0 0 0.029 0.053 0.470 0 0
MUSLIM
Observations 7 1,324 12 3,082 29
Pseudo R-squared 1 0.11 1 0.049 1
Chi2 8.376 90.17 15.28 87.63 23.27
Chi p 0.078 0 0.12 0 0
WOMEN
1ST GENERATION
NON-MUSLIM
Observations 1,068,374 110,150 92,798 60,831 8,437 6,911 17,350 15,863 7,066
Pseudo R-squared 0.013 0.026 0.020 0.042 0.062 0.061 0.039 0.062 0.0808
Chi2 3667 1092 875.3 1746 489.8 346.3 642.6 728.8 550.5
Chi p 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MUSLIM
Observations 1,083 628 99 23,832 871 14,013 27 262 1,052
Pseudo R-squared 0.026 0.089 0.092 0.077 0.060 0.050 0.571 0.064 0.109
Chi2 17.15 52.13 8.666 2069 63.78 744.9 17.66 16.08 134.7
Chi p 0.028 0.46 0 0 0 0 0.061 0.13 0
2ND GENERATION
NON-MUSLIM
Observations 9,822 46,127 4,010 127 644 250 202 167
Pseudo R-squared 0.021 0.026 0.053 0.22 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.18
Chi2 77.52 465.5 108.7 25.65 46.09 24.99 23.41 28.91
Chi p 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.015 0
MUSLIM
Observations 35 990 2,259
Pseudo R-squared 0.24 0.105 0.096
Chi2 7.83 107.3 165.1
Chi p 0.25 0 0
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Table 2.8: Employment discrimination: average by group
MEN WOMEN
origine 1st gen 2nd gen 1st gen 2nd gen
Other
CH 0 0 0 0
WE -0.004 -0.02 -0.017 -0.013
SE 0.003 -0.007 -0.008 -0.009
EE -0.03 -0.037 -0.064 -0.033
AF -0.093 -0.055 -0.131 -0.122
TMM -0.072 -0.072 -0.097 -0.058
LA -0.061 -0.092 -0.134 -0.083
AS -0.034 -0.095 -0.08 -0.13
SCA -0.025 -0.057 -0.138 -0.126
Muslim
ch m -0.026 -0.026 -0.049 -0.049
we m -0.049 -0.233 -0.136
se m 0.007 -0.126 -0.123
ee m -0.056 -0.064 -0.192 -0.16
af m -0.213 -0.296 -0.243
tmm m -0.095 -0.052 -0.167 -0.084
la m -0.327 -0.208
as m -0.059 -0.144
sca m -0.139 -0.1 -0.227
Source: Swiss census, 2000.
Note: Values in italic produced by a model with a F test value < 0.01.
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Table 2.9: Probability to be born in Switzerland
VARIABLES Born in Switzerland
Women Men
widow -0.133*** -0.106***
(0.002) (0.004)
divorced -0.117*** -0.097***
(0.001) (0.001)
married -0.420*** -0.393***
(0.001) (0.001)
sexe -0.005***
(0.001)
age -0.002***
(2.66e-05)
spouse 0.405***
(0.0005)
nenf 0.007***
(0.0002)
lang 0.793***
(0.0005)
Observations 3609095
Pseudo R-squared 0.38
ll -1.262e+06
Source: Swiss census, 2000; S.E in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.10: Cultural distance: average by group
MEN WOMEN
origine 1st gen 2nd gen 1st gen 2nd gen
Other
CH 0.003 0.003 -0.003 -0.003
WE -0.249 -0.056 -0.249 -0.068
SE -0.396 -0.07 -0.441 -0.118
EE -0.564 -0.158 -0.567 -0.175
AF -0.423 -0.124 -0.403 -0.167
TMM -0.436 -0.131 -0.444 -0.133
LA -0.514 -0.191 -0.623 -0.307
AS -0.551 -0.151 -0.623 -0.287
SCA -0.644 -0.327 -0.623 -0.426
Muslim
ch m -0.121 -0.121 -0.185 -0.185
we m -0.354 -0.128 -0.377 -0.174
se m -0.431 -0.145 -0.45 -0.275
ee m -0.601 -0.34 -0.659 -0.443
af m -0.49 -0.168 -0.539 -0.256
tmm m -0.579 -0.176 -0.636 -0.234
la m -0.613 -0.585 -0.264
as m -0.642 -0.219 -0.701 0.037
sca m -0.588 -0.173 -0.612 -0.21
Source: Swiss census, 2000.
Table 2.11: Descriptive statistics of constructed variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
employment discrimination 828239 -0.031 0.062 -0.992 0.141
cultural distance (normalized) 1031628 1.348 0.331 1 2
Source: Swiss census, 2000; sample: migrants only.
Note: higher values represent an improvement. A higher value for employment discrimination reflects a weaker
discrimination on the labour market, and a higher value for cultural distance reflects migrants are culturally closer
to natives. Positive employment discrimination mainly concerns low-qualified SE and high-qualified WE migrants.
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Table 2.12: Effect of employment discrimination on cultural distance
PANEL A: Structural coefficents (effect of endogenous regressor on dependent variable)
ENDOGENOUS REGRESSOR DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CD
Men Women
1st generation
OLS IV IV cluster OLS IV IV cluster
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UDE 0.561*** 1.070*** 1.070 1.446*** 1.824*** 1.824
(0.013) (0.024) (1.130) (0.008) (0.021) (1.113)
N 395409 395409 395409 321472 321472 321472
R2/uncentered R2 0.059 0.955 0.955 0.147 0.953 0.953
F 4137 21635 85.89 9220 14719 184.9
Sargan/Hansen test 0.002 0.571 0.024 0.691
Weak identification stat 51316 10.23 22922 14.22
Stock & Yogo critical value at 20% 8.75 8.75 8.75 8.75
2nd generation
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
UDE -0.678*** 5.745*** 5.745 1.352*** 3.693*** 3.693*
(0.038) (0.696) (5.711) (0.028) (0.194) (2.032)
N 61791 61791 61791 47426 47426 47426
R2/uncentered R2 0.035 0.976 0.976 0.092 0.979 0.979
F 371.5 317.1 177.0 796.2 351.9 5.456
Sargan/Hansen test 0.050 0.387 0.145 0.259
Weak identification stat 49.11 1.198 202.4 7.360
Stock & Yogo critical value at 20% 8.75 8.75 8.75 8.75
PANEL B: Reduced-form coefficients (effect of instruments on endogenous regressor)
INSTRUMENTS
Men Women
1st generation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
skin color -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.018*** -0.018***
(0.00004) (0.003) (0.00008) (0.006)
policy xenophobia 0.0007*** 0.0007 0.002*** 0.002*
(0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.001)
2nd generation
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
skin color -0.004*** -0.004 -0.013*** -0.013**
(0.0001) (0.004) (0.0002) (0.004)
policy xenophobia 0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0008)
Source: Swiss census, 2000; S.E in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.13: Effect of cultural distance on employment discrimination
PANEL A: Structural coefficents (effect of endogenous regressor on dependent variable)
ENDOGENOUS REGRESSOR DEPENDENT VARIABLE: UDE
Men Women
1st generation
OLS IV IV cluster OLS IV IV cluster
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
CD 0.007*** 0.026*** 0.026 0.057*** 0.097*** 0.097*
(0.0001) (0.0004) (0.018) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.057)
N 395409 395409 395409 321472 321472 321472
R2/uncentered R2 0.259 0.354 0.354 0.253 0.457 0.457
F 23046 22868 9.301 18151 14790 6.166
Sargan/Hansen test 0.002 0.44 0.28 0.86
Weak identification stat 51261 65.80 28428 41.91
Stock & Yogo critical value at 20% 8.75 8.75 8.75 8.75
2nd generation
(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
CD -0.007*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.033*** 0.192*** 0.192***
(0.0004) (0.002) (0.021) (0.0007) (0.006) (0.072)
N 61791 61791 61791 47426 47426 47426
R2/uncentered R2 0.045 -0.29 -0.29 0.14 -0.59 -0.59
F 486.8 159.7 5.340 1334 276.3 5.759
Sargan/Hansen test 0.813 0.918 0.406 0.647
Weak identification stat 1014 11.45 542.0 24.43
Stock & Yogo critical value at 20% 8.75 8.75 8.75 8.75
PANEL B: Reduced-form coefficients (effect of instruments on endogenous regressor)
INSTRUMENTS
Men Women
1st generation
OLS IV IV cluster OLS IV IV cluster
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
official language in origin country 0.346*** 0.346*** 0.300*** 0.300***
(0.001) (0.035) (0.001) (0.034)
easy naturalization 0.006*** 0.006 0.004*** 0.004
(0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008)
2nd generation
(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
official language in origin country 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.124*** 0.124***
(0.002) (0.033) (0.002) (0.034)
easy naturalization 0.009*** 0.009** 0.014*** 0.014***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Source: Swiss census, 2000; S.E in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.14: Comparative statics
Groups most affected by change in instrument
Individuals with darkest skin color
Average CDj ...if UDEj = 0 ...if ∆
+UDEj = SD
1st AF men 1.44 1.54 1.51
1st AF Muslim men 1.38 1.61 1.45
1st SCA men 1.2 1.23 1.27
1st SCA Muslim men 1.27 1.42 1.34
2nd AF men 1.68 1.99 2.06
2nd AF Muslim men 1.63 3.33 2.01
2nd SCA men 1.55 1.88 1.93
2nd SCA Muslim men 1.45 2.03 1.83
1st AF women 1.3 1.54 1.42
1st AF Muslim women 1.46 1.9 1.58
1st SCA women 1.23 1.48 1.35
1st SCA Muslim women 1.19 1.6 1.31
2nd AF women 1.45 1.9 1.69
2nd AF Muslim women 1.59
2nd SCA women 1.53 1.99 1.77
2nd SCA Muslim women 1.28
Individuals whose origin country doesn’t share a common official language with Switzerland
Average UDEj ...if CDj = 0 ...if ∆
+CDj = SD
1st men -0.01 0.02 0
1st Muslim men -0.07 -0.03 -0.06
2nd men -0.01 0.11 0.01
2nd Muslim men -0.04 0.07 -0.02
1st women -0.04 0.09 -0.01
1st Muslim women -0.17 -0.05 -0.14
2nd women -0.02 0.3 0.04
2nd Muslim women -0.11 0.17 -0.05
Calculations of the author.
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Figure 2.1: Economic barrier to integration (employment discrimination)
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Appendix
Formal derivation of the Vigdor index33
Define D as a binary variable taking the value 0 if an individual is a native, 1
if he is an migrant. Further degine f0(x) as the density function of individual charac-
teristics x among natives and f1(x) as the density function of x among migrants, and
suppose that the proportion of migrants in the population is p. If migrants are fully
assimilated (i.e. migrants and natives have the same distrimbution of x), it follows that
the ratio of density function g(x) = f0(x)f1(x) is equal to 1. The mean value of g(x) across
natives must be equal to 1, and the mean value of 1/g across migrants must be one.
The dissimilarity index of Vigdor (2009) is based on the estimation of the prob-
ability to be born in/out of the host country. He estimates a model for
Prob(D = 1|x) = pf1(x)pf1(x)+(1−p)f0(x) =
pf1(x)
f(x) = ρ(x).
Vigdor assumes this is a probit function, but this is an arbitrary assumption.
Obviously the average value across the population must be equal to p. Vigdor derives
his index for a value of p = 0.5 only, but it is natural to think about what it should be
for different values of p. The following generalization retains the property that it should
be between 0 and 1 is:
33Derivation done by Allan Manning.
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I =
R
[1−ρ(x)]f1(x)dx
1−p =
∫ f0(x)f1(x)
f(x) dx.
If migrants and natives have the same density f1(x) = f0(x) = f(x), then this
takes the value 1. If they are completely distinct and f1(x)f0(x) = 0 ∀x, then it takes
the value 0. However, this formulation lacks the desirable properties normally required
of segregation e.g. it is not composition-invariant. An composition-invariant alternative
is:
I = 2
∫ f0(x)f1
f0(x)+f1
dx =
∫
1
1+g(x)f1(x)dx.
This way it is possible to estimate g(x) using the probit equation as the mecha-
nism to do that. However, there are other segregation indices, which can also be written
as functions of g(x). For example, the Duncan dissimilarity index:
I =
∫ |f1(x)− f0(x)| dx = ∫ ∣∣∣1− 1g(x) ∣∣∣ f1(x)dx.
This is probably true for other indices. As a consequence, the Vigdor ap-
proach should simply be viewed as a convenient way to estimate g(x) when x is multi-
dimensional and possibly a continuous random variable.
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Chapter 3
The Effect of Host Society
Culture on Migrant Wage
Discrimination: Approaching the
Roestigraben
ghost
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3.1 Introduction
Culture plays an important role in shaping economic outcomes. The most
influential argument supporting this claim was probably made by Max Weber in 1905
when he proposed a theory explaining how beliefs and values deriving from a particular
world view (protestantism) influence behaviours (hard work, savings) and, eventually,
the way the economy is organized (capitalism). In labor market economics, several
authors have suggested that non-economic factors play a role in determining economic
outcomes. In the international context, empirical evidence shows that differences in
national institutions can partly explain contrasts in unemployment equilibrium (Nickell
and Layard, 1999) or in wage gaps between natives and migrants (Chiswick and Miller,
2006). In the Swiss context, where several linguistic regions are integrated into one labor
market with common institutions, Bru¨gger et al. (2009) have established that culture
is causally related to differences in unemployment duration across regions. Following
this logic, the question can be raised whether host society culture is causally related to
differences in migrant wage gaps and wage discrimination across regions of the Swiss
labor market.
This chapter investigates whether host society culture affects the level of mi-
grant wage discrimination, i.e., if migrant wage discrimination is more intense in the
region where host society culture is most inward-looking.1 The motivation for conduct-
ing this investigation in the Swiss context stems from two stylized facts showing that
1The description of a culture as more inward-looking than another could mean different things. In
this study, this adjective is used in relation to the more or less conservative political preferences of host
societies on migration, asylum and naturalization issues.
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(i) political preferences on issues related to migration, asylum and naturalization of
foreigners are markedly more conservative in the German region and closely follow the
Roestigraben,2 and (ii) that average wage differences between migrants and natives are
larger in the German region. It draws on findings of other authors showing that, while
the Swiss labor market is considered homogeneous (Cattaneo and Winkelmann, 2005;
Bru¨gger et al., 2009), wage discrimination is at work against migrants (Golder, 1999; de
Coulon, 2001; Pommeranz, 2003), and employment discrimination is more widespread
in the German than in the Latin region for second-generation migrants from former
Yugoslavia (Fibbi et al., 2005). The contribution of the present study is to measure
unexplained wage differentials between migrants and natives across the German and
Latin regions of Switzerland, and examine whether host society culture is a significant
determinant of observed differences in wage discrimination.
There are at least two reasons why the culture of a host society might matter for
migrant wage discrimination. First, in a host society with a more inward-looking culture,
social interactions between natives and migrants may be scarcer, thus negatively affecting
the opportunities of migrants to gather information about employment providing best
wage opportunities. Secondly, even if information were circulating freely in a host society,
the influence of culture on preferences of natives would still entail a subjective cost
when hiring a migrant. This would lead natives to keep good job opportunities first and
foremost for their peers, as long as the cost of not attributing such an opportunity to
2The “Roestigraben” is a term describing the dividing line between the German-speaking and the
French-speaking regions of Switzerland with their respective cultural differences. A definition has already
been provided in the general introduction, but it is also illustrated in figures 3.5 and 3.6 in appendix to
this chapter.
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a migrant is not too high. Alternatively, they might attribute it to the outsider if he
agrees to relinquish on the attractive wage and to work for a lower wage. Through these
two channels, host society culture could affect the level of migrant wage discrimination.
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section offers a review of the
literature related to migrant wage discrimination and to how cultural differences affect
labor market outcomes. Section 3.3 presents stylized facts on differences in attitudes
and voting patterns between the German and Latin regions of Switzerland concerning
issues related to Swiss identity, migration, asylum and naturalization of foreigners. This
section also points out differences in average wages of natives and migrants in both
regions while presenting the 2003-2008 Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS) dataset used
for the empirical investigation. Section 3.4 details the human capital model as well as
the Oaxaca decomposition used to compare returns to factors, wage differentials and its
unexplained component across origin groups. It then lays out the regression discontinuity
design approach implemented to establish whether a causal effect can be attributed to
host society culture in explaining differences in migrant wage discrimination across the
language border. Section 3.5 presents the results. The last section concludes.
3.2 Related literature
3.2.1 About other countries
Leontaridi (1998) provides a historical perspective on the evolution of the the-
oretical debate between views competing to explain the nature and functioning of labor
markets, i.e., supporters of the segmented labor market hypothesis and classical and
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neo-classical economists. In her review of most widely used empirical strategies that
have been adopted in the literature to test the assumptions made by both schools of
thought, she distinguishes four approaches (i) human capital models (ii) factor analysis
(iii) cluster analysis and (iv) switching regressions. As this study follows the first ap-
proach applied to the Swiss context, this section focuses on studies using human capital
models. It also reviews articles of authors that use alternative approaches as long as
they present valuable evidence about the Swiss labor market.
In the 1970s, Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) were the first to conduct em-
pirical studies on labor market segmentation based on human capital models. Their
approach proposes a two-equation model linking a wage equation to a selection equation
determining employment. This allows the decomposition of wage differentials into three
parts, caused by differences in (i) endowments (ii) returns to factors (iii) selectivity. They
find evidence of racial and gender discrimination, defined as the existence of an unex-
plained part in the wage differentials caused by differences in returns to factors. These
findings were supported by evidence in many other countries (e.g., Zorlu, 2003, in the
Netherlands; Elliott and Lindley, 2006, in the United Kingdom). The Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition is explained in more detail in the methodology section.
Since the 1970s, different extensions have been proposed to this approach. Ar-
guing that policy implications derived from the acknowledgement of discrimination are
limited, beause they can only lead to promoting stronger measures against discrimi-
nation without providing deeper insight into its causes, Neuman and Oaxaca (2004)
further decompose the wage differential component due to selectivity effects. Although
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their theoretical extensions are interesting, their empirical findings remain inconclusive.
Chiswick3 and Miller (2006) propose another extension to the human capital
approach by combining it with a quantile regression methodology. They compare labor
market outcomes of natives and migrants in the USA and Australia. Their results show
that higher wage gaps in the USA and variations across quantiles may be caused by
labor market institutions, especially differences in (minimum) wage regulations.
3.2.2 About Switzerland
Several authors have already implemented the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
using Swiss data to test for and estimate the degree of market labor segmentation. How-
ever, in contrast with the present study, previous studies were more strongly constrained
by the small size of their samples. Golder and Straubhaar (1999) define a human capital
model, distinguishing men and women, as well as natives and first-generation migrants.
Using 1995 SFLS data, they estimate an earnings function controlling for education and
experience. They only correct for selection bias in regressions on female samples, argu-
ing that participation rates in the labor force are very high for men. They find earnings
differentials of 16% between men and women and 14% between natives and migrants.
Their results also show that discrimination accounts for 85% and around 2/3 of these
differentials, respectively. De Coulon (2001) performs a similar exercise on the same
male sample. He however distinguishes between first and second-generation migrants, as
3Barry R. Chiswick was the first to empirically challenge the claim that migrants are discriminated
on the American labor market. In his article published in 1978, “The Effect of Americanization on the
Earnings of Foreign- born Men,” he showed that observed wage gaps decrease with the number of years
since migration.
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well as between education and experience acquired in the home and in the host country.
His specification additionally includes dummies for firm size and hierarchical position.
His results show Western European migrants actually earn more than natives even if
slightly discriminated. Traditional country migrants earn less partly due to lower qual-
ifications while migrants from other regions are most discriminated against. Schooling
in Switzerland plays an important role. Results show that only one third of earnings
differentials observed at the second generation cannot be accounted for by individual
characteristics.
Other authors approached the same question through different empirical meth-
ods. Most of them find evidence that wage discrimination is at work against migrants in
the Swiss labor market. Using data from the Wage Structure Survey, Pomeranz (2003)
shows that in a simple earnings equation, migrant workers holding a permit suffer a wage
penalty going from -1.9% (B-permit) to -16.8% (A-permit holders). Using data from the
SLFS 2000, Sousa-Poza (2004) implements three empirical methods to test for the exis-
tence of labor market segmentation. Results of the cluster analysis indicate the existence
of six or seven segments, among them one very large segment, which doesn’t support the
labor market segmentation hypothesis. Results of the switching model method support
the hypothesis of a strictly dual labor market, and thus of labor market segmentation.
Finally, the results of the analysis of low-wage mobility are inconclusive.
Three further studies matter for the present one, either because the intuition
that was pursued or the methodology implemented served as a source of inspiration, or
because of the findings made about the Swiss labour market. First, using data from
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the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) of 1999 and 2000, Cattaneo and Winkelmann (2005)
examine the effects of mother tongue on labor market outcomes of Swiss residents.
Instead of testing whether the law of one wage holds across linguistic regions, they
examine whether the law of one wage holds within any given linguistic region when
comparing native workers (i.e., Swiss workers whose mother tongue matches the language
of the region they are living in) and non-native workers (other Swiss workers).4 One
advantage of their approach is that they do not have to control for factors such as
geography, institutions, industrial structure, etc. that may have an influence on wage
differences across regions. The authors also examine a model of the decision to move
from one region to another. They find no evidence to suggest that the Swiss labor market
is not perfectly integrated or that internal migrants are positively selected.
Secondly, Bru¨gger et al. (2009) investigate the determinants of unemployment
duration, and ask whether differences observed across the German and Latin regions of
the Swiss labor market can be explained by cultural differences. To legitimize the use of a
regression discontinuity design method, the authors proposes several arguments, backed
up by evidence from the Swiss census 2000, to prove that the labor market cannot be
considered to be segmented across cultural regions. First, the fact that 14% of workers in
the Latin region and 8% in the German region cross the cultural border while commuting
to work shows that the border is permeable, and mobility is symmetric when reported to
the larger dimension of the German region. Second, migrants who are neither German
native speakers nor Latin native speakers seem to have similar unemployment durations
4It should be noted that these definitions of natives and non-natives differ from those used in this
chapter, which are explained in the section presenting the data.
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across the border. Third, although the share of migrants in the population is higher in
the Latin region, which might intensify job competition, it is balanced near the language
border (around 18%). They find that cultural differences can explain around 20% of the
differences in unemployment duration across regions, and that horizontal transmission
of culture (norms and values prevalent at the community level) is more important than
vertical transmission (individual level).5
Finally, a sociological study by Fibbi et al. (2006) investigates the existence of
employment discrimination against second-generation migrants originating from Portu-
gal, Turkey and former Yougoslavia. The authors follow the guidelines of the Interna-
tional Labor Organization (ILO) for practice testing (similar curricula are sent out, the
only difference being the origin and name of the fictitious applicant). Results show that
employment discrimination is at work against second-generation migrants in both re-
gions. Furthermore, in the group monitored in both regions, second-generation migrants
from former-Yougoslavia, the probability to be refused a job interview is substantially
higher in the German region.6
Drawing on the studies reviewed so far, this chapter examines differences in
wage outcomes across regions with the objective of determining whether host society
culture has a significant effect on wage discrimination.
5The concept of “host society culture effect” used in this study is equivalent to what Bru¨gger et al.
(2009) call the “horizontal transmission of culture.” It was chosen because, in the relation to migrant
wage discrimination, it designates more clearly what is examined. The concept of “vertical transmission
of culture” has no equivalent in this context.
6More details on this research can be found in the second chapter of this thesis.
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3.3 Stylized facts and data
3.3.1 Attitudes and voting patterns
The starting point for considering the research question is the markedly dif-
ferent attitudes and voting patterns that exist between Swiss citizens across the “Roes-
tigraben.” SHP data in table 3.1 shows that when asked to position themselves on a
political left-right scale between 0 and 10, natives of German mother tongue appear
to be slightly more conservative than natives of Latin mother tongue (0.31 point), but
the averages are very close to each other and to the political center. Despite a shared
political sensitivity, it appears German-speaking natives are much more cautious when
it comes to relations with foreign countries and more assertive in relation to Swiss iden-
tity. This table also shows that, compared to Latin-speaking natives, German-speaking
natives are more hostile to the idea of joining the EU (+20%), and less supportive of the
idea of opening towards other countries (-11%). Whereas one can argue in good faith
that differences in relation to the first question are motivated by political and other intel-
ligible considerations, responses to the second more emotional question seem to support
“cliche´s” about the Swiss German culture being more inward-looking and more attached
to its traditions.
Although, differences related to such vague questions may seem irrelevant, it
appears they are reflected in voting patterns. Table 2.2 shows that results of popular ini-
tiatives launched since 2000 in relation to naturalization, migration and asylum matters
are systematically more conservative in the German region. The average gap separat-
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ing both regions can occasionally reaches up to 19 percentage points. The illustration
of these differences as a function of distance to the cultural border in figures 3.1 and
3.2 additionally reveals a recurrent and sharp gap at the border between both regions,
hinting at the possible role of culture in explaining the preferences of voters.
Naturalization, migration and asylum potentially concern all migrants. In the
Swiss political debate, however, not all migrants are considered equal. Even if French
workers crossing the border daily to work in Switzerland or German nationals that oc-
cupy an increasing number of high-level positions in Swiss companies and universities
have recently been targeted by right wing political parties, migrants from neighboring
countries (Western and Southern Europe) don’t have a major role in the political debate
anymore. Since the first wave of Italian migration in the 1960s, a shift of symbolic bar-
riers and a change in how Swiss define themselves and foreigners has occurred (Wicker
2003). For a majority of the Swiss population, Western and Southern European mi-
grants may be considered as economic competitors at some times, but not as a threat
to the Swiss identity. As a consequence, right wing political parties, like the Swiss Peo-
ple’s Party, that initiate campaigns for tighter regulations pertaining to naturalization,
migration and asylum find it most efficient to instrumentalize negative “cliche´s” about
migrants coming from more distant and dangerous parts of the world. Over the last
decade, right wing campaigns against migration, asylum and naturalization have made
an increasingly intensive use of figures like ”the violent Eastern European”, “the African
drug dealer,” or “the veiled Muslim woman” (often portrayed in the guise of animals like
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rats, crows and most famously black sheeps)7 in order to appeal to the fear and hatred
of voters. Such campaigns have been systematically more successful in the German part
of Switzerland.
3.3.2 Wages
The second stylized fact supporting the investigation of the research question
is the larger average wage gaps that are observed in the German region when comparing
migrants and natives in Switzerland. Table 3.4 shows the average annual wages of men
working full-time. Although natives earn slightly more in the German region, the wage
level of natives is similar across both regions. For migrants, however, regional differences
are significant. In comparison to natives, migrants seem to fare better in the Latin than
in the German region. Migrant wage gaps are either negligible or smaller in the Latin
region (except for African and Latin American men). It should be noted that the two
most important non-Western migrant groups (Eastern Europeans, Turkey, Maghreb and
the Mideast) both have average wages that are closer to those of natives in the Latin
region.
3.3.3 Data and sample
The second stylized fact is based on SLFS data, which is used in the empirical
part of this chapter. Until 2002, the SLFS surveyed at most 15’000 individuals without
over-sampling foreigners. As around 20% of the population is of foreign nationality,
7See the political ads of the Swiss People’s Party in appendix to the general introduction to this
thesis.
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most of them from Western or Southern Europe, it contained very few observations on
non-Western migrants. As a result, previous studies of labor market segmentation and
wage discrimination in Switzerland either used datasets lacking information on origin
(Pomeranz, 2003) or pooled individuals of different nationalities into very broad groups
(Golder and Straubhaar, 1999; De Coulon, 2003; Sousa-Poza, 2004).
Since 2003, the SLFS has increased its sample to 40’000 and over-samples for-
eigners with 15’000 additional observations. By pooling waves from 2003 to 2008,8 the
SFLS sample reaches 308’346 observations. Table 2.3 details the composition across
gender between natives (159’655), first and second-generation migrants (122’626 and
25’764) from eight ethnic groups: Western Europe (WE), Southern Europe (SE), East-
ern Europe (EE), Africa (AF), Turkey, the Middle-East and Maghreb (TMM), Latin
America (LA), Asia (AS) and South and Central Asia (SCA). For the sake of conve-
nience, migrants from the last five groups will be referred to as “non-European” (NE)
and those of the last four groups as “non-Western” (NW).Natives are defined as indi-
viduals born in Switzerland and Swiss since birth. First generation migrants are born
abroad. An individual born in Switzerland, but whose nationality is foreign is defined
as a second-generation migrant.9
European migrants represent the bulk of migrant population, the most numer-
ous being Southern Europeans, followed by Western and Eastern Europeans. Although
TMM has a sizeable community, the five non-European minorities are comparatively
8Waves of the SLFS are made available by the Office Fe´de´ral de la Statistique (OFS) the year after
it was collected, e.g., data collected in 2008 is made available in 2009 only.
9A small fraction of second-generation migrants are included in the native group as some of them
only have the Swiss nationality since their birth.
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much smaller. The same is true for the second generation. The even larger proportion
of Southern Europeans is due to the fact that Italian and Spanish migrants where the
first to come to Switzerland from the 1960s on. The relative size of the second generation
is a rough indicator of the length of stay of a group in Switzerland.
As most second-generation groups are very small, this study focuses on first-
generation migrants. Women are furthermore ignored in order to avoid well-known
endogeneity issues (Kunze, 2006). Finally, the male sample is restricted to individuals
in the work force aged between 16 and 65, as is done in other studies investigating wage
outcomes to limit the number of outliers.
3.3.4 Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics presented in table 3.5 are based on all income-earning
individuals (unlike those of table 3.4 based on individuals working full-time only). The
sample used for the analysis of wage discrimination also includes unemployed individuals
and is thus slightly larger.
Differences in average characteristic values among native men of both regions
seem negligible. Regional differences in the characteristics of the three large groups of
European migrants are minor too. In the smaller samples of non-European migrants,
the average values of characteristics across regions vary more. As an example, TMM
migrants are on average younger and less educated in the German region. Such differ-
ences might be related to differences in the origin of migration flows nurturing the two
regions. In this case, whereas a majority of TMM migrants in the German region are
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of Turkish descent, they represent only half of the sample in the Latin region, the other
half being mainly from Northern Africa. Asian and South and Central Asian female
migrants display the largest cross-regional differences in characteristic averages.
3.4 Methods and specifications
This section presents the method used to analyze wage outcomes and wage
discrimination in Switzerland. It then lays out the regression discontinuity design ap-
proach, which allows examining whether host society cultures play a role in shaping the
way migrants are treated in both regions of the Swiss labor market.
3.4.1 Returns to factors, wage differentials and discrimination
The human capital model used for the analysis of wage outcomes and wage
discrimination can be represented as a two-equation system composed of a wage function
conditional on being selected into employment:
Yi = X ′iβ + µi (3.1)
E∗i = H
′
iγ + εi (3.2)
where Yi is the market wage (in logs) of wage-earning individual i, and E∗i is the latent
variable associated with being employed in a professional occupation. Xi is a vector
of determinants of market wages and includes the variables already used by de Coulon
(2003) in his specification of the wage equation: education (number of years);10 age;
10In the SFLS, the available educational variable is categorical. We use a scale proposed by de Coulon
et al. (2003) to compute the number of years of education. In his 2003 article, de Coulon distinguished
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civil status; experience (number of years at work without long interruption); supervision
(number of employees under one’s authority); whether one is involved in management
or member of the board of directors; business size (number of workers); number of years
of residence in Switzerland ; 6 year dummies and 14 sector dummies.11
Hi is a vector of the determinants of the probability to be employed including
the following characteristics: education; age; civil status; number of years of residence
in Switzerland; household size; and residence permit (C, B and other permits) dummies.
This model thus estimates the wage of an individual conditional on his selection
into employment. In the first stage, a probit model is used to predict the probability
of being employed and the inverse Mills’ ratio12 is then included as a regressor in the
second stage to correct for the selectivity into employment. Because the inverse Mills’
ratio is a nonlinear function of the variables included in the first-stage probit model,
the second-stage equation is identified even if first and second-stage regressors are the
same. However, the nonlinearity of the inverse Mills’ ratio arises from the assumption of
normality in the probit model. In case this assumption doesn’t hold, a simple alternative
between education acquired in the home and in the host country. This distinction can’t be made here,
as this information is only available in specific modules of the SLFS recurring every 5 years. Adding this
distinction in the specification would mean loosing 80% of the observations.
11Two missing determinants need to be commented. First, no variable accounting for the knowledge of
the language spoken in the region is included in this list of wage determinants. This is not a choice of the
author, but a limitation of the SLFS dataset that has been tolerated in previous studies. Furthermore,
although language is probably a strong determinant when hiring an individual for a specific position,
it is probably less the case for determining the wage of this individual. Secondly, the number of hours
worked is not included because of alleged endogeneity issues. Indeed, it might be that an individual
works more because he wants to earn more. Actually, results don’t change much if the numbers of hours
worked is included, showing that endogeneity is probably more a theoretical assumption than a reality
(at least when considering annual income), and that most individuals don’t chose to the number of hours
they have to work.
12 The inverse Mills’ratio is defined as the ratio of the probability density function to the cumulative
distribution function of a distribution. It is labelled λ in the formulas and tables of this chapter.
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consists in including regressors in the first stage that are not relevant in the second
stage. This makes the source of identification clear and debatable. In order to fulfill
the condition that there be at least one exclusion restriction, and allow the consistent
estimation of parameters, household size and residence permit are included in Hi, but
excluded from Xi. Indeed, a man in charge of a large household probably faces more
pressure to have a job than a bachelor, but this does not translate into a higher wage
level. Similarly, whereas a temporary permit may prevent a migrant from applying for
certain jobs, they are not expected to affect wages.
β and γ are the associated parameter vectors, and εi and µi are i.i.d error terms
assumed to follow a bivariate normal distribution (0, 0, σε, σµ, ρ). The probability of
being employed in a professional occupation can be expressed as
Prob(E∗i > 0) = Prob(εi > −H ′iγ)
= Φ(H ′iγ), (3.3)
where Φ(•) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function (the variance of ε
is normalized to 1). Wages are observed if E∗i > 0, so that the expected wage of an
employed worker is given by
E(Yi
∣∣E∗i > 0) = X ′iβ + E(µi ∣∣ε > −H ′iγ)
= X ′iβ + θλi, (3.4)
where θ = ρσµ, λi =
φ(H′iγ)
Φ(H′iγ)
and φ is the standard normal density function. The
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estimating equation for employed professionals may be expressed as
Yi
∣∣E∗i > 0 = X ′iβ + θλi + error. (3.5)
Focusing on the decomposition of the wage gap along ethnic lines in the presence of
sample selectivity, the wage gap of migrant group j can be defined as Y n−Y j = (X ′nβˆn−
θnλˆn)− (X ′j βˆj − θj λˆj), where the parameters are estimated by the Heckman procedure
separately for each ethnic sub-sample. It follows that correcting for the selectivity bias
requires a wage decomposition of the following form:
Y n − Y j = Xn(βˆn − βˆ
∗
) +Xj(βˆ
∗ − βˆj) + (X ′n −X ′j)βˆ
∗
+ (θˆnλˆn − θˆj λˆj) (3.6)
where βˆ
∗
is the estimated non-discriminatory wage structure apart from selectivity ef-
fects. The first two terms on the right-hand side of equation 3.6 represent favoritism
of natives and discrimination against foreign workers, the third term is the endowment
component. The last term measures the contribution of selection effects to the observed
migrant wage gap. If the native wage structure is considered as the non-discriminatory
wage structure βˆ
∗
= βˆn, then
Y n − Y j = Xj(βˆn − βˆj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
discrimination
+ (X ′n −X ′j)βˆn︸ ︷︷ ︸
endowments
+ (θˆnλˆn − θˆj λˆj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
selectivity
(3.7)
This decomposition distinguishes the absolute migrant wage differential ADj = Y n−Y j
which is composed of a part explained by differences in endowments EDj = (X
′
n−X ′j)βˆn
as well as by an unexplained part caused by differences in returns to factors that is usually
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attributed to discrimination UDj = Xj(βˆn− βˆj). The differential due to selectivity can
be further decomposed as already mentioned in the literature review, but it is not a
priority concern in this study.
Following this theoretical approach, the empirical part first focuses on differ-
ences in returns to factors between natives and migrant groups j as estimated by vector
β of equation 3.1. It then turns to wage differentials and its unexplained component
often attributed to discrimination. Computing UDj for eight migrant groups in both
regions allows for a series of comparisons in order to establish which groups are most
discriminated against, as well as if there are systematic differences across the German
and Latin regions.
In line with the literature presented above, the Swiss labor market is considered
homogeneous enough to allow for comparisons across regions.13 However, to address the
concern that results could be driven by the estimation of one single reference group (e.g.,
native men in the Latin region), two different groups of reference are used (i) native men
of the region where migrants of ethnic subsample j are living, and (ii) native men of
the German region. Furthermore, to address the concern that the chosen estimator
could affect the results, returns to factors and UDj are estimated using the maximum
likelihood and the two-step estimator. For the sake of simplicity, only results obtained
by maximum likelihood and in reference to native men of the region will be displayed,
but results variations are discussed accordingly.
13See arguments reported in the literature review, especially those made by Cattaneo and Winkelmann
(2005) and Bru¨gger et al. (2009). No new evidence or arguments are put forward in this study about
the homogeneity of the Swiss labor market.
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Stylized facts presented earlier suggest that there might be a relation between
the more inward-looking native culture prevailing in the German region of the Swiss labor
market and the comparatively lower average wages of migrants in that region. If results
obtained using the human capital model outlined above show returns to factors are
systematically lower for migrants in the German region, it would support the hypothesis
that migrant wage discrimination is higher in the that region. However, it would not
establish the significance of the causal link that might exist between the more inward-
looking culture prevailing in that host society and the higher level of wage discrimination
endured by migrants.
3.4.2 Geographic disparities and regression discontinuity design
Guiso et al. (2006) propose a methodology to assess the role culture has on
economic outcomes by shaping prior beliefs and preferences. This study follows their
advice as well as existing guidance on regression discontinuity design techniques (Imbens
and Lemieux, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010) and its actual implementation by Bru¨gger
et al. (2009), who investigate the role culture plays in explaining the longer average
duration of unemployment observed in the Latin region of the Swiss labor market.
The key idea of regression discontinuity design is that geographic proximity
preserves differences in culture, but lets differences in wage opportunities and institutions
vanish (Bru¨gger et al., 2009). In other words, observed differences in the treatment of
migrants in the labor market at the cultural border are generated by differences in
host society culture rather than by other factors. As mentioned above, several studies
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have performed cross-regional comparisons or put forward evidence supporting the claim
that the Swiss labor market is homogeneous enough to allow for an analysis of structural
breaks occurring on the Roestigraben. If this assumption is satisfied, then local contrasts
in the unexplained part of the migrant wage differential observed at the border identify
the effect of host society culture on wage discrimination endured by migrants.
Building on the notation used so far, let UDWij be the unexplained part of
the wage differential of migrant i belonging to ethnic group j compared to the reference
group. Empirically, UDWij is measured as the difference in the predicted wage of
individual i using the coefficients estimated for the reference group and those of his
ethnic group j. As wages are in logs, exponentiating predicted wages before taking
the difference gives UDWij in Swiss francs. In the empirical part, several measures
of UDWij are used based on two different reference groups and estimators. For the
sake of simplicity, results obtained using the two-step estimator are omitted, but results
variations are discussed accordingly.
Let every community c in Switzerland be defined as belonging to the German
or Latin region, and Pc = 1 if a majority of its population speaks a Latin language, and
Pc = 0 otherwise,14 and Dc denote the distance by air of community c to the closest
community located in the other region on the other side of the cultural border.15 Dc is
14The Latin region is defined as the French- and Italian-speaking communities in Switzerland. The
German region covers German-speaking communities. Bru¨gger et al. (2009) use the same definition.
A typology classifying communities according to language is provided by the Federal Statistical Office
(OFS). There are over 6000 communities in Switzerland. Note that it could be possible to take the
proportion of inhabitants speaking a particular language instead of binarizing Pc, but this would not
affect the results significantly as communities usually have linguistic majorities of over 85% as illustrated
in Bru¨gger et al. (2009).
15This measure was computed using the GRASS GISS software, and with the kind and indispensable
assistance of Adrian Weber (geographer, Bern University, Switzerland). Different measures of distance
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positive for communities in the German region and negative in the Latin region.
Furthermore, let E+(UDWij) denote the limit of the expectation of UDWij on
the German side of the cultural border, i.e., E+(UDWij) ≡ lim→0E(UDWij) |Dc = ) ,
with E−(UDWij) the corresponding expectation when approaching the cultural border
from the Latin side. Contrasting the differential treatment endured by migrants on
both sides of the cultural border crossing the Swiss labor market, the border contrast is
composed of three components:
E+(UDWij)− E−(UDWij) = β [E+(Pc)− E−(Pc)] + γ [E+(Dc)− E−(Dc)] + [E+(νic)− E−(νic)](3.8)
Equation 3.8 defines differences in the level of wage discrimination endured by migrants
as a function of the majority culture and of the distance to the other cultural region.
It allows exploring whether wage discrimination is discontinuous at the cultural border
and whether distance to the other cultural region matters or not (which may hint at the
permeability of the border).
If the specification of the wage equation, and hence the measured wage discrim-
ination, is satisfactory, then the assumption that the error term νic is mean independent
of the border between cultural regions is respected, so that equation 3.8 can provide
valid evidence about the causal role of host society culture in determining wage discrim-
ination. In order to measure the contrast formulated in the previous equation, consider
exist. Distance could for example be measured in units of time needed to reach the cultural border by
road. However, according to Bru¨gger et al. (2009), differences in outcomes are negligible.
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the following linear regression:
UDWij = pi0 + pi1Pc + pi2Dc + δXic + νic (3.9)
where parameter pi1 is a consistent estimate of equation 3.8. Xic is a vector of vari-
ables that capture differences between individuals and communities (e.g., implemented
policies) that influence wage discrimination. However, it remains difficult to establish
what such factors could be. Xic only contains two additional cofounders: the average
skin color of the ethnic group to which an individual belongs, and cantonal policy to
fight xenophobia. Skin color is an obvious marker likely to influence economic discrim-
ination either directly or through the force “self-selection” of darker skin migrants into
low-pay and low-prestige jobs. The skin color variable is built using the human skin
color distribution map designed by the Italian geographer Renato Biasutti and based on
von Luschan’s chromatic scale, by assigning a value between 1 (clearest) and 8 (dark-
est) to each observation according to its origin group.16 It is averaged for each of the
eight origin regions. Policies to fight against xenophobia target the natives in order to
foster a better understanding among communities as well as mutual tolerance. They
are expected to affect the attitude of natives towards migrants and attenuate existing
discriminations. This policy variable is built using the typology developed by Cattacin
and Kaya (2001). In their comparative study of integration policies at the local level in
Switzerland, the authors classify the 26 Swiss cantons in two categories: active/passive
in “leading campaigns to sensibilize the public to cultural diversity and fight against
16The map is available in Barsh (2003).
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racism and xenophobia.” This categorization is based on the assessment of the extent to
which cantons are involved in/support the organization of events like the National Day
of Refugees or activities to increase public awareness about foreign cultures and ethnic
diversity.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Returns to factors
Results of the estimation by maximum likelihood of β for every migrant group
j in equation 3.1 are presented in tables 3.6 and 3.7.17 Coefficient signs are generally in
line with those obtained in previous studies. Income increases with the number of years
of education, experience, supervising other employees, the position in the professional
hierarchy, business size, as well as with age. Married men earn more. A surprising
result is that the number of years of residence in Switzerland is not always positive as
could be expected based on the findings of similar studies. As an example, the wage
of WE migrants in both regions, of SCA migrants in the German and AS migrants in
the Latin region is decreasing with the number of years spent in Switzerland. This may
be due to the qualitative change in migration flows originating from these regions.18
17For some of the smaller population groups (LA and AS migrants in the German region, and SCA
migrants in the Latin region), results obtained using the two-step estimator are displayed because the
maximum-likelihood estimator did not converge. This is indicated by “2-STEP” under the log likelihood
statistics.
18Until the 1990s, Switzerland had a rather stringent migration regime attributing few benefits to
migrants. Pressure from European countries for the improvement of conditions for their nationals drove
Swiss authorities to reconsider their policy. The idea to create a point system or to implement a
“three circle” policy based on the concept of “cultural distance” of migrants were debated as means to
satisfy Switzerland’s neighbors without alienating xenophobic voters. De facto, Switzerland started to
apply a two circles policy, defining an “inner circle” and an “outer circle.” Through bilateral agreements,
EU/EFTA citizens are granted the same living and working rights as the Swiss, while for other countries,
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Over the last 10 years, Switzerland has experienced a large inflow of highly qualified
migrants, especially from Western Europe. With the growing need of highly qualified
workers and the shortage existing in certain segments of the labor market in developed
countries, firms are now competing internationally to hire very specialized workers, who
are moving almost freely around the world. Like in other developed countries, Swiss
firms have hired many IT-specialists and other professionals they could not find on the
domestic labor market, especially from Asia. These changes might explain why the
coefficient on the number of years of residence is negative for some groups.
As the dependent variable is in logs, the magnitude of individual coefficients is
easy to interpret. Thus, the effect of one more year of education for native men in the
German region leads to an increase in wage of 4.4%. However, the purpose of displaying
tables 3.6 and 3.7 is not to comment on individual coefficients, but to find patterns
allowing for comparisons across migrant groups and regions.
Returns to education are generally slightly higher for natives compared to mi-
grants. Among native men in the Latin region, one additional year of education yields
an increase in wage of 5.08%, exceeding the returns to education obtained by other
groups, the lowest significant returns being observed for TMM migrants (2.46%). In the
German region, four groups display higher returns to education than natives. WE, AF,
LA and SCA migrants earn on average between 4.81% and 5.63% more by additional
year of education. The results for the last three groups might be driven by the fact that
educational achievement along with wages in these small samples are more polarized.
immigration is restricted to highly qualified individuals only (Mahnig et Piguet, 2003).
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However, comparing returns to education across regions, it appears that they are higher
in the German region for migrant men (except for SE and AS men). As a group, non-
European (NE) migrants have higher returns in the German (3.45%) than in the Latin
region (2.66%).
An interesting pattern appears when examining the relationship between co-
efficients on age and experience. Both have a positive effect on wage that is slightly
decreasing over time. In the linear term only and in comparison to migrants, native
men in the German region have a relatively low return to the experience acquired on
the job (1.2%), but this is more than compensated by the higher return on age (6.6%).
Apart from LA men whose return to age is high (8.4%), the wage of migrants living
in the German region is more heavily dependent on experience. In the Latin region,
these returns are of 1.9% and 6.2% for native men, in line with the pattern observed
for natives in the German region. However, migrants enjoy higher returns to age and
returns to experience are closer to that of natives in the Latin region compared to the
German region. For example, non-European migrants in the German region have re-
turns to age and experience of 2% and 1.8% respectively, but of 3.4% and 2.3% in the
Latin region. This implies that whereas wages of natives in the German region tend to
be automatically adjusted upwards over time, wages of migrants only increases as long
as they do not change jobs, limiting their mobility and career opportunities. This trend
is comparatively less pronounced in the Latin region.
Another pattern emerges when examining the effects related to the position in
the professional hierarchy. Returns to being involved in supervision tasks are of a non-
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negligible magnitude, as wages increase by around 2% for each supervised employee.
The increase in wage related to the participation in management is about 20%, but it
can more than double for some migrant groups. In the Latin region, these returns are
low for native men (2% and 13%) compared to migrants, indicating that these factors
make less of a difference for the wage level of natives. In the German region, migrants
are not necessarily much better rewarded than natives for performing supervision tasks
(SE, EE and SCA men have lower returns to this factors in comparison to native men),
but AF, LA and AS seem to enjoy higher returns from being involved in management.
No particular patterns emerge from examining the coefficients associated to
marital status, business size and the number of years of residence in Switzerland. Native
men earn a relatively large premium for being married (8.6% in the German and 8.9% in
the Latin region) in comparison to migrants (only AF and LA men in the Latin region
do better). Surprisingly, married TMM migrants in the Latin region earn less than non-
married men. Concerning the effect of business size (the number of employees in the firm
where an individual is working), the picture is blurred. Finally the number of years of
residence has a negative effect on the wage of the four migrant groups mentioned earlier.
It is insignificant for many other population groups.
There is a sense that selection effects may play a role in determining wages.
This can be seen by looking at the statistics provided at the bottom of tables 3.6 and
3.7. Coefficient λ (lambda) take on both signs, but are negative most of the time.
Since λ is inversely related to the probability of being employed, a negative coefficient
indicates that (ceteris paribus) workers with higher probabilities of being employed will
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earn higher wages (conditional upon employment).
3.5.2 Wage differentials and discrimination
The decomposition of wage differentials is presented in table 3.8. The predicted
wage of the reference group (Prediction 1) and of the migrant group j (Prediction 2) are
first reported. The differential is then decomposed in three parts related to endowments,
coefficients (discrimination) and interaction (selectivity). This is first done for individ-
uals living in the German region, and below for those living in the Latin region. At
the bottom of those tables, wage differentials and their unexplained part are compared
across regions in order to observe whether results support the research hypothesis.
Predicted wages are significant for all groups. In table 3.9 predictions are expo-
nentiated and compared to the observed wage in Swiss francs (see descriptive statistics
in table 3.5). Predictions are in general close to the observed wage, supporting the hy-
pothesis that the specification of the model is good. Discrepancies are largest in small
samples, notably AF men in the German region, or AS and SCA migrants in the Latin
region.
For most groups, the wage differential in comparison to the reference group is
significant too. For LA and AS men in the German region and SCA migrants in the
Latin region, the wage differentials as well as the three components are insignificant,
which may be explained by the smaller size of the samples and the use of the two-step
estimator.
The first part of the wage differential decomposition (endowments) is generally
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positive and significant. This indicates that differences in individual characteristics con-
tribute to increasing the migrant wage gap. Western European men are the only group
that is on average better endowed than natives. In comparison to the endowments com-
ponent, the selectivity component has a minor impact on wage differentials. For Western
migrants, the sign is in line with that of the estimated wage differentials. However, for
non-Western groups that have a larger λ in tables 3.6 and 3.7, the result is reversed,
and the effect is negative. In relation to the interpretation of λ (i.e., that workers with
higher probabilities of being employed will earn higher wages), this may be interpreted
as an indication that the polarization of income is more pronounced in these popula-
tion groups in comparison to natives. The fact that the unemployment rate is higher
among non-Western migrants with low qualifications supports this interpretation. On
the contrary, if individuals with a high probability of being employed were not to earn
comparatively higher wages, selectivity effects would be insignificant and the estimated
average wage differential in comparison to natives would actually increase.
Results in relation to the second component of the decomposition (the un-
explained wage differential) also provide an interesting insight. Indeed, whereas UDj
always have the sign of the wage differential and most of them are positive in the Ger-
man region, UDj are sometimes of the opposite sign and not significantly different from
zero in the Latin region (except for WE and LA men). A simple interpretation of this
result would imply that returns to factors are overall the same for natives and migrants
in the Latin region, i.e., that there is no significant wage discrimination at work against
migrants in this region.
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Table 2.10 displays the equivalent in monetary terms (in CHF) of gains/losses
in the annual predicted wage caused by differences in returns to factors, as estimated
in tables 3.6 and 3.7. This effect varies from +1’302 (LA men in the Latin region) to
-16’041 (AF men in the German region).
Wage decompositions are sensitive to a series of factors. However, results not
displayed here show that patterns described above remain valid even if changes are
brought to (i) the specification of the model (ii) the estimator as well as (iii) the ref-
erence group.19 First, given the limitations of the SLFS, the specification of the model
cannot be changed much. Previous studies based on the same dataset (Golder and
Straubhaar, 1999; de Coulon, 2003) have set the parameters for estimating an earnings
equation. Taking out the squared terms or the sector dummies or adding further vari-
ables (the number of hours worked that may be endegenous) does not change the results
much. Secondly, opting for the two-step instead of the maximum-likelihood estimator
yields qualitatively similar results. The two-step estimator tends to provide less signifi-
cant coefficients when estimating returns to factors. As a consequence, predicted wages
are less accurate, generally overestimated, and wage differentials much larger. It is also
more difficult to interpret the results in real terms as exponentiated predictions and wage
decomposition components are too large. However, although unexplained wage differ-
entials grow in both regions and become significant in the Latin region, they remain
much higher in the German region. Finally, if the Swiss labor market is assumed ho-
mogeneous for natives across regions, returns to factors should be sufficiently similar to
19Results discussed but not reported here are available upon demand.
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enable the use of one wage structure (e.g., natives in the German region) as the reference
to compute UDj . Implementing this approach increases UDj in the Latin region such
that UDjg < UDjl for some groups. However, as shown in the next section, although
such variations diminish the estimated effect of host society culture on migrant wage
discrimination, they do not jeopardize the identification of a host society culture effect.
3.5.3 The host society culture effect
As mentioned in the section on methodology, UDWij is defined as the unex-
plained part of the wage differential of migrant i belonging to ethnic group j compared
to the reference group. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show spatial representations of UDWij as a
function of the distance to the language border. In the former, UDWij are computed
using the wage structure of natives living in the region as the reference, whereas the wage
structure of natives living in the German region is used in the latter. Both graphs in
figure 3.3 show there is a structural break on the Roestigraben, indicating that migrants
are more discriminated in the German region. The only exceptions are LA men.20 When
one same group of reference (i.e., natives in the German region) is used in figure 3.4, the
structural break becomes smoother, but does not disappear.
The concern that differences in distance to the language border or factors so
far omitted in the analysis might affect UDWij across regions are more specifically ad-
dressed by estimating equation 3.9. Mirroring figures 3.3 and 3.4, tables 3.11 and 3.12
present the results of the regression discontinuity design approach using UDWij mea-
20UDWij for LA and AS men in the German and SCA migrants in the Latin region were computed
based on coefficients estimated using the two-step estimator. As is made visible by the larger 95%
confidence interval in the graphs, the variance of UDWij is higher for these population groups.
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sured in reference to both reference groups. In the upper panels, the host society culture
effect is estimated using all observations. In order to address the concern that unob-
servable factors might become more important with a growing distance to the language
border, the host society culture effect is estimated again in the lower panels using only
observations located in bilingual cantons adjacent to the language border.
In this setting, host society culture is confirmed to have a significant causal
role in determining the level of wage discrimination endured by migrants. Leaving LA,
AS and SCA migrants aside in table 3.11, coefficients related to Pc are all negative and
significant, most strongly for AF men (-16’527 francs). Non-Western migrants suffer
more from the inward-looking culture prevailing in the German region than Western
migrants (-9558 for NW, -5’576 for WE, -8’121 for SE). Interestingly, table 3.12 shows
that the host society culture effect for Western European becomes insignificant when
one single wage structure is used as reference to compute UDWij in both regions. This
reveals the results are sensitive to the reference group that is used. It also hints to the
fact that WE are not more discriminated in the German region, which is consistent with
the fact that they are not perceived as a threat anymore in the political debate. The
picture for other migrants, however, does not change. The magnitude of the host society
culture decreases but remains negative, substantial and significant for most groups. For
non-Western migrants host society effect still represents a loss of 4’205 francs in annual
income.
This effect remains significant for most groups even after the sample is limited
to individuals living in bilingual cantons (7’518 for non-Western migrants), in line with
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the intuition conveyed by the spatial representations of UDWij that there is a structural
break occurring at the language border. Although the break in the economic outcome
(migrant wage discrimination) is less pronounced than the one observed when exam-
ining political preferences on issues related to migration, asylum and naturalization of
foreigners, both are consistent. This supports the idea that culture, by shaping prior
beliefs and political preferences, does influence economic outcomes. Even if emotional
impulses inherent to political issues may be tempered by rational considerations when
actors move from a context where they can express their opinion freely and anonymously
(democratic votes) to a context where they are bound by profit-maximizing constraints
(labor market), host society culture can still influence economic outcomes, and affect
the level of wage discrimination endured by migrants. In a situation where economic
actors would be perfectly rational, wage discrimination would not exist and it would
be impossible to observe systematic differences in migrant wage discrimination across
different cultural regions of the same labor market.
There is less support for the hypothesis that discrimination increases/decreases
with distance to the language border, i.e., that the cultural border is permeable in
relation to this issue. Many coefficients for Dc (split into two components, distlatin and
distgerman) are insignificant, mostly when using the same reference group.
In table 3.11, the coefficient associated with policies to fight xenophobia is pos-
itive in the regression pooling all observation, revealing that individuals living in cantons
pursuing active policies actually have smaller unexplained wage losses (-2’088 francs).
When using the same reference wage structure, this effect is slightly stronger (-2’412). In
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regressions limited to individuals living in bilingual cantons, it is mostly negative when it
is significant, but it is never significant in regressions on NW and NE migrants. Policies
to fight xenophobia thus appear to reduce migrant wage discrimination, but more so for
Western than non-Western migrants.
In the regression pooling several groups or all migrants, skin color interestingly
has the expected positive and significant effect, confirming that individuals originating
from darker skin population groups are more discriminated in the labor market. As the
skin color scale goes form 1 to 8, the effect of belonging to a population group of dark
skin color (AF has skin color equal to 7 out of 8) and coefficients associated to this
variable vary between 401 and 3661, it appears that skin color can have a large effect on
the unexplained part of the wage differential, and significantly reduce the annual wage.
According to these results, migrants of dark skin color working in the German region are
likely to endure the highest degree of wage discrimination on the Swiss labor market.
F-tests allow rejecting the null hypothesis that all coefficients are equal to zero
with a 1% level of confidence, with the exception of some regression run on LA, AS
and SCA men. Those groups are those where the host culture coefficient effect is not
significant or those for which the dependent variable was predicted using the two-step
estimator. Other results are robust to the F-test.
Before turning to the conclusion, it is worth mentioning that alternative meth-
ods could be used to identify regional differences in the level of migrant wage discrimina-
tion and the existence of a host society culture effect. Propensity score matching could
notably be used to compare the wage of migrants and natives and estimate the effect of
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being “treated” as a native. Such an approach does not focus on differences in returns
to factors, but rather on matching migrants and natives sharing common characteristics.
Although it is not the purpose of this study to present in details results obtained based
on the propensity score matching approach, it should be noted that both approaches
yield similar results. Using determinants of wage as matching factors,21 the effect of be-
ing treated as a native makes a difference that is larger in the German region compared
to the same effect in the Latin region of the Swiss labor market. As an example, and
according to this alternative way of approximating the host society culture effect, the
effect of being treated as a native makes a statistically significant difference that is larger
in the German region by 6’127 and 4’325 francs for NW and NE migrants respectively.
When using nearest neighbor as a matching algorithm instead of local linear regression,
the difference is of 9’486 and 1’999 francs of the same groups. These numbers are of
course different, but they are comparable to the estimates of the host society culture
effect presented in detail in this study.
3.6 Discussion
This chapter investigates whether host society cultures do affect migrant wage
discrimination, i.e., whether migrant wage discrimination is more intense in host societies
where culture is more inward-looking. The empirical results obtained using Swiss data
seem to support the hypothesis that there a link between the fact that (i) political
preferences on issues related to migration, asylum and naturalization of foreigners are
21The determinants of wage are the same as those used earlier, i.e., those in vector X of equation 3.1.
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markedly more conservative in the German region, and (ii) that average wage differences
between migrants and natives are larger in the German region. In other words, the
degree of openness of the culture prevailing in the host society does affect the level of
wage discrimination endured by migrants.
Comparing the returns to factors of migrants and natives leads to several in-
teresting findings. It first appears that Western and Southern European migrants have
returns that are closer to those of natives, than non-Western migrants. As an exam-
ple, whereas the earnings of the former are more strongly and positively influenced by
age, the latter are best rewarded for their experience on the job. Secondly, predicted
wage differentials between natives and migrants are larger in the German region. The
same is true for the unexplained component of the wage differential, especially for mi-
grants from Turkey, the Mideast and the Maghreb. If discrimination were to disappear
and returns to factors equalize with natives, migrants would make larger gains in the
German region. The mapping of unexplained wage differentials against distance to the
cultural border shows there is a structural break occurring on the Roestigraben. The
final step establishes the significance of the causal link between the more inward-looking
host society culture prevailing in the German region and the higher level of wage discrim-
ination endured by migrants in that region. While the effect of active cantonal policy to
fight against xenophobia is sometimes uncertain, darker skin color strongly affects the
intensity of wage discrimination.
The evidence provided in this chapter is interesting in relation to two ongoing
debates. First, in the context of the debate on the rationality of economic actors, this
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study supports the notion that culture, by shaping prior beliefs and political preferences,
does influence economic outcomes. Even if emotional impulses inherent to political issues
may be somewhat tempered by rational considerations when actors move from a context
where they can express their opinion freely and anonymously (democratic votes) to a
context where they are bound by profit-maximizing constraints (labor market), host
society culture keeps influencing economic outcomes. In a situation where economic
actors are perfectly rational, wage discrimination would not exist and and it would
be impossible to observe systematic differences in migrant wage discrimination across
different cultural regions of the same labor market.
Secondly, in the context of the current migration debate in Switzerland, much
emphasis is often put on how different migrants are from Swiss citizens. It is widely ac-
cepted that migrants need to go through a cultural integration process before they can be
naturalized and become an integral part of the Swiss people. Much less attention is paid
to the conditions under which this process is supposed to occur. If cultural integration of
migrants is hampered by economic discrimination exerted by natives, then the evidence
provided in this chapter would partly explain why the integration of migrants seems to
be more problematic in the German region of Switzerland, where a more inward-looking
culture, and a higher degree of wage discrimination prevail. Higher levels of wage dis-
crimination do matter for cultural integration not only because they negatively affect the
possibility to lessen the emotional distance existing between a migrant and the culture
of a society that is originally not her own. It also matters because higher levels of wage
discrimination lower the earnings of migrants, thus impacting on their consumption pat-
191
terns (buying clothes, movies, books, etc.) and investment decisions, notably decisions
concerning the education of their children. More generally, wage discrimination limits
the economic capacity of migrants to imitate the behaviors of natives as well as their
access to the culture of the host society.
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Table 3.3: Sample
Region of origin Men Women
Natives 69 857 89 798
Immigrants 72 389 76 302
Of which 1st generation 2nd generation
Men Women Men Women
WE 18101 21560 2780 3308
SE 19821 17666 8586 7925
EE 12751 14477 760 743
AF 1436 1551 60 59
TMM 3367 2622 691 507
LA 1385 2953 76 61
AS 737 1590 44 64
SCA 1589 1020 57 43
Source: Swiss Labor Force Survey (2003-2008).
Table 3.4: Average full time wages (in CHF 000)
Latin German
N Wage ∆ N Wage ∆ ∆∆
Natives 9,868 95.19 0 23,167 98.11 0 0
WE 3,352 123.33 -28.14 6,699 118.23 -20.12 -8.02
SE 6,265 75.98 19.21 4,768 74.02 24.09 -4.88
EE 1,498 66.71 28.48 5,651 68.86 29.25 -0.77
AF 464 80.83 14.36 293 84.99 13.12 1.24
TMM 648 81.72 13.47 1,183 67.82 30.29 -16.82
LA 434 87.58 7.61 355 101.47 -3.36 10.97
AS 142 98.14 -2.95 250 85.89 12.22 -15.17
SCA 184 105.66 -10.47 826 74.35 23.76 -34.23
Source: SLFS. Sample: only men aged 16-65 with full time job.
194
Table 3.5: Descriptive statistics
Natives WE SE EE AF TMM LA AS SCA
Men in the German region
wage (mean) 93320 111960 73153 67311 76851 64477 92504 80168 71039
wage (median) 78000 86450 65000 59032 48100 54000 63700 60000 54600
yearsed 13.62 15.55 10.06 11.38 12.81 11.21 14.27 13.91 12.06
age 42.24 42.25 44.38 36.2 37.01 36.42 37.32 39.55 37.99
married 0.54 0.59 0.78 0.78 0.75 0.81 0.66 0.62 0.81
experience 22.09 17.51 22.88 13.53 11.4 11.88 12.87 14.32 12.47
supervision 3.06 3.68 1.81 1.71 2.45 1.73 2.48 1.79 1.94
management 0.36 0.35 0.21 0.13 0.2 0.21 0.26 0.21 0.21
hours 42.35 41.47 41.83 41.84 39.7 41.66 40.12 40.23 41.01
business size 10.3 11.48 11.28 11.16 11.3 10.97 11.38 11.63 11.41
residence 0 11.9 22.53 13.12 8.07 13.19 8.95 10.88 12.41
Men in the Latin region
wage (mean) 89547 116677 74186 64315 71485 77034 79451 89188 97080
wage (median) 75000 83200 61483 53963 50110 52144 58480 62932 52650
yearsed 13.56 15.23 10.93 11.87 13.07 13.14 13.71 14.62 13.21
age 42.4 42.71 43.34 36.96 38.8 40.65 37.05 37.84 39.63
married 0.56 0.62 0.74 0.75 0.67 0.78 0.59 0.64 0.73
experience 21.42 17.64 21.12 13.72 11.79 14.22 12.19 14.41 12.61
supervision 3.14 3.81 2.15 1.49 2.38 2.25 2.12 2.36 2.92
management 0.45 0.45 0.31 0.18 0.22 0.33 0.24 0.34 0.41
hours 41.64 41.39 41.59 41.55 39.37 40.97 39.27 40.08 40.46
business size 9.8 10.61 10.19 10.43 11.16 10.5 10.83 10.24 10.9
residence 0 12.79 19.98 12.32 11.09 11.96 10.32 10.04 11.74
Source: SLFS. Sample: all wage-earning men aged 16-65.
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Appendix
Figure 3.5: The Roestigraben (illustrated by Igor Kravarik)
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Figure 3.6: The Roestigraben (illustrated by Mix et Remix)
ghost
ghost
Conclusion
This research partly confirms results of previous studies and makes several con-
tributions to the literature on migrant integration. It is also subject to some limitations
and opens perspectives for future research.
Main results22
The present thesis examines the cultural and economic integration of migrants
in Switzerland in order to better understand how they influence each other and the
extent to which the context in which these processes occur matters. More specifically,
the first chapter focuses on the cultural integration of migrants from the first generation
to the second. Chapters 2 and 3 look at how the “cultural distance”23 of migrants to
the natives is influenced by economic discrimination (and vice versa) and whether host
society culture has an effect on economic discrimination. The combined investigation of
these issues is important to improve the understanding of the conditions under which
migrant integration can be successful. Indeed, especially in times when the integration
of migrants is rising on the political agenda, it is important to understand the factors
influencing it and the context in which it is occurring.
22More detailed results can be found in the three individual chapter conclusions.
23See the general introduction for comments about the limitations of this concept.
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The findings of the first chapter are in line with those of previous studies,24
confirming that cultural integration is at work across all migrant groups,25 although at
different paces. They also confirm the intuition that attitudes may change faster than
actual behaviors, notably in relation to gender issues, and that certain migrant groups
tend to preserve more traditional household structures than natives, especially those
with low intermarriage rates.
The second chapter shows that there is a correlation at the aggregate level be-
tween “cultural distance” and economic discrimination, i.e., , communities that are the
most discriminated against are also more culturally distant. The specificity of Muslim
communities, which come under scrutiny, relies more in the stronger economic discrimi-
nation they face than in the “cultural distance” separating them from natives.
At the individual level, the relationship between “cultural distance” and eco-
nomic discrimination is endogenous. On the one hand, migrants who don’t adopt the
language of the host country or remain in endogamous families with limited contacts to
Swiss society will have a more difficult time competing in the domestic labour market; on
the other hand, economic discrimination deprives migrants from working and interacting
with the natives in their professional life and from spending their money like and/or with
natives during their spare time. These two phenomena tend to reinforce each. However,
cross-section evidence shows that the barriers migrants face in the labour market have
an effect on their private life that dominates the effect their cultural inclinations have on
24Notably those of the Swiss National Science Foundation research programme on migration and
intercultural relations, see Wicker et. al (2003).
25See the last section of the introduction of this thesis for the definition and description of the eight
migrant groups examined throughout the three chapters.
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their odds of getting a job. Hence, the relationship between economic discrimination and
“cultural distance” is asymmetric, the former dominating the latter. Furthermore, this
asymmetry is more acute for second-generation compared to first-generation migrants.
The third chapter shifts the focus in order to investigate the role of host society
for the integration of migrants. It brings to light that migrant wage discrimination is
influenced by host society culture, i.e., in a society that is less migrant-friendly, migrants
will face more intense discrimination in the labour market. In Switzerland, returns to
factors of wage-earning migrants are lower compared to natives in general, but more so
in the German region. An analysis of unexplained wage differentials also support the
hypothesis that wage discrimination is more pronounced in the German region. Finally,
results of the regression discontinuity design approach confirm that host society culture
is a significant determinant of migrant wage discrimination.
These main results strengthen the case for several policy recommendations
made in previous sociological and demographical studies concerning the support that
should be brought to specific groups including women, second-generation migrants or to
specific policies like discrimination prevention and the use of legal incentives as a tool
to promote cultural integration.
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Contributions
The findings of the three chapters sketch a multi-dimensional and complex
picture of the integration process of migrants, involving not only the migrants, but also
the natives. Beyond the description and analysis of the cultural and economic integration
of migrants in Switzerland, this exploratory study makes two main contributions to
the literature on migrant integration. First, by looking at the interaction between the
economic and cultural dimensions of integration, it highlights the importance or primacy
of economic factors over cultural factors in the integration process of migrants, i.e., the
fact that economic discrimination is a more important obstacle to the integration of
migrants than cultural differences. Secondly, by examining the influence of the context,
it shows that market interactions are not immune to tensions developing in the society
at large, i.e., that host society culture may affect migrant wage discrimination, thereby
hindering their integration.
As a corollary, this “systemic” approach stresses the weaknesses of simple dis-
courses disregarding the interplay between the various dimensions and actors of migrant
integration. In light of the findings of this research, the assertion of populist right wing
parties that cultural differences are the main determinant of differences in outcomes
between migrants and natives is shown to be misleading; and the mainstream economic
approach to migrant integration, which focuses narrowly on human capital factors and
ignores discrimination, appears inadequate to address the complexity of social interac-
tions that foster or hinder the integration of migrants. Cultural factors certainly play
a secondary role to economic factors, but the integration of migrants is not only about
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migrants, it is also about the natives and the host society at large.
Perspectives for future research
The exploratory nature of this thesis leaves certain perspectives open for future
research. The dynamic interaction between the various dimensions of migrant integration
deserve to be studied further, especially by researchers who have the opportunity to
design their own qualitative studies or who have access to suited longitudinal data.
Another interesting area of research would be to further compare policy im-
plementation in federal countries or across countries. Like Switzerland, many developed
countries face growing migration flows and integration issues that are exploited by pop-
ulist parties, which represents an additional threat to the welfare state. The questions in-
vestigated in this thesis are therefore certainly relevant beyond the Swiss case. However,
although some of these findings may be replicated in other national contexts, compar-
ing integration of migrants across countries is very difficult because of specific historical
and political circumstances, differences in the institutional settings, differences in how
data is collected, etc. Although comparing policies and their outcomes across countries
is challenging because national contexts vary greatly, comparisons across entities of a
federal state are more readily feasible.
In relation to the broader debate mentioned in the introduction, it would also
be interesting to observe how the intensive media coverage of migration and integration
issues and their exploitation by the populist right wing affect tax preferences of natives,
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and the extent to which this represents a threat to the future of the welfare state.
Finally, for the study of any complex societal issues like those just mentioned,
it is relevant and necessary to combine approaches from various social sciences, even
if it is complicated from a methodological point of view. The shortcomings of one-
dimensional discourses about migrant integration reassert the relevance of looking at
complex issues from different perspectives. Interdisciplinarity is especially important for
researchers in the economic discipline, which has come under criticism for its systematic
use of reductionist assumptions and excessive mathematical formalism, practices which
strengthen the temptation towards the self-referential.
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